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Defamation, Public Officialdom and the
Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria-A Proposal for
Revivification: Two Decades After New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan
DAVID ELDER*
INTRODUCTION

N the two decades since the pivotal decision of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan' the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the realm
of defamation law has vociferously and excruciatingly debated the
vast array of attitudinal perspectives of the Court's Justices and of
legal scholars on the appropriate accommodation of the competing states' interests-in protecting individual reputation and ensuring a modicum of responsibility in dissemination of news-and
the first amendment interest in providing sufficient breathing
space to eliminate the spectre of self-censorship. A short two years
into this twenty-year debate, a debate engendered by the constitutional innovations of this decision, 2 the Court, in Rosenblatt v.
Baer,3 has endeavored to give general guidelines for determining
what types of governmental employees qualify as "public officials"
and thus invoke the stringent, press-protective requirements of
New York Times. The general criteria of this decision, with the
footnote qualifications imposed on them by the Court, have often,
however, been grossly misinterpreted, inattentively ignored, or
perfunctorily applied. The net result has been that all types of
* Professor of Law, The Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. J.D., St. Louis University, 1972; L.L.M., Columbia University, 1973.

1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Recent decisions have noted the "radical changes" generated by New York Times and
its progeny in an area "never noted for its clarity." Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill,
281 Ark. 25, 660 S.W.2d 933, 937 (1983); De Carvalho v. de Silva, 414 A.2d 806, 811
(R.I. 1980) (New York Times "introduced an innovative and unprecedented constitutional
gloss" on the common law of defamation); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 371, 419 (1969) (New York Times and its progeny "radically modified the
traditional law of libel").

3. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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lower echelon governmental employees have been generally subsumed4 under the rigorous New York Times standards, threshold
requisites which one state court has recently denominated a "virtually impermeable envelope of protection"5 for the media in suits
brought by public persons. This looseness of analysis in the application of the Rosenblatt criteria, however, is at odds with not only
the letter and spirit of the decision itself but also with the decided,
pro-reputation orientation and realignment of the Court in the
last decade, the decade following Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.6 The
Rosenblatt standards necessitate reexamination, both in the context of the Supreme Court's own increasingly plaintiff-oriented
perspective in defamation cases generally (particularly with respect to its elucidation of "public figure" status) and in light of
Chief Justice Burger's highly significant intimation in footnote
eight of Hutchinson v. Proxmire that "public official" does not encompass "all public employees."' 7 Section I of this Article will delineate in a tripartite analysis the Court's own conceptual framework for evaluating defamation cases and the lessons deducible
therefrom. Section II will provide an in-depth analysis of state and
federal decisional law and its interpretation and application of the
"public official" concept. That Section will also propose a new
evaluative framework for delineating and utilizing the Rosenblatt
critetia, a framework infused with the pro-reputation perspective
of the Court over the past decade. The Article will conclude with
a calculated projection for the Court's handling of defamation
cases in the future.
4. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1376-77 (1975), where the author notes
that, as a result of the courts' ignorance of or disregard of the Rosenblatt "footnote thirteen" limitation, "[t]he distinction drawn between scrutiny of the position occupied and
scrutiny occasioned by the particular charges in controversy has been all but ignored." See
also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 636 (1978) (" '[P]ublic official' now embraces
virtually all persons affiliated with the government, such as most ordinary civil servants,
including public school teachers and policemen"). One noted commentator has even interpreted Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), itself as intended to have this effect. Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution, 75 MicH. L. REv. 43, 46 (1976).
5.

Gulf Publishing Co. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 695 (Miss. 1983).

6.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

7.

Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979).
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DEFAMING PUBLIC OFFICIALS

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE "STATUS"/"SUBJECT

MATTER"

DICHOTOMY-A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

A.

The "Public Official" Standard

In the momentous 1964 decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 the Supreme Court, writing on a "clean slate," 9 concluded
that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations" 10 and interposed for the first time
stringent limitations on first amendment rights in civil libel suits
by "public officials" against critics of their "official conduct."
Placing substantial reliance on the thoroughly discredited Sedition
Act of 1798 and the "broad consensus" that that act had been
invalidated in "the court of history,""' the Court adopted the
Madisonian view that "free public discussion of the stewardship of
public officials [is] a fundamental principle of the American form of
government. ' 1 2 Concluding that this notion of popular sovereignty could not withstand the endemic self-censorship that would
result from the reputation-protective common law of civil libel"
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Three members of the Court concurred on absolute first
amendment grounds. Id. at 293 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 304-05
(Goldberg, J., with Douglas, J., concurring). Note, however, that Justice Goldberg's absolutism did not extend to "private conduct of a public official or private citizen.. . . Purely
private defamation has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society." Liability for such "private defamation" does not run afoul of the "freedom of public speech"
guaranteed by the first amendment. Id. at 301-02 (dicta). The decision to reverse as a matter of law was thus unanimous, albeit with shadings of opinion on the ambit of the first
amendment Of coturse, the underlying assumption was that, if New York Times did not apply
to the facts of the case, the plaintiff was relegated to the milieu of strict liability and the
circumscribed common law qualified privileges, privileges which one author has depicted as
"grudgingly granted and narrowly construed." Cohen, A New Niche for the FaultPrinciple:A
Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege In Libel Cases, 18 UCLA L. REv. 371, 375 (1970).
9. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 299 (Goldberg, J., with Douglas, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 269.
11. Id. at 276.
12. Id. at 275 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, adopted a
qualified version of Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that "[a]ll constitutional authority" resided in the body public, "the governors." Meiklejohn, The First Amendment isan Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 253-54. Justice Brennan seems to have tacitly conceded the influence of Meiklejohn on his authorship of the New York Times and Garrison decisions. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV.L.
REv. 1, 18-20 (1965).
13. Unless the defendant could prove the truth of the ad in "all" its "particulars," the
plaintiff could get "presumed" general damages for this published matter, deemed libelous
per se under Alabama law, without any evidence that pecuniary loss had resulted therefrom. 376 U.S. at 267. Indeed, there was no testimony that anyone "actually believed" the
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under which "fear of damage awards" may be "markedly more
inhibiting" than fear of criminal prosecution, 14 the Court decided
to eliminate the "pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those
who would give voice to public criticism, an atmosphere in which
First Amendment freedoms cannot survive." 15 To eliminate this
chilling atmosphere, the Court promulgated a constitutional manmatters purportedly relating to Sullivan. Id. at 260. Justice Black, himself a native Alabamian, stated that "[v]iewed realistically . . Sullivan's political, social, and financial prestige
ha[d] likely been enhanced" by the advertisement. Id. at 294 (Black, J., with Douglas, J.,
concurring). For an extensive analysis of the racial background and punitive nature of the
libel verdict, see Pierce, The Anatomy of an HistoricDecision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965). Although such factors were clearly evidenced in the background
of the decision, it is necessary to reaffirm that the application of the common law rules
therein was not a sham, but reflected the general tenor of the common law of defamation
existent in most states at that time. See Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1,6 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 195-97. However, it is also
necessary to keep in mind that the power relationships in evidence in the worst case scenario of New York Times are probably atypical. As one author has noted, the press "wields
virtually limitless power against the individual," and the more common situation involves
the media "ganging up" on the individual. Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality:An Essay On
Legal Regulation of Public Communication, 46 Tx. L. REv. 650, 653-54 (1976). The Supreme
Court's adoption of a negligence standard in private versus media defendant cases, its narrowing of the sphere of the public statuses, and its loosening of the rules of discovery in
public person cases, see infra note 154, reflect a sanguine appreciation of the typical power
relationships in an individual versus media encounter and evidence a calculated attempt by
the Court majority to reach a more fundamentally fair accommodation of reputational and
free expression interests. For a further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 40509.
14. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277. The Court noted that the half-million dollar
damage award was one thousand times as high as the Alabama criminal defamation fine
($500 and a maximum of six months in jail), one hundred times as high as the repudiated
Sedition Act of 1798 penalty ($5000 and a maximum of five years imprisonment) and that
no "double jeopardy" rule precluded other awards based upon the same publication. Id. at
273, 277-78. Indeed, another verdict of the same amount had been awarded in the only
other case tried; other pending cases sought a total of two million dollars. Id. at 278 n.18.
Justice Black stated that eleven libel suits against this media defendant-totaling $5.6 million-and five others against CBS-totaling $1.7 million-with state and local officials as
plaintiffs were pending in Alabama. Id. at 295 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 278. Such potential "pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount"
deterred not only false, defamatory speech but also matters that are true, due to the
"doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." Such
a rule "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate." Id. at 279. This selfcensorship assumption has been strongly criticized by some authors who noted that the
press "grew and prospered mightily" despite a pre-New York Times common law legal milieu
substantially more plaintiff-protective than the regime generated by that case. Shapo, supra
note 13, at 656. See also Merin, supra note 2, at 473 (noting that the media are normally
"vast corporations . . . unlikely to be snuffed out by a libel suit").
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date that "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."1 6
The Supreme Court, in its famous footnote twenty-three to
New York Times, declined to answer in detail the questions of "how
far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or
otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not
be included," 17 or to determine the "boundaries of the 'official
conduct'" concept.1 8 The Court explicitly limited its holdings to
16. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (emphasis added). Curiously, the Court in its
adoption of the minority view epitomized by Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 742-43,
98 P. 281, 292 (1908), seems to have ignored the suggestion therein that such privilege
could be lost by common law "malice" or negligence. As is suggested by the quoted language, the near universal view is that the burden of proof on the "actual malice" issue is
on the plaintiff in public person cases. See infra notes 420-22. In addition, the Supreme
Court, possibly inadvertently, opined in evaluating the evidence in the case under the "actual malice" standard that that evidence "lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands." 376 U.S. at 285-86. This aside has been transformed into a
"clear and convincing" evidence requirement. It was first formally restated as "clear and
convincing" proof in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971), and has been
repeatedly reaffirmed in subsequent cases.
17. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. The Court intimated obliquely several times
in the opinion that the first amendment interest might be broader than merely discussion
of "public officials" and their "official conduct" and might encompass discussion of "public
issues." Id. at 270, 271, 281-82 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P.
281, 285 (1908) (the privilege "'includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.' ")). See also id. at 288 (citing Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.,
142 Conn. 605, 615-16, 116 A.2d 440, 445 (1955) (comments by a candidate for mayor on

radio concerning the financial instability of the plaintiff company and the possibility of lost
employment for the voting public is a "matter of public interest" to which the minority
rule of "fair comment" applied)); id. at 280 n.20 (citing Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp.,
103 N.H. 426, 438-40, 174 A.2d 825, 833 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1962) (articles
defaming plaintiff, who was under contract with the city and was accused of fraudulently
substituting inferior shrubbery, were privileged, but that the privilege was abused)). The
broader "public issue" orientation of the latter decisions was temporarily implicitly disavowed in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 (1966), particularly its "footnote thirteen"
rejection of the "catches the public's interest"/newsworthiness notion as sufficient to cause
application of New York Times. Although such "public issue" orientation was revived and
reached its zenith in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29
(1971), discussed infra text accompanying notes 105-26, it never was the view of a Court
majority in libel cases and has been decisively rejected by the Supreme Court in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and its progeny. See infra text accompanying
notes 127-81.
18. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
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twin determinations that the claimant therein, an elected city
commissioner of public affairs, was "clearly" a "public official""9
and that the allegations of malfeasance involved, if regarding the
unidentified official at all, 20 undoubtedly related to his "official
conduct. ' 21 An examination of the precedents relied upon by the

Court, however, provides additional guidance concerning the
scope of the "public official" bailiwick. Clearly, the Court's juxtaposition of contempt decisions involving the judiciary (" '. . . men
of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate' -1)22 in its animad-

version of "other government officials" 23 (like Sullivan), reflects
19. Id.
20. Id. The Court later held, as an alternative to its conclusion that the "actual malice" standard had not been met as a matter of law, id. at 285-88, that the allegedly libelous
remarks were not "of and concerning" Sullivan-either by name or office-and were
based on the "bare fact" of his "official responsibility" for the actions of the police as
commissioner of public affairs. Id. at 288-89. Such transmutation of "impersonal" "criticism of government" into libel of its constituent officials was constitutionally insufficient.
Id. at 292. It is not totally clear from the opinion whether such general criticism of government in the abstract was absolutely privileged or afforded only the New York Times protection. See the Court's reference to the "good faith critic of government," id. at 292. The
entire posture of the case does, however, bespeak an absolute immunity from defamation
liability for the critic of government, rather than the New York Times qualified privilege for
the critic of governors defeasible upon proof of "actual malice." Rosenblatt v. Baer similarly
rejected the "spectre of prosecution for libel on government, which the Constitution does
not tolerate in any form." This is the universal view of the case law. See D. ELDER, KENTUCKY TORT LAW: DEFAMATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 354-56 (1983); L. TRIBE, supra
note 4, at 632. Note, however, that the recent California Supreme Court decision of City
of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 645 P.2d 137, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1982), holding
that a malicious prosecution action brought by a city against a prior unsuccessful litigant
violated the absolute constitutional right of petition, was remanded to the California Supreme Court for clarificiation of whether its decision was on "federal or state constitutional
grounds, or both." City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 103 S. Ct. 712, 712 (1983). On remand,
the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior opinion "in its entirety," concluding that
the federal and state constitutional grounds used previously were dual bases for its decision, and stated that the California constitution was an "independent ground" of its decision. City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 33 Cal. 3d 727, 727-28, 661 P.2d 1072, 1073, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 918-19 (1983). This legal scenario suggests that the absolute immunity for criticism of government, at least in the malicious prosecution context, is not totally free from
doubt. Note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts has refrained from taking a position on
the issue. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §561, comment d, caveat 2, (1977).
21. On the "official conduct" component of the "public official" standard, see infra
notes 341-404 and accompanying text.
22. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376
(1947) (an elected layman judge); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (elected
judges of the superior court)). The status of judges as "public officials" and criticism of
them as lying at the "core" of the first amendment was recently reaffirmed in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978).
23. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273. The Court rejected the contention that factual
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the Court's assumption that members of the judiciary would be
similarly covered by the panoply of the "public official" designation. Additional insight is likewise provided by the decisions relied

on by the Court in adopting the minority variant of "fair comment"2 as the framework for its constitutional construct and by
the Court's makeweight analogy to the decisions affording absolute immunity as defendants to federal executive officials with substantial authority.2 5 A careful analysis of these decisions discloses
that none of them involved lower echelon garden-variety public
employees but included only individuals with positions of substantial actual or potential influence in the political arena (candidates
for public office, 28 a United States congressman,2 7 appointed elecerror or injury to official reputation or the cumulative effect of both was sufficient to terminate the first amendment privilege. Id. It specifically noted that "[c]riticism of their official
conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism
and hence diminishes their official reputations." Id.
24. See generally Eaton, supra note 4, at 1362-63. In recently reaffirming the judicial
duty of "independent examination" of "actual malice" determinations by factfinders, the
Supreme Court noted that the federal "public official" standard of "actual malice" had its
"counterpart" in state law cases preceding New York Times and referenced the list thereof in
footnote 20 of the New York Times opinion. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S.Ct.
1949, 1960 & n.18 (1984). This reference reinforces the view advanced herein, that such
common law minority view precedents are helpful in fathoming the types of public officials
covered by the umbrella of New York Times. Under this common law minority view the
media defendant was accorded a privilege even where the underlying facts were untrue. By
adopting this Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) minority variant, the
Court tacitly rejected the view of the leading majority decision of Post Publishing Co. v.
Hallam, 59 F. 530, 541 (6th Cir. 1893), with its rationale that adoption of a contrary rule
would deter "honorable and worthy men" from politics. A fervent plea for revitalization of
the latter policy has recently been made by L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 271-72
(1978). For a further discussion, see infra note 251 and text accompanying note 411.
25. The Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer disaffiliated the concept of the "public
official" status of plaintiffs from the vagaries of the immunity of such officials as defendants. See infra note 49. Such a slight subsequent change in focus regarding the underlying
rationale does not render the Supreme Court absolute immunity decisions any less useful as
probative evidence of the types of "public officials" the Court had in mind at the time of
issuance of New York Times.
26. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 273-74, 312 P.2d 150, 151-52
(1957) (plaintiffs were mayoral and city council candidates in Phoenix charged with the
intention of relaxing vice controls if elected); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn.
226, 229, 203 N.W. 974, 975 (1925) (the nature of the office sought was unidentified). It
was also extended to a candidate-incumbent for public office. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) (attorney general and candidate for reelection who was by
virtue of his office a member of the commission responsible for supervision of the state
school fund; the article related to plaintiff's conduct in "connection with a school fund
transaction"). See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. Another cited decision concluded that
one who had "taken charge" of a statewide campaign to defeat ratification of the electoral
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tion officials at the precinct level),28 members of the judiciary (a
state supreme court justice" and a judge of the court of common
pleas),3 0 high-ranking police and military officers (the deputy superintendent of police of Detroit,3 1 the chief of police of Los Angeles,32 the commanding officer of the Boston Naval Shipyard),33
and federal and state executive officials of significant, policy-making authority (the state road commissioner for West Virginia 4
and the acting director of the federal office of rent stabilization).3
franchise for women stood in the same posture as a candidate for public office: "[A]ny
person who takes charge of an election campaign involving a matter of great public moment. . . stands much in the position of a candidate for public office." Consequently, his
"doings, his associates, the forces back of him, his support financial and otherwise in connection with the campaign, his goings and comings, all of these insofar as they might throw
light upon the nature of the forces that were interesting themselves in such campaign were
matters of legitimate public interest and concern." McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 400,
175 N.W. 878, 880-81 (1920). New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20. Such a non-governmental individual would, of course, be a "public figure" under the Supreme Court's subsequent decisional law. See infra text accompanying notes 63-204.
27. The Court quoted approvingly from a case involving a congressman suing for allegations of anti-Semitism. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72. The court of appeals had
identified the congressman as a "public official," which undoubtedly he was. Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942). See also Schenectady
Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), affd by an equally divided
Court, 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
28. Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 282-83, 126 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1962) (plaintiffs were
the registrar and two judges charged with fraudulently certifying election returns). See New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20.
29. Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 874-75, 191 N.W. 167, 168 (1922) (plaintiff was
charged with "coercing" a railroad having pending cases before the court into hiring a
third party). See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20.
30. Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 185 Kan. 61, 63, 340 P.2d 396, 398 (1959)
(plaintiff was charged with being a "ringleader" in a burglary ring). See New York Times, 376
U.S. at 280 n.20.
31. Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 135, 97 N.W.2d 719, 720 (1959) (plaintiff was
accused of official corruption. "Few offenses known to the litany of prostitution of the
public trust were omitted"). See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20.
32. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1, 2 (1921) (plaintiff was
charged with graft and corruption in a cartoon). See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20.
33. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 594 (1959). This is the companion case to Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 364 (1959). See infra note 35.
34. Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 293-94, 27 S.E.2d 837, 838-39
(1943) (allegation that plaintiff had unnecessarily used an intermediary to purchase a
bridge, increasing thereby the sale price of the bridge). See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280
n.20.
35. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959). This decision extended the absolute
immunity accorded cabinet level executive officials in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498
(1896) (post-master general) to petitioner, the acting director of "an important agency of
government." Barr, 360 U.S. at 574. Note that the fifth member of the 5-4 decision appar-

1984]

DEFAMING PUBLIC OFFICIALS

587

In the same year it decided New York Times, the Court was
asked to review two criminal defamation convictions under the
standards promulgated in that case. In the single case in which an
opinion was issued by the Court, Garrison v. Louisiana,8 the offended "public officials" were eight judges constituting the "entire bench"' 7 of the Criminal District Court of Orleans Parish, to
whom the criminal defendant (the district attorney of the same
parish) 8 had attributed a plethora of allegations of unprofessionalism and worse.3 9 Explicitly adopting the conclusion implicit in
the New York Times progenitor, it held that "libel law . . . civil or
ently would have extended the privilege to "public employees . . . from the least to the
most important." Id. at 577 (Black, J., concurring). justice Brennan, the author of the New
York Times opinion, dissented, concluding that the absolute immunity "unnecessarily deprives the individual citizen of all redress" for reputational injury in the face of the "deeprooted policy of the common law generally to provide redress against defamation." Id. at
586 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Three members of the Court concurred on absolutist
grounds. Id. at 80 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]here is absolutely no place
in this country for the old, discredited English Star Chamber law of seditious criminal libel"), id. at 80-83 (Douglas, J., with Black, J., concurring) ("[I]t is disquieting to know that
one of its [Star Chamber] instruments of destruction is abroad in the land today"-a reference to the permissibility of criminal defamation prosecutions if the "actual malice" standard is met), id. at 88 (Goldberg, J., concurring). On the issue of modern criminal libel law,
see Elder, Kentucky Criminal Libel Law and Public Officials-An HistoricalAnachronism?, 8 N.
Ky. L. REv. 37, 60-72 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Elder, Criminal Libel]. For an analysis of
the checkered history of its seditious libel British predecessor, see Brant, Seditious Libel:
Myth and Reality, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1964). Recent articles have challenged, in elaborate
analyses, the heretofore prevailing view that seditious libel was not deemed violative of
freedom of the press by the founding fathers and have come to conclusions regarding the
unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act paralleling those reached in the New York TimesGarrison duo. See Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rlv. 455, 536
(1983); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. Rav. 91,
125 (1984).
37. State v. Garrison, 244 La. 787, 795, 154 So. 2d 400, 403 (1963), rev'd sub nom.,
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The Court made it quite clear that the case of a
criminal defamation prosecution for the "discrete area of purely private libels," "totally
unrelated to public affairs," was not before it. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72 n.8. For further
discussion of this issue see infra text accompanying notes 341-404. The Court on a few
occasions gave hints of a broader rationale for the Garrisondecision than criticism of "public officials": "Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where
discussion of public affairs is concerned." Id. at 74.
38. Garrison,379 U.S. at 64-65. It seems clear that the Court treated Garrison himself
as a "public official," although it did not explicitly so indicate. The Court did characterize
him as a "public official" in a subsequent case, however. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
39. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 66. See the discussion of the "relevance regarding 'official
conduct'" concept, infra text accompanying notes 341-404.
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criminal. . . must satisfy relevant constitutional standards,"' 4 1 that
the "actual malice"/"calculated falsehood" 41 standard was applicable, and that the state courts had utilized "constitutionally invalid standards" 42 in the criminal defamation case. In the other
criminal libel case decided by the Court in 1964, Moity v. Louisiana,43 reversed per curiam, the criminal defendant was convicted
for imputing to a parish district attorney, undoubtedly a public
official, the illegal incarceration of a prisoner based upon knowingly perjured testimony. 4
In a terse per curiam opinion the following year in the jointlydecided cases of Henry v. Collins and Henry v. Pearson," the Court
tacitly extended the evolving "public official" status to the chief of
police of Clarksdale, Mississippi, and the elected county attor40. Garrison,379 U.S. at 68 n.3.
41. Id. at 74-75. The Court made it eminently clear, however, that "use of calculated
falsehood" is "at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the
orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected." Consequently, such a "knowingly false statement" or one made with "reckless disregard of the
truth" was sans any constitutional safeguard. Id. at 75. If the standard is met, there is
clearly no general constitutional bar to criminal prosecution for defaming individuals. See
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 156 n.1 (1979); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S.
Ct. 1473, 1479 & n.6 (1984) (implied). There may be other constitutional problems of
vagueness, however. See generally Elder, Criminal Libel, supra note 36, at 60-72, and infra
note 47. The New York Times-Garrison treatment of the criminal libel issue clearly calls into
question the continuing precedential value of Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952),
wherein the Court, 5-4, upheld a group defamation law. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTONAL LAW 944 (1983) [hereinafter cited as J. NowAX]. Indeed, at least
two of the dissenters almost omnisciently suggested that a law that could be used to criminally punish an opponent of integration could be similarly used against a proponent of
integration, i.e., the setting of New York Times. Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 274-75 (Black, J.,
dissenting), id. at 304 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
42. The Louisiana criminal defamation law forfeited defendant's qualified privilege if
true or false statements were made with common law malice or without probable cause, i.e.,
were made negligently. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78-79.
43. 379 U.S. 201 (1964), rev'g sub nom. State v. Moity, 245 La. 546, 159 So. 2d 149
(1963).
44. The sheriff was likewise implicated in the wrongdoing. Moity, 245 La. at 550, 159
So. 2d at 150. Although the conviction was apparently based only on the depiction of the
district attorney, other accusations of malfeasance were directed at "various officials" of
the parish, "both elected and appointed." Id. at 564, 159 So. 2d at 155. See also State v.
Cox, 246 La. 748, 756, 167 So. 2d 352, 353 (1964), cited in Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78, and
implicitly disavowed therein, wherein a criminal conviction was based on imputations to the
effect that a sitting judge solicited and received bribes from blacks who wished to avoid
imprisonment. The case was reversed on other grounds.
45. 380 U.S. 356 (1965).

1984]

DEFAMING PUBLIC OFFICIALS

589

ney, 48 respectively, who were charged with participation in a "diabolical plot" to frame the claimant. And in 1966, two years after
New York Times, the Court was specifically confronted with the
"footnote twenty-three" caveat of that case, namely "how far
down into the lower ranks of government employees" the " 'public official' designation would extend." The question was
presented in Rosenblatt v. Baer,'7 a case involving the former 8 ap46. Although not disclosed by the Supreme Court's opinion, an examination of the
state supreme court decision discloses that Pearson was an elected official and "expected to
be a candidate for reelection." Henry v. Pearson, 253 Miss. 62, 82, 158 So. 2d 695, 703
(1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
47. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court in which Justice White and Chief Justice Warren joined in toto. Justice Stewart concurred in the rationale of the Court, concluding that nothing therein deviated from the "fundamental proposition" that New York Times and Garrison represented a conversion of civil or criminal libel
into a species of "seditious libel." Id. at 92-93 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also
concurred in the parts of the Court's opinion developing standards for "public officials,"
dissenting only with respect to the Court's conclusion that libel of the unidentified plaintiff
connoted a "libel of government" running afoul of the constitutional colloquium ("of and
concerning" requirements) of New York Times. Thus, a clear majority of five expressly
agreed with the Rosenblatt v. Baer alternative criteria for applying the "public official" status discussed in the text. Justice Clark concurred in the result only. Id. at 88 (Clark, J.,
concurring). Justice Douglas concurred in the judgement of reversal, the part of the
Court's opinion on the constitutional colloquium issue, and in Justice Black's partial concurrence and partial dissent. Id. at 91 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black, with Justice
Douglas joining, concurred in the judgement of reversal on absolutist grounds and dissented from the remand to the state courts. Id. at 94-95 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., joining,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Fortas dissented on the ground that the writ was "improvidently granted," as the case (and the resultant record) were pre-New York Times. Id. at
100-01 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Note that two other libel decisions were decided in the same year. In one the Court
held that defamation actions under state law in labor disputes were not preempted by federal law, provided that New York Times "actual malice" and "damages" were proved by the
plaintiff. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966). In the other decision,
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966), the Court reversed a common law criminal libel conviction on vagueness grounds. All three alleged victims were undoubtedly public persons-two (chief of police and sheriff) were undoubtedly "public officials"-and the
third, the editor of the local newspaper, was probably a "public person" under the standard developed the next year in the Butts and Walker cases. The "status" issue in Ashton
was not specifically addressed by the Court.
48. Plaintiff-respondent had been terminated in a change of regimes "some six
months" prior to the defamatory article. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 78. However, the mere
fact that he was no longer in the governmental position "could not" be "seriously contended" to have "decisional significance" in the case. Although there might be situations in
which an individual is "so far removed from a former position of authority that comment
on the manner in which he performed his responsibilities no longer has the interest necessary to justify" New York Times protection, the controversy over the efficiency of management of the recreational area remained "a matter of lively public interest"- proposals for
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pointed supervisor of a county recreation area. Rejecting the sugfurther reformation were under consideration and "public interest" in the performance of
the predecessor administration (in which plaintiff was involved) "continued strong." Id. at
87 n.14. See also infra note 98; Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d
495, 510 n.67 (3d Cir. 1978) (passage of three years since plaintiff was mayor and port
authority chairman did not "strip" him of "public official" status where his "official role
was directly relevant" to the defamation), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978); Gray v.
Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 590-91 n.3 (10th Cir. 1981) (conduct of former policeman was still
"a matter of lively public interest" at the time of publication); Stripling v. Literary Guild, 5
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1958, 1959-60 (W.D. Tex. 1979), affd, 636 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1981)
(passage of thirty years did not terminate "strong public interest" in chief investigator for
McCarthy committee); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 813 n.5 (Tex.
1976) (technicality that plaintiff, a regularly-employed consulting engineer, was not under
contract on the date of the alleged defamation was "not so far removed" from his "former
position" in that role as to render New York Times inapplicable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123
(1977); Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 683, 165 N.W.2d 705, 709-10 (1969) (prior
resignation of "public officials" defamed in press conference held shortly thereafter (and
portraying them as terminated for cause) did not affect the application of New York Times);
Newson v. Henry, 443 So. 2d 817 (Miss. 1983) (former elected sheriff and candidate for
sheriff in 1967 was a "public figure" regarding comments in 1980 concerning his 1967
campaign). The same rule has been extended to defeated candidates for office. See A.S.
Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 75, 265 A.2d 207, 216-18 (1970) ("public figure" status
as constitutional convention candidate not lost in abbreviated period from her defeat until
publication of defamatory matter), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971); Perkins v. Mississippi
Publishers Co., 241 So. 2d 139, 141 (Miss. 1970) ("public figure" status not lost by passage
of a few weeks since election defeat; also "widely known" in state), and to former "public
officials" who have died. State v. Deffley, 395 So. 2d 759, 761 (La. 1981) (criminal defamation case involving statements regarding fitness of deceased "public official" educators "remained in the public realm" after their deaths). See generally, Note, Public Status Over Time:
A Single Approach to the Retention Problem in Defamation and PrivacyLaw, 1982 U. ILL L. REv,
951. It is necessary to reaffirm that the Supreme Court in its "footnote fourteen" discussion in Rosenblatt indicated only that it would continue to apply "public official" status
under the facts of the case before it-a "matter of lively public interest" of a continuing
nature. This was not a case involving a former public official where the "public interest"
was revived by the press itself, i.e., where the press published a matter regarding a former
public official's conduct in or fitness for office and therefore whose public status did not
remain "a matter of lively public interest." Note that the Supreme Court has rejected
"newsworthiness" as alone sufficient for "public figure" status. See infra text accompanying
notes 127-81, and "governmental affiliation" plus newsworthiness as sufficient in "public
official" cases. See infra text accompanying notes 410-34. Query whether it would apply a
similar analysis in cases involving a formerly bona fide "public official" where the media
generates the matter's current newsworthiness. See, e.g., Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing
Co., 218 Kan. 295, 301-05, 543 P.2d 988, 993-96 (1975) (former policeman did not lose
"public official" status regarding comments in "Looking Backward" column ten years later
regarding his conduct in office: "public disclosure"/right of privacy case). One recent decision refused to apply Rosenblatt's "footnote fourteen" where the defamatory matter did not
relate to his former status as a special prosecutor, but only to his alleged involvement with
a house of prostitution. Durham v. Cannan Communications, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 845, 848-49
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982). But compare the case of General Westmoreland. He clearly is a
"public official" concerning allegations of manipulation of intelligence data during the Vi-
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gestion that "reference to state-law standards" should be control-

ling,4 ' the Court attempted to delineate general federal guidelines
for determination of "public official" status while noting that
"[n]o precise lines need be drawn for the purposes"5 0 of the case
etnam War; such manipulation remains a prototypical "matter of lively public interest"

under "footnote fourteen." He is also undoubtedly an "all purpose" "public figure." See
generally, Margolick, Can Generals Waging War Be Wounded by the Press?, N.Y. Times, Nov.
25, 1984, at E18, col. 1. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
49. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84. State standards, promulgated for "local administrative
purposes" rather than "national constitutional protection," were rejected as the controlling frame of reference for defining "public official." If such standards mirrored first
amendment concerns, such would be "at best accidental" and would result in standards
that would "'vary with state' " lines. For "similar reasons" the Court noted its rejection of
the contention that its previous references in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 282, 283 n.23
and Garrison,379 U.S. at 74 to Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), involving the absolute
immunity of federal officials from suit, "mean that we have tied the New York Times rule to
the rule of Official privilege." "The public interests protected by the New York Times rule
are interests in discussion, not retaliation, and our reference to Barr should be taken to
mean no more than the scope of the privilege is to be determined by reference to the
functions it serves." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85 n.10. The Court was specifically responding
to the trenchant criticism of one author that there would "rarely be any correspondence"
between those attacking and those attacked by'government officials. See Pedrick, Freedom of
the Pressand the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoPmi.sL L.Q. 581, 590-91
(1964). It was also probably responding to lower court decisions which had refused to extend New York Times beyond "public officials" to those not holding government office, and,
consequently, not entitled to such immunity if sued as defendants. Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188,
195-96 (D.D.C. 1965). This disentanglement from the federal immunity of executive officials was a necessary precondition to extension of New York Times to "public figures" or
"candidates for public office." It was also necessary to eliminate the spectre of potentially
different status applications depending on whether one was a federal or state executive
official. The New York Times decision had neglected to acknowledge that the federal rule of
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1960), extending absolute immunity to federal officials
of whatever level acting within the "outer perimeter" of their authority, is not the general
rule under state law, which accords only a qualified immunity to "inferior administrative
officer[s]" of a state or subdivision thereof and limits the absolute immunity to "superior
executive officers." REsrATEmNwrr (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 591 and comment c (1977). Surely,
a distinction applying different "public official" status criteria depending upon whether one
is a federal or state official of comparable rank (and the extent of the federal or state correlative privilege for defendants) would pose problems of constitutional equal protection.
See infra note 104. There has been a recent attempt to link the media defendants' argument for absolute immunity in the Sharon and Westmoreland cases to the plaintiffs' absolute
immunity when sued as defendants. This has apparently been unsuccessful, at least in the
Sharon case. See Margolick, supra note 48. See also Sharon v. Time, Inc., 11 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1153, 1163-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But cf Westmoreland v. C.B.S., 596 F. Supp. 1170,
1172 (1984) (Judge Leval refused to decide the absolute immunity question in advance of
trial-he noted that no cases directly supported or rejected the contention).
50. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85. One decision referenced by the Court, id. at 83 n.7,
Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 A.D.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aft'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207
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before it. Prefatorily, the Rosenblatt Court identified the dual-faceted "motivating force" for the New York Times criteria: "a strong
interest in debate on public issues," and "a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues." Since "[c]riticism of government"
is at the epicenter of the "constitutionally protected area of free
discussion," critical commentary regarding "those responsible for
government operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be penalized.

' 51

In demarcating "public officials," those "gov-

ernment employees" who are in "a position significantly to influence" public issues or are "responsible for government
operations," the Court stated that the "public official" status "applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibilityfor or control over the conduct of government affairs."'52 AlN.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965), is open to the possible interpretation that persons
who are not "public officials" but are linked to a "public official" (here, a law partner) in
the defamatory matter published are similarly required to prove constitutional "actual malice." It is clear from reading the Supreme Court's opinion that the reference to the aforesaid case was only with respect to the "of-and-concerning" the plaintiff issue, i.e., whether
the matter specifically pertained to plaintiff or was "impersonal discussion" of government
and, hence, absolutely immune under New York Times. It did not hold that, if specifically
identified, he was, nonetheless, subject to the New York Times "actual malice" standard, the
same as were the elected county commissioners. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 82-83. If the Court
had intended to "bootstrap" him thusly into required compliance with New York Times,
there would have been no necessity for elucidation of the standards for determining "public official" status. That the court was not subjecting him to New York Times as a member of
the group defamed is made clear by a prior footnote, id. at 81 n.5 (a "recovery" by him
would be subject to New York Times "if [he] were a 'public official' ") and by its remanding
of the case to the state courts for a determination of his status. Id. at 87-88. In any event,
such "bootstrapping" of a plaintiff linked to a "public official" by professional liaison
would constitute a resurrection of the "subject matter" approach repudiated by the Court
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and its progeny. See text accompanying notes 127-81. For a
recent well-considered opinion rejecting such "bootstrapping" see Sellars v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 573, 575, 684 P.2d 450, 455-56 (1984) (wife of a county
sheriff not a public person based on such relationship).
51. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added). Note that one of the Court's designated dual rationales underlying Rosenblatt's "public official" criteria-"public issues"-has been decisively repudiated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., see infra text accompanying notes 127-45, and is not sufficient alone to justify the New York Times standard. It is
clear then that the presently controlling rationale for determining "public official" status is
the interest in "persons. . . in a position significantly to influence" "public issues" and the
two-part, alternative test developed therein.
52. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added). The three cases cited in the footnote following the "have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs" test are illuminating: Clancy v. Daily
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ternatively, according to the Court in Rosenblatt, the twin justifications underlying New York Times apply where the following
criterion is met: "[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the
general interest in the qualificationsand performance of all government
employees." 3
In cases involving these types of individuals, the thrust of New
York Times-that first amendment considerations predominate
when the "interests in public discussion are particularly
strong"-has resulted in a hierarchical preference for first
amendment values over society's conceded "pervasive and strong
interest" in deterring and remedying reputational disparagement.5 4 In a footnote caveat in Rosenblatt v. Baer, ("footnote thirNews Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 2-3, 277 N.W. 264, 265 (1938) (candidate for city council regarding his previous tenure as mayor and city councilman); Tanzer v. Crowley Publishing
Co., 240 A.D. 203, 204, 268 N.Y.S. 620, 621 (1934) (comments concerning a former
mayor three months after the end of his tenure in such official capacity); Poleski v. Polish
American Publishing Co., 254 Mich. 15, 235 N.W. 841 (1931) (plaintiff was candidate for
Detroit common council). Note that no distinction is made between candidates for office
regarding their conduct during a previous stint in office, former public officials criticized
for their conduct while in office, and those running as candidates for the first time. Indeed,
it is arguable that the language-"have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over governmental affairs"-was intended only to preclude the
suggestion that the "public official" status is limited to those presently holding such an,
elected position. This is clearly not the interpretation given this part of the Rosenblatt v.
Baer standards by the case law, which has applied it to all manner of appointed officials. The
fact that Clancy, Tanzer, and Poleski all involved former elected officials and candidates for
office is some probative evidence that such individuals were considered, by definition,
within the "public official" rule. For a further discussion of the necessity for a "per se"
rule, see infra notes 410, 412, 418.
53. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. The fact that the "subject matter may have been only of
local interest," was "constitutionally irrelevant" "at least here, where publication was addressed primarily to the interested community." Id. at 83 (emphasis added). The cases have
generally made no distinction between "local" and "national" issues. See Dyer v. Davis, 189
So. 2d 678, 685 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ refused, 250 La. 533, 197 So. 2d 79 (1967) ("The
result is correct" (rejecting a limitation of the "public official" rule to matters of " 'grave
national concern' ")). The tacit assumption of the case law seems to be that only rarely will
a local issue generate more than local interest and that the reputation of a "public official"
will be subject to diminution normally only in the community in which he can be said to
have "assumed" the "risk." But compare Berney, supra note 13, at 351, who has concluded
that the national press "can and often has" assumed the function of exposing local politicians because of the paralysis of the local media.
54. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. The Court appended a caveat that it intimated "no
view" whether there were "other bases" for utilizing New York Times, such as where "in a
particular case the interests in reputation are relatively insubstantial,because the subject of
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teen") the Court took pains to note that the substratal policies of
New York Times discussed above would not warrant the exacting
first amendment protections of the "public official" status "merely
because a statement defamatory of some person in government employ
catches the public interest"-sucha result "would virtually disregard
society's interest in protecting reputation." 55 The Court specifically rebutted under the latter caveat the contention of concurring Justice Douglas that the "key man" in a government hierarchy might well' 6be a "night watchman" accused of defalcation of
"state secrets" and that even such a lower echelon employee
should be required to comply with, at minimum, the New York
Times criteria. To preclude such media "bootstrapping" of the
mere government employee into a newsworthy focus of interest
by press coverage, the Court clearly qualified its above-mentioned
"independent interest in the qualifications and performance"/
"beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees" test with the following,
generally forgotten or ignored 57 but eminently important, limitation: "The employee's position must be one which would invite
public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particularcharges in
controversy."'15 Applying these general criteria to the government
discussion has thrust himself into the vortex of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern." Id. n.12 (emphasis added). This caveat was, of course, resolved in the Butts and
Walker cases decided the following year. See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
55. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13.
56. Id. at 88 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas used as his polestar the "free
discussion of public issues" and stated that under such a test, he saw "no way to draw lines
that exclude the night watchman, the file clerk, the typist, or, for that matter, anyone on
the public payroll." Id. at 89. It is clear from the Brennan-Douglas contretemps that the
majority excluded from "public official" status the "anyone on the public payroll" variety

of governmental employee. The Court also implicitly rejected the almost identical view of
Justice Black that the right of criticism of any "public agent engaged in public activities" cannot justifiably be based on whether he is "arbitrarily labeled" a "public official." Justice
Black had noted that "a large percentage of public moneys expended is distributed by local
agents handling local funds" as in the case at hand. Id. at 94-95 (Black, J., with Douglas, J.,
joining, concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). For a parallel view espousing the position that the determination of who is a "public official" is inherently a somewhat "sterile
and mechanistic" and "completely unworkable" guide, see Bertelsman, Libel and Public
Men, 52 A.BA J. 657, 659-61 (1966).
57. See infra notes 276-89 & 427-34 and accompanying text.
58. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13 (emphasis added). On remand the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire trenchantly interpreted the impact of the Rosenblatt v. Baer criteria. It
indicated that it would be insufficient for New York Times coverage for the defendant to
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employee involved in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court held that he
"may have held such a position" and that his own arguments on
another contention before the Court (the "of and concerning"/
colloquium requirement) raised a "substantial argument"5 9 that
he qualified as a public official. However, the Court did not hold,
as one authoritative commentator has concluded,6 0 that he fell
within the "public official" classification. Rather, the Court
merely afforded him the opportunity6 l to demonstrate that his
case was dehors the New York Times standard. The Court furthermore determined that it was a matter for the "trial judge in the
first instance to determine whether the proofs show [a plaintiff] to

be a 'public official.'

",62

demonstrate that plaintiff had "general charge of financial transactions" and "general supervisory powers" under the supervision of the county commissioners. "It must appear that
his position was 'one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion' engendered by the defendant's charges."
Baer v. Rosenblatt, 108 N.H. 368, 370, 237 A.2d 130, 132 (1967) (emphasis added). It is
unfortunate that the New Hampshire Supreme Court's lucid analysis on remand has not
become the prototype for delineation of the Rosenblatt v. Baer criteria. For a further discussion of this case, see infra note 434 and accompanying text.
59. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). In dicta the Court also intimated that
the elected county commissioners for whom respondent worked would be public officials,
id. at 82-83, a conclusion paralleling New York Times.
60. See J. NOWAK, supra note 41, at 947, where the author interprets Rosenblatt as a
case when the New York Times standard was "applied" and as an example of the "breadth"
of the "public official" status.
61. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87. Plaintiff was caught in the throes of a dilemma posed by
the lack of specific identification of him in the published article. In order to try to comply
with the "of-and-concerning" requisite, he endeavored to persuade the Court that his position in the realm of the recreation area was "so prominent and important" that the general
public equated him with responsibility for its success or lack thereof. The Court, taking
note of the plaintiff's seemingly antithetical arguments, concluded that the record (in this
pre-New York Times trial decision) left open the "possibility" that "the respondent could have
adduced proofs" to exempt himself from the coverage of New York Times. Id. (emphasis
added). The quoted language does not require all plaintiffs with some government affiliation to "adduce proofs" to demonstrate they are not part of "public officialdom." Such a
burden of proof finds no support elsewhere in the case or in the decisional law. This language merely reflects the sui generis nature of plaintiff's awkward position and the Court's
analysis of the difficulties thereof. This was obviously the interpretation of the New Hampshire Supreme Court on remand, where the tribunal reaffirmed the traditional rule that
the defendant has the "burden of establishing a privileged occasion" by showing compliance with the Rosenblattv. Baer criteria. See Baer v. Rosenblatt, 108 N.H. 368, 371-72, 237
A.2d 130, 133 (1967) and citations therein. This is the general rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613(2) and comments g & i (1977). See also infra note 420.
62. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 88 (emphasis added). Such a posture would minimize the
possibility that the jury would utilize "the cloak of a general verdict to punish unpopular
ideas or speakers" and has the added advantage of ensuring the appellate courts an ade-
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The Public Figure Standard and the
Public/PrivateDichotomy

In 1967 the Supreme Court decided a pair of libel decisions. In
one, Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, a a per curiam decision in-

volving the sole question of the impermissibility of the trial court's
erroneous definition of "actual malice," the Court tersely denominated the elected clerk of the county criminal and circuit courts a
public official and accorded the same appellation in dictum to the
president of the county board of health." In the other libel decision, the jointly-decided cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and
Associated Press v. Walker, 5 the Supreme Court, in a variegated set
quate "record and findings" for review of constitutional determinations. Id. n.15. Justice
Black expressed reservations concerning whether the qualifying language "in the first instance" might lapse into desuetude, with the net result that the constitutional rule would
preclude the states from letting juries determine "essentially jury questions" in libel cases.
Referring to the bitter legal battle in England and America over court-jury functions and
the pivotal Fox's Libel Act of 1792 entrusting juries with resolution of issues of "law and
fact," he noted that many states had woven such provisions into their state constitutions to
preclude the former "oppressive practice of denying the jury and granting thejudge power
to determine the guilt of a defendant in libel cases." Id. at 96 (Black, J., with Douglas, J.,
joining, concurring and dissenting). One of the anomalies of the post-New York Times era is
the anachronistic nature of Justice Black's respect for the jury as the protector of free
expression. It is generally accepted that this role has devolved to the courts, trial and appellate, in applying the appropriate legal criteria. See Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why:
A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455, 498 ("[Jluries were
overwhelmingly more favorable to plaintiffs than were judges, both as to liability and damage awards"). This sanguine appreciation of juries in free expression cases is reflected in
the Court's recent decision of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union; 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 &
n.29 (1984), reaffirming the courts' constitutional mandate to make an "independent examination" of the record to ascertain whether the "actual malice" standard has been met
in cases where it is applicable.
63. 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
64. Id. at 82-83.
65. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the FirstAmendment. Hill,
Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT.REv.267, 275, where the decision is humorously depicted
as one where "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card," and Bertelsman, The
First Amendment and Protectionof Reputation and Privacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
How It Grew, 56 Ky. L. J. 718 (1968). In a non-defamation case issued in 1967 prior to
Butts-Walker involving a fictionalized account of a hostage crisis (in essence, a "false light"
right of privacy case) the Court extended the New York Times standard to "matters of public
interest" in "this discrete context." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388, 390-91 (1967).
The Court carefully limited its holding, stating that the "relative opportunities" for rebuttal and "the degree of 'waiver' of the protection" of the state "might be germane" in a
libel action by a "public official." Id. at 391. Although the claimant therein undoubtedly
was not a willing recipient of the notoriety engendered by the article, the Court curiously
stated that "the question whether the same standard should be applicable to persons voluntarily thrust into the public limelight is not here before us." Id. Justice Harlan, presaging
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of opinions requiring at least minimal mathematical competence
to interpret, extended an equal measure of constitutional protection to "public figures." The initial plurality opinion of Justice
Harlan for the Court interpreted New York Times as not having
"an unintended inexorability""6 or containing "the only appropriate accommodation" 67 of the competing reputational and first
amendment interests and concluded that the latter decision-based on the analogy to seditious libel and the concomitant
"vindication of governmental policy" resultant from damage recoveries by public officials-was inapposite in cases involving
"public figures." 68 Such "public figures" were permitted to collect
damages for defamation upon a "showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable
publishers, '

69

a "gross negligence" standard. Butts was a "well-

known and respected figure''70 among coaches who was depicted
as endeavoring to fix the 1962 Alabama-Georgia football game
while a privately-paid athletic director for the latter.7 1 According

to the plurality, he "may have attained [the] status [of public fighis views in dissent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, concluded that a negligence standard was
permissible in the case of a private person, as in this case, who, "[n]ot being inured to the
vicissitudes of journalistic scrutiny. . . is more easily injured and his means of self-defense
• . . more limited." Time Inc., 385 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a further discussion of the ambiguous stature of the Time, Inc. v. Hill rule
in private individual cases after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), see infra
note 137.
66. Butts, 388 U.S. at 148.
67. Id. at 155.
68. Id. at 154.
69. Id. at 155, 158 (emphasis added). This plurality opinion for the Court by Justice
Harlan was joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas. Id. at 133.
70. Id. at 136. He was not coaching, but was in the throes of negotiations with a professional football team at the time of publication. Id. The district court, after the issuance
of New York Times, opined that even if Butts was a governmental employee, he was not the
kind "contemplated" by that decision. Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390,
394 (N.D. Ga. 1964). The court of appeals rendered no opinion on this issue, finding that
defendants had waived the constitutional privilege issue. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
351 F.2d 702, 711-13 (5th Cir. 1965).
71. He was employed by a private company, the Georgia Athletic Association, not the
state of Georgia, although the University of Georgia was and is a state school. 388 U.S. at
135. He "hotly disputed" the nature of the overheard telephone conversation with the
opposing coach which formed the basis of the allegation. The court majority ultimately
affirmed a judgment awarding him $400,000 in punitive and $60,000 in general damages.
Id. at 138, 159-61; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1965).

598

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

ure] by position alone. 7' 2 In the second of the joint cases Walker,
a retired major general in the Army, was portrayed as having
"taken command" of a mob involved in a "charge" against federal marshalls7 He previously had made numerous "strong statements"7 4 against federal intervention in school desegregation controversies in general and concerning the University of Mississippi
in particular.75 According to the plurality, Walker may have received "public figure" status "by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy.176 In any event, both claimants
"commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able to 'expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' "7 of the
libelous matter.
The Harlan plurality opinion, with its "highly unreasonable
conduct" criterion, was not and has never been adopted by a majority of the Court 8 as the controlling first amendment standard
for "public figures." While Chief Justice Warren's concurrence in
the result of Justice Harlan's plurality molded a majority for the
affirmance of the damage award in Butts,7 9 it was his adoption and
application of the undiluted New York Times "actual malice" criteria to "public figures" that drew the concurrence of four other
members of the Court and became the limited holding of the
case.80 In his opinion Chief Justice Warren denominated Justice
72. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155. For a similar case, see Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72
Wash. 2d 999, 1007, 436 P.2d 756, 762 (1968) (college basketball coach a "public figure").
73. Butts, 388 U.S. at 140.
74. Id.
75. Id. He was a person of "some political prominence," and had "received wide publicity" for his views. Id. During the period September 26-30, 1962 (the reported incident
took place on September 30, 1962), he held several well-publicized press and media conferences in which he had endeavored to persuade the citizenry to defy desegregation decrees
and federal authorities implementing them. Id. at 159 n.22 (containing a summary of those
conferences).
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id. at 154 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
78. The Court made this clear in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335-36 &
n.7 (1974).
79. Butts, 338 U.S. at 165-70.
80. The Chief Justice agreed with Justice Harlan in reversing the judgment in Walker.
Id. at 165. As he noted, all seven members of the Court reaching the issue on the merits
agreed on this point. Id. See also the opinion of Justice Black. Id. at 170 (Black, J., with
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Harlan's plurality approach "an unusual and uncertain formulation" having "no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy""1
and concluded that "public figures," like their "public official"
counterparts, were required to meet the New York Times standard. 82 He eschewed a hard-and-fast distinction between "government" and "private" sectors, noting the "high degree of interaction between the intellectual, governmental, and business
worlds."' 83 Such "public figures" often play an influential role in
ordering society and are "intimately involved in the resolution of
important questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in

areas of concern to society at large.

'8 4

Furthermore, "surely as a

class these 'public figures' have as ready access as 'public officials'
to mass media communication, both to influence policy and to
counter criticism of their views and activities."8 5 Consequently,
the public has a legitimate and substantial interest in such persons
and the media has an entitlement to "engage in uninhibited debate" concerning their "involvement in public issues and events"
that is as fundamental as its function regarding "public

officials." 88
In the year following the Court's extension of the New York
Times rule to "public figures," two decisions were issued which,
Douglas, J., joining, concurring in the result in Associated Press v. Walker, dissenting in the
affirmance of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts). In the latter opinion, id. at 170, Black and
Douglas concurred in the reversal of Associated Pressv. Walker on the grounds given in the
parts of Chief Justice Warren's opinion adopting New York Times, while noting that it reflected no withdrawal from the absolutist views theretofore adopted. Id. at 170. They dissented in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts on such absolutist grounds, concluding that the
"quagmire" emanating from adoption of New York Times' qualified privilege necessitated a
case-by-case evaluation of whether the libel was "so abusive" that the "quality of the reporting is [not] approved by a majority of us"-a "flat violation" of the seventh amendment. Id. at 171. Justice Brennan, with Justice White, concurred in the result in Associated
Press v. Walker based on the same parts of the Chief Justice's opinion adopting New York
Times in "public figure" cases, id. at 172 (Brennan, J., with White, J., joining, concurring in
the result in Associated Press v. Walker, dissenting in Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts). Although
indicating that the testimony would undoubtedly have supported a finding of "actual malice" in the latter case, unlike the Chief Justice, they would have remanded for a new trial
in light of the clear inadequacy of the instructions. Id. at 172-74.
81. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).
82. Id. at 164-65.
83. Id. at 163.
84. Id. at 164. "Under any reasoning, General Walker was a public man in whose
public conduct society and the press had a legitimate and substantial interest." Id. at 165.
85. Id. at 164.
86. Id.
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upon superficial examination, might suggest that the Rosenblatt v.
Baer criteria for the "public official" status would be interpreted
to include garden-variety public employees. A disinterested analysis of these decisions, however, quickly dispels such a reading. In
the first decision, St. Amant v. Thompson,87 the Court was almost
exclusively concerned with ameliorating the rampant confusion
precipitated by its careless adoption of the rubric "actual malice"
in the New York Times decision.8 The Court unequivocally
adopted for "purposes of this case" only the Louisiana court's determination that a parish deputy sheriff was a "public official." 80,
The other decision was Pickering v. Board of Education,0 a nondefamation decision involving the issue of the first amendment
standards applicable to a teacher discharged for public criticism of
his employer or superiors. In Pickering, the Court accorded a high
school teacher the benefits of the New York Times rule in fighting
his discharge for criticism of the way the board of education and
district superintendent Pf schools had dealt with previous propositions for tax increases Ito support the schools. Finding that the
rights of the school Iadministration-employer to delimit the
teacher's right "to contribute to public debate" were "not significantly greater" than regarding "any member of the general public"
in a case where employment is "only tangentially and insubstantially involved," the Court held that the discharge could not be
based on speech concerning "issues of public importance" without
complying with the New York Times rule."1 It is clear from the
opinion that the Court did not denominate the teacher-victim as a
87. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
88. Id. at 730-32. The Court rejected any type of an objective "reasonable man" or
"prudent publisher" standard and held that the complainant must show defendant "in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" in order to prove "reckless
disregard." Id. at 731.
89. Id. at 730. Justice Fortas in dissent was the only member of the Court that unequivocally denominated the deputy sheriff as a "public official." Id. at 734 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting). The state supreme court, applying the Rosenblatt v. Baer criteria, had concluded
that a deputy sheriff's acts were "the acts of the sheriff" since he acted as the latter's "representative ...in his official capacity" and that "the sheriff's position in government"
vested him and his deputies with "'substantial responsibility'" regarding "'governmental
affairs'" under Rosenblatt v. Baer. Thompson v. St. Amant, 250 La. 405, 422, 196 So. 2d
255, 261 (1967), rev'd, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). Clearly, the Louisiana Supreme Court found
such compliance with the latter criteria derivatively through the office and functions of the
sheriff. See infra note 482.
90. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
91. Id. at 573-74.

1984]

DEFAMING PUBLIC OFFICIALS

"public official," but rather a "member of the general public he
seeks to be." 92 The Court further intimated that the offended
parties and prosecutors of the discharge petition-the board of
education (and its members) and the district superintendent of
schools-constituted "public officials" under the rule. 93 Consequently, the St. Amant and Pickering decisions indubitably provide
no precedential authority for the proposition that all lower echelon police officers and school teachers qualify as public officials
under the Rosenblatt v. Baer standards.
In a period of approximately one year in 1970 to 1971 the
Supreme Court rendered a spate of important libel opinions. In
the first decision, Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v.
Bresler,94 it held that the contention that the claimant therein was
a "public figure" was "clearly correct" in light of his extensive
involvement in the past and future development of the city of
Greenbelt and the volatile exchanges and confrontations engendered by the "[n]egotiations of significant concern" between him
and local officials.9 5 In light of its conclusion that the plaintiff
"clearly fell within even the most restrictive definition of a 'public
figure,'

"

it abjured deciding whether he was a "public official"

in view of his status as an elected state representative from an ad97
joining county.
92. Id. at 574.
93. "It is therefore perfectly clear that, were appellant a member of the general public,
the State's power to afford the appellee Board of Education or its members any legal right to
sue him for writing the letter at issue would be limited by the requirement. . . laid down in
New York Times." Id. at 573 (emphasis added).

94. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
95. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff owned land the city wanted for a high school and used this fact
as a lever to get zoning variances for high-density housing not permitted by the city master
plan.
96. Id. at 9. Note that the Court accorded "public figure" status to him despite the
Maryland Court of Appeals' conclusion that he was unlikely to receive an entree to defendant's paper to respond to the articles, as evidenced by the latter's refusal to even allow
him to subscribe to the paper. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 253 Md.
324, 344, 359, 252 A.2d 755, 766, 775 (1969), rev'd, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
97.

Greenbelt Cooperative PublishingAss'n, 398 U.S. at 9. In view of plaintiffs counsel's

concession that he was a "public figure," the Maryland Court of Appeals did not resolve
the issue of whether his status as a member of the Maryland House of Delegates from
another county rendered him a "public official." It did explicitly indicate "grave doubts"
as to whether he would so qualify, since the city of Greenbelt was in a different county than
the one he represented and there was "no suggestion" that his conduct as representative
"had had any particular effect" upon the city of Greenbelt or the county in which it was
located. Indeed, the articles concerned him as a "private developer" and there is "no sug-
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In Time, Inc. v. Pape,9" the first of a trio of decisions issued on
the same day a few months after Bressler, the Court accepted,
without itself deciding, the lower courts' determinations that the

deputy chief of detectives of the city of Chicago was a "public official" and that allegations of police brutality and deprivation of
constitutional rights appertained to his "official conduct." In the
remaining two cases of the triad, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy," and
Ocala Star-BannerCo. v. Damron,100 the Court applied the New York
Times rule to candidates for public office of the highest and lowest
strata of elected officialdom: candidates for the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate 01 and for county tax assessor, 02 respectively. Recognizing the intended implication of
gestion he had any political prominence at the national, state, county, or municipal level"
in the battery of articles. Although he had been asked to run for state comptroller by then
Governor Agnew, that was some seven months after "[s]ubstantially all" of the libels had
been disseminated. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 253 Md. 324, 35657, 252 A.2d 755, 773-74 (1969), rev'd, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In light of the trial court's
disposition of the case-it had instructed on the "actual malice" standard-the court assumed, arguendo, that he was a public official and public figure and that the allegedly
libelous articles had relevance to his functioning in each capacity. Id. at 774. For a discussion of this unresolved issue see infra note 203.
98. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). The Court said that the "only question" before it was
whether the court of appeals "correctly applied" the constitutional "actual malice" standard to the facts of the case. Id. at 284. Justice Harlan in dissent noted that he did not
believe the majority disputed the lower court's determination that the New York Times standard was the appropriate one. Id. at 294 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The court of appeals
decision in the case, Pape v. Time, Inc., 419 F.2d 980, 981 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S.
279 (1971), which had reaffirmed its earlier decision in the same case that an appointed
deputy chief of detectives and lieutenant of police of the Chicago Police Department was a
"public official," is undoubtedly correct, in view of the substantial authority wielded by
such a ranking police functionary. See infra note 270 and accompanying text. Nor is the
fact of his "leave of absence" for employment as director of security for Chicago Thoroughbred Enterprises, Inc., (the operator of several Chicago-area race tracks), id. at 981,
significant in light of the unquestioned continued "public interest" under Rosenblatt v.
Baer, see supra note 48, of the police brutality/deprivation-of-constitutional-rights issue involved therein. This issue resulted in a major civil rights decision, Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), and a jury verdict for the claimant on January 24, 1963. The $8000
judgment was satisfied by Pape. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 283 (1971).
99. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
100. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
101. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 266.
102. Ocala Star-BannerCo., 401 U.S. at 296. He was also mayor of Crystal River. Such
status was an entirely separate ground for applying New York Times, as his mayoral position
"without question" rendered him a public official. Id. at 299. Note that the trial court and
the district court of appeals had, in part, decided the "public official" classification was
inapplicable because there was "no reference to the public offices held or sought" by him.
Id. at 298, 300 n.4. Since no such identification, by office or position sought, occurred,
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the New York Times decision itself,"0 3 the Court held that these
stringent limitations have their "fullest and most urgent applications precisely to the conduct" of political campaigns.10 4
"the record is devoid of any evidence" to demonstrate that he was "acting in the area
falling within the federal rule asserted." Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 221 So. 2d
459, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), review denied, 231 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1970), rev'd, 401
U.S. 295 (1971). This theory of non-applicability of New York Times was "not before the
Court," and it did not discuss the issue. Ocala Star-Banner Co., 401 U.S. at 300 n.4. For a
further discussion of this open issue, see infra note 203.
103. The Court characterized Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281, 286
(1908), as "admirably" justifying the subsumption of candidates under the panoply of New
York Times:
"[I]t is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character
and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the State
and to society of such discussions is so vast and the advantages derived are so
great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons
whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputation of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be
great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to
private character so small that such discussion must be privileged."
Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 271-72, n.3 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711,
724, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908)). Coleman was the major state law precedent followed by New
York Times in its constitutionalization of the minority variant of "fair comment." See supra
note 16.
104. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 272. See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron,
401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971) ("Public discussion about the qualifications of a candidate for
elective office presents what is probably the strongest possible case for application of the
New York Times rule."). The Court admitted that it "might be preferable" to denominate
candidates as public figures, if only to "avoid straining the common meaning of words."
However, the issue of status categorization was of "no importance" since candidates "must
be accorded at least as much protection" as those currently in office. Monitor Patriot Co.,
401 U.S. at 271. The Court's results in these two cases are undoubtedly correct and reflect
the unanswerable arguments of lower court decisions so holding. See Dyer v. Davis, 189 So.
2d 678, 685 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ refused, 250 La. 533, 197 So. 2d 79 (1967) ("The
result is correct") (Any distinction between a holder of office and a contestant for that
office would "constitute a manifest anomaly resulting in a gross inequity," accord the nonincumbent a "tremendous advantage" over the incumbent, shield the non-incumbent candidate from the "revealing searchlight" of public scrutiny while subjecting his opponent to
such scrutiny, and could result in election to public office of unqualified and unfit persons
through the ignorance of the electorate); Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 452,
48 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821, hearingdenied (1966) ("[A]ny rule of law which would differentiate
between the freedom of speech allowed to an incumbent running for reelection and that
permitted to him who seeks his office, would run afoul of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment"); Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir.
1964)("[I]f a newspaper cannot constitutionally be held for defamation when it states without malice, but cannot prove, that an incumbent seeking reelection has accepted a bribe, it
seems hard to justify holding it liable for further stating that the bribe was offered by his
opponent"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965).
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The Subject Matter Approach

In the last of the five libel decisions of 1970-1971, Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,101 a plurality of the Court shelved the "status"
approach (whether plaintiff constituted a "public official" or
"public figure" or rather a non-public or private person) and substituted a standard focusing on the "subject matter" of the libel-"matters of public or general concern"-in determining the
sphere of applicability of New York Times. Adopting as first principles and postulates that "[s]elf-governance . . . presupposes far

more than knowledge and debate about the strictly official activities of various levels of government" and that modern society
places in the private domain "vast areas of economic and social
power that vitally affect the nature and quality of life," the plurality opinion by Justice Brennan suggested that the Court's own decisional law had "disclosed the artificiality, in terms of the public's
interest" in utilizing a public/private status bifurcation. 106 Specifically rejecting the view that constitutional protection was "limited
to matters bearing broadly on issues of responsible government,"
the plurality expanded New York Times to include all the "myriad
matters of public interest. '10 7 In elucidating its rationale for rejecting the Harlan-Marshall-Stewart dissenting posture-with its
"assumption of risk"/"access to the media" underpinnings for a
negligence-and-limitation-to-actual-damages standard in private
individual cases-the plurality opinion concluded that "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or
because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose
105. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Keeton, Some Implications of the Constitutional Privilege to Defame, 25 VAND. L. REv. 59, 61-75 (1972). Eaton's
conclusion that the self-defining nature of the Rosenbloom decision's test ("public interest"/
"newsworthiness") had "nearly destroyed" the common law action for defamation is undoubtedly correct. See Eaton, supra note 4, at 1402-03. Very few actions resulting in judgment for the plaintiff were sustained on appeal during the vitality of the Rosenbloom test.
See Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protectionfor the News Media from Liabilityfor
Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547, 1566 (1972) (only
three plaintiff's verdicts had withstood appeal at the time of publication).
106. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41.
107. Id. at 42. The Court plurality expressly reserved the question of what constitutional standards applied in cases falling "outside the area of public or general interest." Id.
at 44 n. 12. The opinion left the definitional content of the new subject matter classification
to future opinions, id. at 44-45, while concluding that the police arrest for distributing
alleged obscenity qualified thereunder. Id. at 45.
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to become involved." The preeminent public interest was "in the
event" and "the public focus . .. on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of' ' the conduct, not

the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety."
Consequently, according to the plurality of the Court, the primary raison d'etre of the Harlan-Marshall-Stewart dissenting perspective-that "public" persons had "voluntarily exposed their
entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have
kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view"-was deemed
"at best, a legal fiction." 10 9 The secondary, peripheral rationale of
the public/private dichotomy-the presumed greater access to
the media for rebuttal-was considered to be "too insubstantial a
reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction."1 "0 While the
access, self-help argument might be applicable regarding "some
very prominent people," 1 media access for the purpose of contradiction or reply for the "vast majority"'' 12 of public persons
would depend on the "same complex factor" that was determinative in private person cases: "continued interest" by the media.113
Lastly, the proposed "reasonable person or care" standard was
considered too vague a standard for assessing media culpability
108. Id. at 43. The opinion cited Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), as
an example in which the "public's interest in the provocative speech" would have been the
same whether made by an unidentified student rather than the prominent, retired general.
That decision was likewise referred to in support of "another anomaly" of the "status"
approach-that the retired general's notoriety emanated from "events completely unconnected" with the campus incident. "It seems particularly unsatisfactory to determine the
extent of First Amendment protection on the basis of facts completely unrelated to the
newsworthy events being reported." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43 n. 11.
109. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48. "[S]ome aspects of the lives of even the most public
men fall outside the area of public or general concern." Id. "This is not the less true because the area of public concern in the cases of candidates for public office and of public
officials is broad." Id. at 48 n.16 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971)).
110. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 47.
Ill. Id. at 46. Even in such cases, it is "the rare case where the denial overtakes the
original charges," as such denials, retractions and corrections do not constitute "'hot'
news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story." Id.
112. Id. "When the public official or public figure is a minor functionary or has left
the job that put him in the public eye, the rationale loses all of its force." Id.
113. Id. In any event, the diminished protection for the media in cases involving "public discussion of matters of public concern" is a "cure . . . far worse than the disease." A
suggested alternative is to accord the private individual a right of response under a retraction or similar statute. Id. at 47 & n.15. This suggestion seems to be an eminently doubtful
alternative in light of the unanimous decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974). See Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 616 (1983).
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because of the "[f]ear of guessing wrong" that would "inevitably
cause self-censorship," with its omnipresent
danger that "legiti11 4
mate utterance will be deterred.

The majority of five deeming reversal appropriate consisted
of the absolutist Black,"'5 concurring in the judgment, and Justice
White, concurring on a very limited ground, who would have held
that New York Times allowed the media "to report and comment
upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, with no
requirement that the reputation or the privacy of an individual
involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public
view."'" Both the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan and that of
Justices Marshall and Stewart repudiated this fractionated extension of New York Times to the arena of "public or general concern"
as inadequately accommodating the inherent tension between
state protection of reputational interests and the first amendment
value of avoidance of self-censorship. Justice Harlan argued that
the plurality's analysis results in a case-by-case examination of trial
court verdicts which would inherently necessitate "judicial secondguessing of the newsworthiness of each item," a process that requires a type of individualized assessment of competing values, undermining thereby the need for "a measure of order and predict7
'
ability in the law.

11

114. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50.
115. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment). The other remaining absolutist,
Justice Douglas, did not participate in the decision. Id.
116. Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). One post-Rosenbloom v. Metromedia decision "experience[d] some discomfort" in accepting it as the "definitive statement" of controlling law, suggesting that, in light of supervening changes in the Court, the
"y& unarticulated philosophies" of Justices Powell and Rehnquist would determine the future course of the Court in deciding between the "status" and "subject matter" approaches
to first amendment protection of the media in libel cases. Gordon v. Random House, Inc.,
486 F.2d 1356, 1359-60 (3d Cir. 1973). The court's reluctance was justified, as Justices
Powell and Rehnquist joined the majority view which discarded the Rosenbloom test in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.
117. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 62-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Justice Marshall's
conclusion that the Brennan plurality view would involve the courts, "not anointed with
any extraordinary prescience," in determining "what information is relevant to self-government," id. at 79 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)), a function which would require the Court to adopt the role of "constant and
continuing supervision" of libel litigation nationally. Id. at 81. While Justice Brennan contended that matters of contraception are only of private interest, id. at 48, Justice Marshall
noted that the concept generated by the plurality is essentially open-ended, since "all
human events are arguably within the area of 'public or general concern.'" He argued that
even such "intimate and personal concerns" are not outside that area in an "era of a dra-
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In the view of dissenting Justice Harlan, the proper assessment of the competing interests developed in the New York Times
decisions was "not fully applicable" in cases of private, non-"public" personages-clearly, true "public persons" have "a greater
likelihood of securing access to channels of communication sufficient to
rebut falsehood" than private persons who do not "toil in the
public spotlight."1 1 8 Likewise, "our willingness to assume that
public personalities are more impervious to criticism, and may be
held to have run the risk of publicly circulatedfalsehoods concerning
them" was not based "solely upon an empirical assertion of fact
but also upon a belief that, in our political system, the individual
speaker is entitled to act upon such an assumption if our institutions are to be held up, as they should be, to constant scrutiny. '" 9
In light of these countervailing considerations Justice Harlan declared that the states, though required to "use finer, more discriminating tools" of regulation1 20 in "purely" private plaintiff
versus media defendant cases, were not precluded from utilizing a
negligence standard to protect the reputational interests of the
"ordinary citizen. ' 1121 He would, however, have limited the permissible recovery under the negligence standard to "actual, meamatic threat of overpopulation" and rapidly evolving standards of acceptable human conduct. Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., with Stewart, J., joining, dissenting). For a further discussion of
this issue, see infra note 360.
118. Id. at 70.
119. Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan conceded
that his views were "somewhat different" from those in Curtis PublishingCo. and that "a
more precise balance" of the competing values was required in "this delicate area." His
views in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia reflected those previously developed in support of a negligence standard in a private versus media defendant context in the "false light" case of
Time, Inc. v. Hill, where he distinguished the Rosenblatt v. Baer standards as applicable in an
environment "where public attention creates the strong likelihood of a competition among
ideas." "Public officials" were "a breed from whom hardiness to exposure to charges, innuendoes, and criticisms might be demanded," "who voluntarily assumed the risk of such
things by entry into the public arena," whereas a private person's "means of self-defense
are more limited," and "the public is less likely to view with normal skepticism what is
written about him because it is not accustomed to seeing his name in the press and expects
only a disinterested report." Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 407-09 (Harlan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The views of Justice Harlan in the Rosenbloom and Time, Inc. v. Hill
dissents ultimately prevailed in the private versus media defendant libel context in Gertz in
1974. See infra text accompanying notes 127-46.
120. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 68-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 66-68. A newspaper does not have "a special immunity from the application of general laws." Id. at 67. He did, however, implicitly preclude strict liability in such
cases. Justice Marshall explicitly proscribed "absolute or strict liability." Id. at 86-87 (Marshall, J., with Stewart, J., joining, dissenting).

608

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

' "reasonably foreseeable" to a person of "aversurable harm"122
age sensibilities"1' 23 unless "actual malice ' 124 was proved. If the
latter additional threshold requirement was met, state law admonitory policies did not preclude the imposition of punitive damages
bearing "a reasonable relation 1 25 to actual damages. Justice Marshall's dissent, with which Justice Stewart joined, took substantial
issue only with the latter aspect of the Harlan opinion and would
have precluded punitive damages which, like traditional common
law "presumed" damages, were subject to the "unlimited discretion" of juries and would have magnified the problem of self-censorship 12 6 resulting from large awards.

D. Public Figuredom Revisited
A short three years later the Supreme Court rejected the fragile
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia plurality extension of New York Times to
matters of "public or general interest" and adopted the general
rationale of the Harlan-Marshall-Stewart dissent for cases involving private individuals suing the media. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.127 the Court, while reaffirming the appropriateness of the New
122. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 68. This is an exception to the normal tort rule, the "eggshell skull" rule.
Id. (citing W. PRossRas, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 (3d ed. 1964)). If, however, the defendant
had scienter regarding any unusual susceptibility of the plaintiff, the general rule would
apply. Id.
124. Id. at 73.
125. Id. at 75.
126. Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., Stewart, J., joining, dissenting). "This discretion allows
juries to penalize heavily the unorthodox and the unpopular and exact little from others."
Id.
127. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz was a reputable attorney hired by the family of a
victim of a homicide by a police officer to sue said officer. Defendant, publisher of American
Opinion, a John Birch Society publication, published an article depicting the attorney as the
"architect of the 'frame-up'" of Nuccio, the policeman (despite his decidedly "remote connection" with the criminal proceeding), a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter" and as having a criminal file requiring "a big, Irish cop to lift." Such allegations contained "serious
inaccuracies." Id. at 325-26. The opinion cited extensively in the text was by Justice Powell
for a plurality of four members of the Court. Justice Blackmun joined the opinion and
judgment of the Court with a brief explanation of the two-fold reasons for his departure
from his views in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (he formed part of the Brennan plurality): the
removal of presumed and punitive damages, unless the New York Times standard was met,
eliminated "significant and powerful motives for self-censorship" inherent in the traditional libel action, affording thereby "sufficient and adequate breathing space for a vigorous press," and the "profound importance" of a "clearly defined majority position" to
replace the "sadly fractionated" result in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Id. at 354 (Blackmun,
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York Times standard for "public persons" (i.e., "public officials"
and "public figures") as an "extremely powerful antidote" to the
self-censorship precipitated by common law strict liability for defamation, noted frankly that that standard "exacts a correspondingly high price" ' from victims of reputational disparagement.
This price is exacted by the New York Times standard's "demanding requirements, ' 12 9 threshold requirements which "many deserving plaintiffs" were incapable of meeting. 13 0 According to the
Gertz Court, this exacting rule, reflecting the "limited state interest" ' ' in "public person" libel cases, did not, however, reflect an
"equitable boundary"' 1 2 between competing reputational and first
amendment values in the private individual versus media context.
In such a context, a different balancing of interests justifies a
more limited incursion upon the common law of defamation. Explicitly adopting the Harlan-Marshall-Stewart dissenting view of
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. that there are two distinguishing
characteristics between "private" and "public" persons (the primary rationale of assumption of risk, i.e., "a compelling normative
consideration"' 3 3 that "public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from deJ., concurring). Four members of the Court dissented: Chief Justice Burger, id. at 354-55;
Justice Douglas, id. at 356-60; Justice Brennan, id. at 361-69; and Justice White, id. at 370404.
The literature on this case is extensive. For a sampling of the treatments generally critical of the decision, see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422
(1975); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 645 (1977); Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution:Confusion and Conflicting
Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43 (1976); Pember and Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REV. 57 (1974); Comment, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term:
Freedom of Speech and Privacy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 139 (1974). For generally favorable
treatments of Gertz, see Robertson, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: In Praiseof Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199, 201 (1976) (Gertz "makes a great deal of sense");
Elder, The Law of Defamation and ConstitutionalPrivilege: A Contextual Analysis of Oklahoma
Law in Light of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Through Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 4 OKa. Crry U.L.
REV. 17 (1979). Note that one of the curiosities generated by the Gertz decision is that a
Court with an increasingly "law and order" reputation has substantially reduced the protection of the press in reporting about "organized crime" and criminals generally, prototypical matters of "public interest" protected by New York Times in the pre-Gertz era. Comment, supra note 105, at 1560-61 & n.95.
128. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
129. Id. at 337.
130. Id. at 342..
131. Id. at 343.
132. Id. at 347-48.
133. Id. at 344.
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famatory falsehood, ' 134 and a peripheral rationale of access to the
media, i.e., that they "usually enjoy significantly greater access to
the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private
individuals normally enjoy"), 13 5 the Court held that such considerations warranted more solicitous treatment for private individuals
than the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia result: "[P]rivate individuals are
not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public
'' a
figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. 1 3
Rejecting the "drastic alternatives" of New York Times and
common law strict liability,1 37 the Court approved the general
134. Id. at 345.
135. Id. at 344. The Court conceded that the "opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood" and that the law of defamation is "rooted in
our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." However, this "fact that the
self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it
is irrelevant to our inquiry." Id. at n.9. By contrast, private individuals have no such generalized opportunity for self-help and are "more vulnerable to injury." Consequently, the
state's interest in according them redress for injury to reputation is "correspondingly
greater." Id. at 344. Note that the media defendants in the Generals Sharon and Westmoreland cases have contended that their virtually unlimited opportunities for rebuttal and
their assumption of the risk of criticism due to their close identification with governmental
conduct of war warrant and compel adoption of an absolute immunity for the defendants.
This has apparently (and properly) been rejected as unjustified under controlling precedent
at least in the Sharon case. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Query whether the
absolute immunity argument would not be more persuasive where the head of state of an
autocratic regime (e.g., the Ayatollah Khomeini or Colonel Khadaffi) is suing for libel. The
courts might be tempted to find that such figures are inextricably linked with and symbolize their respective governments and that any criticism of them was, in fact, criticism of
government qua government. Note that this absolutist argument was recently made in a
certiorari request in Gannett Co. v. DeRoburt, 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) No. 112 (Dec. 11,
1984), on the ground that "foreign leaders using vast national treasury resources" were
attempting to suppress critical accounts of their countries' official acts. See infra note 205
and accompanying text. Certiorari was denied January 14, 1985. 53 U.S.L.W. 3499 (1985).
If this step is taken regarding autocratic regimes, could a comparable argument of "'etat,
c'est lui" not be made concerning the head of state in a democracy, i.e., a U.S. President
with regard to his conduct of foreign affairs, an area in which he reigns supreme as governmental spokesman? But compare the decision in which Barry Goldwater, as a presidential
candidate, was subject only to the New York Times standard. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 345.
137. Id. at 346. The New York Times rule in "public or general interest" cases "inadequately serve[d]" both reputational and first amendment interests. If a private individual
was involuntarily thrust into such an issue or controversy, he was remediless unless the
"rigorous requirements" of New York Times were satisfied, despite the aforesaid factors that
justified the greater state interest in protecting private persons. On the other hand, if the
issue did not fall within the confines of the "public or general interest" concept, the media
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framework of the constitutional construct proffered by the
Harlan-Marshall-Stewart trio in dissent in Rosenbloom: the abnegation of common law strict liability138 in all private individual vermight be mulcted in damages despite taking "every reasonable precaution to ensure the
accuracy" of its story. Indeed, such common law damages could include both "presumed"
and punitive damages, exceeding any redress for actual injury. Id.
The Court's adoption of a negligence standard in such private versus media defendant
cases calls into question the continuing viability of Time, Inc. v. Hill, and its adoption of New
York Times in non-public person versus media "false light" cases. In one decision issued
shortly after Gertz, the Court discussed the issue of whether the latter decision justified "a
more relaxed standard of liability" than the constitutional "actual malice" standard, but
did not resolve the issue therein, as no objection to use of the more stringent standard had
been made at the trial level. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249-50
(1974). This caveat was repeated the following year in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 490 n.19 (1975). Justice Powell, the author of the Court's opinion in Gertz,
has suggested that the latter "calls into question the conceptual basis" of requiring a New
York Times analysis in "false light" cases involving private individuals. Id. at 498 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Undoubtedly, the Court ultimately will apply the public/private dichotomy to
"false light" cases, a development foreshadowed by its designation of reputation as the
protected interest in both libel and "false light" cases in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). The recent suggestion that plaintiffs,
whatever their status, will likely be required to meet the New York Times standard, W. PRosSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 866 (5th ed. 1984), is unpersuasive. It ignores the basic commonality of interests protected in defamation and "false
light" and neglects to mention the substantial emerging consensus to the contrary. See the
citations in Wood v. Hustler, 736 F.2d 1084, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) No. 6 (1985). But compare Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70,
89-90 (W.Va. 1984), where the court purports to adopt the Gertz standard in "false light"
cases in light of the "pronounced overlap" of the two torts but then inexplicably states that
New York Times would be applicable in "false light" cases involving public persons or "legitimate matters of public interest." Without apparently recognizing the net result of its decision the court effectively reaffirmed Time, Inc. v. Hill.
138. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48. Although the Court did not unequivocally denominate
negligence as a constitutionally permissible ground for liability in such cases, this was undoubtedly what the Court intended. It did refer to the negligence standard once in its
opinion. Id. at 350. This minimal negligence threshold was the clear consensus interpretation of the rest of the Court. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 355 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting), 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 376, 392 (White, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the standard of evidence constitutionally required was predicted
to be that of "preponderance" rather "than clear and convincing." Id. at 366 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Note, however, that the negligence standard only applied to "false statements
of fact" in private person cases, as "[u]nder the first amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea." Id. at 339. Utilizing this dicta and limited holdings in two other cases (Greenbelt Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970) ("blackmail" held to be "rhetorical hyberbole" in the context of disclosed supporting facts) and Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 283-86 (1974) (epithet "scab" held non-actionable under federal labor law)),
the RESTATEMF.NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) and a munificence of recent decisions
have adopted an absolute privilege for "pure" opinion-opinion, however unreasonable,
based on disclosed or readily assumed non-defamatory facts. For a survey of the decisions,
see generally D. ELDER, supra note 20, at 334-53. There is a substantial developing consen-
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sus media defendant suits and the limitation of such plaintiffs' recovery to that for "actual injury,"1 3 9 precluding thereby
"presumed" or punitive damages absent compliance with the New
York Times rule.

4

Having elucidated its novel standard and hav-

sus that imputations of criminality, dishonesty, and unethical behavior are not protected
opinion even where the underlying facts are disclosed and non-defamatory. Id. at 348-52.
At least two members of the Court have recently opined that there was no intent by the
Gertz majority to "wipe out this 'rich and complex'" history of the common law "opinion"
doctrine by its Gertz, dicta citing Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the FirstAmendment, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976). See Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 103 S. Ct. 235,
236 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., with White, J., joining, dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
And note that the Court has referred to the common law "opinion" rule obliquely in a
non-libel opinion. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 580 (1968).
139. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. Since the state's "strong and legitimate interest" in protecting private persons' reputations was limited to compensation for injury, id. at 348-49, it
had "no substantial interest" in "gratuitous awards" exceeding "actual injury" in the form
of presumed damages, "an oddity of tort law," id. at 349, or punitive damages, "private
fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and deter its future occurrence." Id. at 350. The Court declined to define precisely "actual injury," noting the extensive experience of trial judges in drafting instructions. But the Court did suggest that
actual injuries were not limited to special damages, "out-of-pocket loss," but additionally
included "the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood"
such as "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering." The very flexible nature of the "actual injury" requirement and the facility of compliance therewith was evidenced clearly by the subsequent decision of Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61 (1976), in which the Court held
that damages to reputation were not the "only compensable injury" in defamation cases or
a threshold requirement of a defamation action if state law did not so provide. Even where
the libel claimant therein had withdrawn the issue of reputational injury prior to trial, the
awarding of other damages from among the Gertz-generated non-exclusive "actual injury"
concept "did not transform" such a suit into a non-defamation action. Id. at 460. Thus, the
Court has clearly held that actual reputational injury is not a constitutional prerequisite to
recovery of the other "actual damage" component elements. See also Hearst Corp. v.
Hughes, 297 Md. 112, 130, 466 A.2d 486, 495 (1983). Such reputational loss may be required as a matter of state law, however. See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. I, 67, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243-44 (1982) (adopting the New York view-mental distress is not
alone sufficient).
140. The Court clearly intimated that such "presumed" and punitive damages were
constitutionally permitted if the New York Times standard (i.e., "calculated falsehood") was
met and if such damages were permissible under the applicable state law. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
349-50. See also the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, id. at 354, and the dissents of
Justice Brennan, id. at 367 and Justice White, id. at 370, 377, 395-98. In addition, see
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 162 n.7 (1979) (Punitive damages are "still awardable
upon a showing of knowing or reckless falsehood") (dicta). The authors of one generally
authoritative hornbook clearly misinterpret Gertz and ignore the result in Butts and the
aforesaid dictum in Herbert when they conclude that the implication of punitive damage
availability extends only to private plaintiffs if New York Times "actual malice" is met, suggesting that it "should not be surprising" if such punitive damages were proscribed in
futuro in all public person cases. J. NOWAx, supra note 41, at 950-51. A close reading of the
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ing reinstated and rejuvenated its traditional emphasis on the determinative nature of the "status" of the litigation plaintiff, the
Gertz Court proceeded to reformulate the concept of "public
figuredom ' 1 41 and apply that reformulation to the facts of the
case. The Court held that the lawyer-claimant therein, though
"well known in some circles," had "no general fame or notoriety
in the community" 142 and was not, consequently, a public personSupreme Court's decisions, however, reveals that once the New York Times "actual malice"/
"calculated falsehood" threshold is met, such defamatory matters "do not enjoy constitutional protection," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964), and thus all common law
damages are available, if state law so provides. See also Brennan, supra note 12, at 18-19. It
surely would be a curious perversion of logic to permit internment for criminal defamation
regarding public persons if that standard is met, see supra, note 41, but to deny in toto
quasi-criminal punishments such as punitive damages in all such cases. This permissibility
of "presumed" and punitive damages if New York Times is met is the clear consensus rule
followed by the lower federal and state courts. See, e.g., the Gertz decision on remand. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983)
(affirming an award of $100,000 compensatory and $300,000 punitive damages) and cases
cited therein. This permissibility of punitive damages is the only material respect in which
the majority deviated from the opinion of Justice Marshall, with Justice Stewart joining
dissenting, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. See supra text accompanying note 126. Note that
this permissibility of "presumed" damages conflicts with the non-constitutional policy of
the Court delineated in a labor dispute context in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S.
53, 55, 58 n.2, 64-65 (1966), where the Court required plaintiff to prove "damages" in
addition to "actual malice." See supra note 47. Note also that it adopted proof of "compensable harm" as a precondition of punitive damages in labor cases, a prerequisite not presently imposed in constitutionally-limited libel actions. In a case issued the same day as
Gertz, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281-86 (1974), the Court reaffirmed extension of New York Times to labor disputes, but, curiously, it made no mention of the damage
rules discussed above. However, in dicta the Court has recently reaffirmed the anomalous
Linn "damages" requirements. Bill Johnsons's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161,
2169-70 (1983). It is not clear that the Court is aware of the inconsistency of its labor law
decisions and first amendment decisions on the damage requirements interposed by New
York Times. For a thoughtful proposed set of statutory alternatives to the present damage
rules, see Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18
U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1983).

141. The Court stated that "[h]ypothetically," the possibility exists for a third type of
"public figure," the "truly involuntary public figure," one who becomes such "through no
purposeful action of his own," but concluded that this "must be exceedingly rare." Gertz,
418 U.S. at 345. Indeed, it is highly doubtful if such a sub-status continues to exist in light
of the post-Gertz decisions of the Court. It is noteworthy that the Court subsequently reinterpreted Gertz as specifying only "two ways" of becoming a "public figure"-"all" or
"limited" purpose. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979). See Comment, The Involuntary Public Figure Class of Gertz v. Robert Welch: Dead or Merely Dormant?,
14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 71, 84-85 (1980) (proposing abolition of the involuntary "public figure" category); Rosen, Media Lament-The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public Figures, 54 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 487 (1980).
142. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52. Although he had "long been active in community and
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ality for "all aspects of his life"' 4 3-he was not an "all purpose"
public figure. Furthermore, and in light of his limited professional
role in the controversy precipitating the libel, he could not be
considered to be a "public figure" in the "more meaningful context" of an evaluation of "the nature and extent of an individual's
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation."' 144 He was not, in other words, one of those who "thrust

themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.

' 145

Fi-

nally, the Court perfunctorily and disdainfully rejected the suggestion that a lawyer representing a client in contemplated civil litigation was a "de facto public official": "Our cases recognize no such
concept. Respondent's suggestion would sweep all lawyers under
the New York Times rule as officers of the court and distort the146plain
meaning of the 'public official' category beyond all recognition.

professional affairs" and had published widely on legal topics, none of the jurors knew of
him and there was a dearth of evidence that such general anonymity was "atypical." Id. at
351-52. The Court refused to "lightly assume" that such involvement rendered him an "all
purpose" public figure: "absent clear evidence of generalfame or notoriety in the community,
and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public
personality for all aspects of his life." Id. at 352 (emphasis added). He would probably have
been a "public figure" under the more expansive notion of "public figure" preceding the
issuance of his namesake decision. See Robertson, supra note 127, at 222. As a result of the
Gertz decision "all purpose" public figures doubtlessly are limited generally to those who
constitute "household names." Id. at 222-23.
143. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
144.

Id.

145. He played a "minimal role" in the coroner's inquest into the decedent's death
and his total involvement in the controversy "related solely" to representing the interests
of his private client. He was not involved in the criminal proceedings against the police
officer, Nuccio, had no contact with the media, and was never even cited as having discussed either proceeding with the media. Id.
146. Id. at 351 (emphasis added). One aspect of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264 (1974), issued the same day, indirectly and obliquely reinforces the view that the Gertz
decision was intended to tighten up the criteria applicable to all public persons, including
"public officials." It is clear from reading the former decision that the plaintiffs therein
were governmental employees, i.e., non-union letter carriers. It is also probable that the
medium used to defame plaintiffs, a monthly union newsletter, closely enough parallels the
"press" as to precipitate application of the first amendment. See infra note 161. It is interesting that no member of the Court, in reaffirming the applicability of New York Times to
labor cases, referred to the plaintiff's status and the logical concomitant that New York Times
applied as a matter of first amendment jurisprudence-an appropriate conclusion if mere
"governmental affiliation" were deemed sufficient for "public official" status. In any event,
undoubtedly, such mere governmental employment status would be insufficient today. See
infra text accompanying note 204, 451-98.
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Two years later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,14 7 the Supreme
Court followed its narrowing of the sphere of applicability of the
"public figure" status in a case involving imputation of adultery as
an alternative ground for a divorce awarded to Mrs. Firestone's
former husband.1 48 In determining that'she had not "assume[d]
any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society" and that
she had not "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved" therein, 49 the Court rebuffed the notion that this
" 'cause c616bre' 150 was a "public controversy." It eschewed
equating "public controversies" with "all controversies of interest
to the public." The Court imposed thereby a qualitative limitation
on the nature of the "public controversy" an alleged "public figure" must become involved in for the purpose of deciding the status issue: "Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings
is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even
though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals
may be of interest to some portion of the reading public."1 ' ' The
Court also refused to find that she had voluntarily thrust herself
into the public limelight by involving herself in the divorce process, either by her initial filing or subsequent conduct of the civil
action. In view of the monopolistic and exclusive nature of the
divorce process for one seeking a marital dissolution, utilization of
147. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
148. Id. at 452.
149. Id. at 453. The Court's relegation of the access-to-the-press factor to back-burner
status is well demonstrated by this case. Mrs. Firestone had conducted numerous interviews
during the lengthy divorce proceeding. Despite this demonstrated ability to command press
attention, the Court cryptically rejected that as sufficient to qualify her for "public figure"
status: "Such [press] interviews should have had no effect upon the merits of the legal
dispute between respondent and her husband or the outcome of that trial, and we do not
think it can be assumed that any such purpose was intended. Moreover, there is no indication that she sought to use the press conferences as a vehicle by which to thrust herself to
the forefront of some unrelated controversy in order to influence its resolution." Id. at 454
n.3.
150. The Supreme Court of Florida had used this phrase to characterize this rather
sensational, lengthy, hotly-disputed divorce. The divorce trial had lasted seventeen months
and had received extensive national publicity. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 454. In the Court's view, adoption of such a broad subject-matter approach
would admit the rejected posture of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia through the back door. For a
discussion of whether the Court may in the future append a comparable qualitative restriction on the relevance regarding "official conduct" concept in "public official" cases, see
infra note 360.
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the State's judicial machinery was, in the Court's view, "'no more
voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called
upon to defend his interests in court.' "152
The Supreme Court has continued to reflect the unequivocal
pro-reputation / restrictive-application-of-"public status"-orientation of Gertz-Firestone in its most recent triad of decisions, issued
in 1979.153 The first of them, Herbert v. Lando,15 4 involved primarily discovery of evidence of "state of mind" in cases mandating
compliance with New York Times. The Court accepted the concession that the claimant therein, a retired military officer with an
extensive Vietnam War record who had received "widespread media attention" resulting from an imputation to senior officers of
covering up war crimes, was a public figure.1"
152. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77
(1971)). Although noting that some parties to judicial proceedings might be "all purpose"
or "limited purpose" public figures, the Court stated that most will "more likely resemble
respondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to attempt to
obtain the only redress available to them or to defend themselves" against proceedings
initiated by the sovereign or third parties. Id. at 457.
153. In the five-year hiatus until 1984, the Court issued no libel decisions. In 1984, it
issued four such opinions. Two of them, Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1488 (1984), and
Keeton v. Hustler, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1481 & n.12 (1984), have rejected any special procedural status based on the first amendment for media defendants in cases involving in personam jurisdiction. A third, Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09 (1984),
affirmed the authority of the trial court to issue protective orders to prevent media defendants from publishing in a wholesale fashion maters learned during discovery in libel litigation. The only media-protective decision involved a reaffirmation of the rule of independent examination of the record to ensure that the "constitutional fact" of "actual malice"
had been properly established. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1967
(1984). Any other result in the latter case would have entailed outright reversal of numerous prior libel decisions. Id. (The Court noted that the "independent appellate review"
rule had been applied "uncounted times before").
154. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). In affirming New York Times as the appropriate standard in
suits by public persons against the media, the Court noted that "the individual's interest in
his reputation is also a basic concern," Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169, and held that the first
amendment did not proscribe inquiry into the "editorial processes of those responsible"
for publication of the libel in endeavoring to prove compliance with "a critical element" of
their case-a minimum of subjective awareness of probable falsity under New York Times.
Id. at 155, 169, 171.
155. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155-56 (1979), rev'g 568 F.2d 974, 979 n.15 (2d
Cir.), rev'g 73 F.R.D. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). He accused the defendants-CBS, the
producer and narrator of 60 Minutes, and the author and publisher of Atlantic Monthly-of
libeling him by their portrayal of his charges as mendacious and fabricated in order to
explicate his relief from command. Id. at 156. One member of the Court clearly intimated
that the concession that plaintiff was a "public figure" was correct. Id. at 181, 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (Herbert is "concededly a public figure"). One court of appeals
judge apparently considered him to be both a "public official" and "public figure." Her-
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In its two most recent status decisions, Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,156 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.,'" the Court
further narrowed the statuses of "public figure" and "public official." In the former decision the Court declined to resolve the
question left unresolved by the federal district court and court of
appeals as to whether the claimant-who had numerous associations with the state of Michigan and the federal government"1 8-was a "public official." 15 9 At a minimum, he was a "state
bert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 985 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oaks, J., concurring) ("a United
States Army officer who was a public official and employee, who by his charges against the
military establishment unquestionably made himself a public figure, thereby inviting 'attention and comments' "). A district court judge has recently declined to resolve the "public
official" status issue in light of Herbert's conceded status as a "public figure." Herbert v.
Lando, 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1233, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Compare infra notes 271-73.
156. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
157. 443 U.S. 157 (1979). The thrust of this Article is an attempt to infuse the "public official" status with the underlying values reflected in the Supreme Court's decisional
law, not to provide the reader with a detailed critique of the Court's stringent "public
figure" criteria. For a recent incisive critique of the latter, see Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 49-63 (1983).
158. During the seven-year period antedating his receipt of the "Golden Fleece of the
Month Award," he had received at least a half-million dollars in federal funds-during
pre-trial both sides had proffered "higher estimates." Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 114 n.l. At
the time of the award, Hutchinson was director of research at Kalamazoo State Mental
Hospital. Previously, he had held a comparable position at the Fort Custer State Home.
Both positions were under the direction and control of the Michigan State Department of
Mental Health-consequently, he was a "state employee" during both jobs. Additionally,
he was an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University, a state school, during the
greater part of the period covered by the award. However, a couple of months after
Hutchinson's receipt of the award in April, 1975, the research division employing Hutchinson was closed, and he transferred his funding to the non-profit Foundation for Behavioral
Research, which employed him as research director. Id. at 114-15.
159. The court of appeals had declined to decide the "public official" issue and had
held him to be a "public figure." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1035 n.14 (7th
Cir. 1978). The district court, however, did hold that plaintiff was a "public official" under
the standards of Rosenblatt v. Baer, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327-28
(W.D. Wis. 1977), citing the fact that he held the "important public position" of research
director at Kalamazoo State Hospital and was dealt with as a "responsible public official"
by the federal administrative entities which had underwritten his research. The court relied on Adey v. United Action for Animals, 361 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff d without
opinion, 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974). In this decision the
court found that the plaintiff, who was director of the brain research institute at UCLA,
consultant to NASA, and "intimately involved" in a space mission in which an experimental monkey allegedly died in an inhumane manner, was a "public official," "public figure,"
and involved in a "matter of public interest" for the purpose of defamatory commentary
thereon. Id. at 460-62. Note that the district court decision in Hutchison was followed in a
subsequent case involving the director of the children's section at the state psychiatric hospital and associate professor of clinical psychiatry at the University of Kansas medical
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employee." ' However, in an extremely important footnote, one
of a pregnant trio16 1 in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, the Court
school. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 856 (D. Kan. 1977) ("false light" case).
160. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 114.
161. The other two footnotes have potentially influential effects on public person versus media defendant libel litigation. In footnote nine, the Court, although noting the issue
was not before them, felt "constrained to express some doubt about the so-called 'rule'"
that use of summary judgment "might well be the rule rather than the exception" in determining "whether plaintiff had made an adequate showing of [New York Times] actual malice" ("The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question . . . and
does not readily lend itself to summary disposition."). Id. at 120 & n.9. The lower court
decisional law endeavoring to fathom the import of this pithy footnote is divided regarding
whether normal summary judgment rules apply. See S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS § 1.81 (1982). See also Calder v. South, 104 S.
Ct. 1482, 1488 (1984), where the Court reiterated its footnote as an example of where it
had "declined" to give "special procedural protections" to media defendants in libel cases.
In footnote 16 of Hutchinson, the Court interposed an issue which it acknowledged had
not been examined by either lower federal court, i.e., whether the New York Times standard
applied to "individual," non-media defendants sued by public persons and, then, inexplicably concluded that "this Court has never decided the question." Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at
133 n.16. See also the Court's dicta in a decision dealing with a state farm labor statute.
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 309 n.16 (1979) ("[w]e have
not adjudicated the role of the First Amendment in suits by private parties against nonmedia defendants"). At least two lower court decisions have extended New York Times protection to non-media defendant congressmen like Proxmire. Trails West, Inc. v. Wolff, 32
N.Y.2d 207, 217, 298 N.E.2d 52, 58, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863, 870 (1973) ("[C]ertainly, an
elected official merits the same protection"); Rusak v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 297 n.22
(M.D. Penn. 1978) (The congressman-defendant was "protected by constitutional rights
applicable to the general citizenry"). See generally Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and
First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv.915 (1978); Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust:
Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to Non-Media Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1876 (1982). At least in the realm of public persons, the Chief Justice's "footnote 16"
seems clearly at odds with a number of the Court's precedents. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 264 & n.4, 267-68, 271-72, 282, 286 (1964). The Court talked
throughout the decision of the twin guarantees of speech and press in reversing an award
against the media defendant and four individual defendants. See particularly its discussion
of the "'commercial' advertisement" issue where the Supreme Court concluded that treating this as such might eliminate an "important outlet" for information for those "who wish
to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press." Id. at
266. See also its reference to the "citizen-critic of government." Id. at 282. See also id. at
296-97 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., joining, concurring) (the "people and the press" have a
coequal absolute immunity) and id. at 298, 300, 301, 304, 305 (Goldberg, J., Douglas, J.,
joining, concurring) (the "citizen and the press" have an absolute right of "public criticism"). Other post-New York Times cases similarly appear to reject a media/non-media dichotomy in public person plaintiff cases: Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)
(criminal defamation prosecution of an individual defendant for statements critical of sittingjudges at a press conference ran afoul of the "constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression"); Moity v.Louisiana, 379 U.S. 201 (1964) (a criminal defamation conviction-for imputing illegal imprisonment of a prisoner based on knowingly perjured testimony to a parish district attorney-was reversed per curiam under Garrison v. Louisiana);
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explicitly rejected the notion that mere public employment was
synonymous with "public offical" status: "The Court has not provided precise boundaries for the category of 'public official'; it cannot
be thought to include all public employees, however. "162
The Court thus left the "public offical" versus "public employee" issue for another day. The Court instead limited its analysis to the sole question of whether the behavioral scientist and federal grant recipient was a "limited purpose" public figure in light
of his conceded success in receiving federal grants, the reports
thereon in the local media, and his access to that media, i.e., the
reportage of his reply to receipt of the "Golden Fleece Award."
The Court found these factors insufficient to precipitate application of "public figure" status. Hutchinson's professional activities
and public persona paralleled those of "countless members" of his
profession and his published scholarship was of interest only to a
"relatively small category" of similarly interested co-professionals.1 3 To the extent that his research had developed into a controversial matter, such was a "consequence" of the award. It thus
unequivocally rejected media "bootstrapping" of a previously
purely private person into a "public figure" by press-generated
notoriety: "Clearly,. those charged with defamation cannot, by their own
conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 78 (1966) (defendant "regularly contributed" to a column
on a gratuitous basis and defamed the plaintiff therein; the media defendant which published that column had settled the claim against it. Baer v. Rosenblatt, 106 N.H. 26, 36,
203 A.2d 773, 781 (1964)); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728-29 (1968) (defendant was a candidate for U.S. Senator who made the libelous statements during a televised
speech); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). Collins and the case decided with it both
involved non-media defendants, although the statements were in fact communicated to and
published by the press. Henry v. Collins, 253 Miss. 35, 42-43, 158 So. 2d 29, 33 (1963),
rev'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Henry v. Pearson, 253 Miss. 62, 67-69, 158 So. 2d
695, 697 (1963), rev'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). Although all the above cases involved some direct or indirect media linkage, there is no indication in any of the opinions
that said factor was of any relevance whatever. See also Greenbelt Co-op. Publishing Ass'n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) (The Court concluded that the epithet "blackmail" was
"not slander when spoken" at the city council meeting and "not libel" when reported in
defendant newspaper-rejecting, in dicta, any media/ non-media distinction). In its most
recent opinion, the Court has observed that the publisher of Consumer Reports was a "'media defendant'.. . under any conceivable definition of that term." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1955 n.8 (1984).
162. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8 (emphases added).
163. Id. at 133-36. No member of the Court disputed the majority characterization of
Hutchinson as a private individual, a non-"public figure." Only Justice Brennan dissented
and that was on the Speech and Debate Clause issue. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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figure.'"1
The Hutchinson Court delineated, in further detail, its limiting construction of the "limited purpose" "public figure" status.
Initially, it noted that the media had not specifically identified the
"particular controversy" into which the petitioner had "thrust"
himself-"at most," they had pointed to a "concern about general public expenditures." That generalized concern was, however, "shared by most and related to most public expenditures."' 5 Acceptance of this definition of "public controversy"
would entail inclusion of all recipients or beneficiaries of the
"myriad public grants for research" within "public figuredom," a
position the Court declined to adopt.1 6 8 Furthermore, Hutchinson
had not at any point "assumed any role of public prominence" in
the "broad question" of public concern regarding expenditure of
public moneys. 6 7 By his grant applications and professional scholarship he had not assumed any risk of "public attention and comment" thereon sufficient to justify "public figure" status.6 8 Finally, the Court redefined the "access to the media" policy
rationale for "public figure" status: that policy rationale encompasses only "regular and continuing access" to the media. 6 9
Clearly, in the Court's view, Hutchinson's limited and fleeting
right of response did not precede the Award but was precipitated
by it, hardly "one of the accoutrements"' 7 0 of having attained
"public figure" status.
In the last of the trio of 1979 decisions, Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n Inc., the Court held that a witness who "voluntarily
chose not to appear"'' before a grand jury investigating Soviet
espionage activities in the late 1950's, and was convicted subsequently of criminal contempt was neither an "all purpose' 7 2 nor
164. Id. at 135 (emphases added).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 136.
170. Id.
171. 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
172. Id. at 165. In emphasizing that Wolston was not one of the "small group" of "all
purpose" public figures, the Court noted that he had "a thoroughly private existence"
prior to the newsworthy occurrence, reverted to a post-sentencing "position of relative
obscurity," and at no time had achieved "general fame or notoriety" or "assumed" a "role
of special prominence in the affairs of society" because of his activities. Id.
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a "limited purpose" public figure based upon the "flurry of publicity" precipitated by the incident."7 3 Far from having " 'voluntarily thrust' or 'injected' himself into the forefront of the public
controversy," he had, in fact, been "dragged unwillingly"'' 17 into
any such controversy by governmental pursuit of its investigation.
His declination to appear-with foreknowledge that such refusal
"might be attended by publicity"-was not determinative. Like
attorney Gertz, who had "voluntarily associated himself" with
civil litigation "certain to receive extensive media exposure, ' ' 175

Wolston's involvement in the "particular controversy" was quite
limited-his "minor role" in whatever controversy existed ' " was
restricted to his defense of the contempt citation. The Court refused to consider the criminal contempt citation as itself sufficient
for "limited purpose" public figure status.

77

While his non-ap-

pearance and consequent contempt conviction were undoubtedly
"newsworthy," Gertz's repudiation of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. had, according to the Court, clearly refuted "public figure"
status based on the "simple fact" that activities "attracted media
attention": "A libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York
Times.' 8 There was, furthermore, no evidence that Wolston's absence from the grand jury was "calculated to draw attention to
himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public
with respect to any issue," i.e., his absence was not intended "as a
fulcrum to create public discussion" concerning investigative or
prosecutorial methodology.7 In sum, there was no justification
173. Id. at 163. Collectively, there were fifteen stories in the six week interim between
his initial contemptuous refusal and subsequent sentencing which appeared in the Washington, D.C., and New York press. Id.
174. Id. at 166.
175. Id. at 167.
176. The Court "accept[ed], arguendo" the definition of "public controversy" proposed by defendants-the "propriety of the actions of law enforcement officials" pursuing
the investigation and prosecution of those suspected of Soviet liaisons-while pointedly
concluding that it was "difficult to determine with precision" the "'public controversy' " into
which Wolston had purportedly precipitated himself. Undoubtedly, in the Court's opinion,
there was "no public controversy or debate" at that time concerning Soviet espionage-"all responsible" citizens "were and are opposed" to such. Id. at 166 n.8 (emphasis
added).
177. Id. at 167.
178. Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 168. The Court apparently accepted Wolston's justification that his initial
refusal to appear was attributable to ill-health. Id.
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for a conclusion that Wolston had "relinquished, to any degree,
his interest in the protection of his own name" under the "limited
purpose" public figure concept. 80 Any other result would, under
the exacting criteria of New York Times, "create an 'open season' "
to defame, any and all persons convicted of a criminal offense,
even though most such defendants were " 'drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order . . .to defend themselves
against actions brought by the State.' "181

E. The Lessons of New York Times and Its Progeny
The above discussion of the Supreme Court's defamation "status"
decisions during the fifteen year period 1964-1979 discloses several clearly-evidenced, though not necessarily well-articulated,
facts of life for courts, scholars, and practitioners attempting to
fathom the rules and nuances of New York Times and its "status"
progeny:
-First, the Court has definitively resolved the "status"-"subject matter" threshold determination for application of New York
Times and has constructed a two-tiered analysis of first amendment
rules depending on "status"-for "public persons," the New York
Times criteria, and for "private persons," a minimum of negligence for "actual damages"-in suits against the media."8 2
180. Id. Two members of the Court concurred in the result, eschewing the "more
difficult question" of Wolston's status in 1958 in favor of a conclusion that the intervening
sixteen years had rendered him a "private" individual. Id. at 171-72 (Blackmun, J., with
Marshall, J., joining, concurring). Under the "access"-"assumption-of-risk" "public figure"
rationales he was a "private" individual in 1974. Id. at 171. Such a posture concededly
created a dichotomy between reporters' protection for "contemporaneous reporting of a
controversial event" ("public figure" status) and an historian's more limited protection
("private" status) when he writes "sub specie aeternitatis." In the concurring Justices' view
such merely reflected the respective functions and working limitations of the two professions. Id. The majority had not reached this issue of restoration to "private" status, id., and
had adopted a too narrow holding that applied the "limited purpose" public figure subspecie only to one who "literally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular
view," i.e., "to influence the resolution of the issues involved." "[S]o restrictive a definition" was "unnecessary" in light of the sixteen year "lapse" in the case before it. Id. at
169-70. Only one member of the Court found Wolston to be a "public figure" in both
1958 and 1974. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 169 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976)). For a
thoughtful analysis of "public figure" criterion in light of the "four horsemen" of "public
figuredom" (Gertz, Firestone, Wolston, Hutchinson), see Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
182. The status of the "purely private" case-private plaintiff and non-media defen-
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-Second, the Court has unambiguously constricted the field
of application of the more exacting New York Times standard in
"public figure" cases and has clearly intimated by its "footnote
eight" portentous suggestion that it will similarly respond to expansive or all-encompassing interpretations of inclusion within
"public officialdom."
-Third, the Court's own decisions, expressly delineating the
"public official" status or otherwise providing guidance on its
realm of applicability, refute any suggestion that any and all governmental employees from the highest to the lowest echelons of
governmental employment warrant treatment as "public officials,"
with the concomitant severe incursions on their rights to redress
for reputational injury resultant therefrom. The Court has thus
far concluded or intimated that only the following types of political figures or public employees are required to meet the New York
Times threshold: elected officials at all levels of the body politic;"8 3
all candidates for public office, at whatever level, whether incumbent 1' 4 or non-incumbent; 18 5 members of the judiciary at all
levels; 8 8 governmental attorneys in positions of substantial
power; 1 7 high-ranking police'" and military officials;18 9 the president 90 or members 9 1 of local policy-making boards; a high-ranking school administrator; 92 and federal and state executive officials of significant policy-making authority,1 9 or with functions at
dant-has not been resolved by the Court. See supra note 161. A credit reporting agency
case is pending presently before the Court. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983) (no first amendment or state common law privilege
applied to erroneous'reports of credit reporting agencies), appeal pending.
183. See supra text accompanying note 19 (city commissioner), note 27 and accompanying text (U.S. congressman), note 22 and accompanying text (judges), note 46 and accompanying text (county attorney), note 59 (county commissioner), text accompanying
note 64 (clerk of county criminal and circuit courts), note 102 (mayor).
184. See supra notes 26, 52 & 101.
185. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 22, 29-30, 37 & 44 and accompanying text. The Court treats all
members of the judiciary identically, regardless of their elected or appointed status. In the
cases in notes 29 and 30, it is unclear whether the judges were elected or appointed.
187. See supra note 38; note 44 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 31-32, 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
192. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-71, 573-74 (1968) (implied).
193. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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the core of the political process.9 Furthermore, it is worthwhile
reiterating that the Supreme Court has not held that low-ranking
policemen 19

5

or teachers 96 are "public officials" and has con-

cluded only that a9 supervisor of a county recreation area might be a
"public official"' -- an issue decided negatively by the state court
on remand.'98 Lastly, it is noteworthy that the Court has taken
pains on three occasions to reject the suggestion that the merest
governmental connection suffices for "public official" status-its
"night watchman" analysis in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 99 its rejection of
an attorney-"officer-of-the-court" as a "public official" in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,200 and its pithy "footnote eight" in Hutchinson

v. Proxmire, disavowing mere "governmental affiliation" as sufficient for "public official" status. 0 1
-Fourth, the primary "assumption of risk" and the peripheral "access" rationales underlying the constitutional differential
for "public" and "private" persons and the Court's unequivocal
refutation of media-generated "newsworthiness" as a sufficient basis for a finding of "public" status (basic, explicit postulates for
resolving "public figure" issues in the post-Gertz era) have their
express counterparts in the general standards for determining
"public official" status as delineated by the Court in Rosenblatt v
Baer.2 o2
-Fifth, a close analysis of the defamation decisions during
the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. era discloses that the Supreme Court
has rarely granted review of well-articulated, plaintiff-oriented
lower court decisions 203 and, more frequently, has reversed such
194. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 419-98.
203. See Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2463 (1983), where the court held that the defendant was "presumptively precluded"
from benefitting from the "public official" standard because the story failed to specifically
"identify" plaintiff "as the holder of a public office." Id. at 273-74. Concluding that the
Rosenblatt policy of encouraging discussion of persons in a position to substantially influence public issues only applied where plaintiff was "directly or indirectly" identified as an
office-holder, it was determined that the interest in protecting reputation warranted applying the negligence standard where the plaintiff was not so identified. It did indicate that
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decisions when they impose substantial and, in the majority's esti-

mation, unjustifiable, impediments to the protection of individual
reputation.
In view of the aforesaid factors, it is likely that the Court, in

the imminent future and at an early opportunity, will explicitly
and unequivocally disaffirm the general view of the pre-Hutchinson
v. Proxmire lower court decisional law that "governmental affilia-

tion" connotes "public official" status. It is also probable that the
Court will accord that contention the same cryptic treatment it
rendered the attempt to characterize attorney Gertz as a "de facto
public official"-that it would "distort the plain meaning of the
'public official' category beyond all recognition." 2 0' ,

such "direct or indirect identification" would not be required if the plaintiff was "widely
known throughout the community" (e.g., the president or governor) or where statements
were published "about an official of far lesser stature" "in the area within the official's
jurisdiction and a significantportion of the population in that area would recognize" his status
merely from recitation of his name. Id. (emphasis added). This issue is an open one among
the decisions. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the colloquium-of-office issue on one
occasion, see supra note 102, but has never resolved it. The state high court in Bresler,
another case eventually appealed to the Supreme Court, evidenced doubts that New York
Times applied in such non-identification cases, see supra note 97, but did not resolve the
issue. In addition to the above cases see the following: Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc.,
541 S.W.2d 809, 815-16 (Tex. 1976) (based on record on summary judgment defendant
had adduced no evidence of an "express" or "implied" reference to plaintiff as elected
county surveyor-New York Times inapplicable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Durham
v. Cannan Communications, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 845, 848-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (article
did not reference his status as former special prosecutor but only alleged that he was involved with a bordello-New York Times rejected); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
367 Mass. 849, 863, 330 N.E.2d 161, 171 (1975) (lack of reference to plaintiff's "public
capacity" ".notcrucial"); Goodrick v. Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp. 125, 126 (D. Del. 1980)
(New York Times applied to plaintiff, an assistant public defender, impliedly charged with
criminality despite non-identification of him by official title). See generally Note, 28 ViLL L.
REv. 1028 (1983). The Bufalino decision and the general rules developed therein for colloquium-of-office are consistent with the framework proposed infra in the text accompanying
notes 410-50, are in line with the jurisprudential underpinnings of Gertz and its progeny,
and are likely to be followed subsequently in the decisional law. Undoubtedly, the Court
majority would have ratified the colloquium-of-office rules had the Court granted certiorari
in the case.
204. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
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II. New York Times, Rosenblatt v. Baer, AND THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL
STATUS-TWO DECADES OF INTERPRETATION AND
MISINTERPRETATION

A.

The Public Official Status and Candidacyfor Public Office

The universal consensus of the decisional law has properly concluded that the prototype for inclusion within the "stewardship of
public officials" 20 5 subject to the New York Times rule is the elected
public official. Consequently, all gradations and varieties of federal and state elected public officials have been subjected to the
threshold requirement of the constitutional "actual malice" standard: a United States congressman 20 6 or senator; 20 7 the holder of
205. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964). There is very little
decisional law dealing with the issue of the application of New York Times to foreign officials
or those involved in foreign elections. One early decision refused to extend the rule to an
aspirant non-incumbent (but former) President of Haiti on the now rejected ground that it
did not apply to candidates (i.e., who were not entitled to absolute immunity themselves).
See supra notes 25, 49 and accompanying text. Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F.
Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). To the extent the decision can be read to suggest that
New York Times is inapplicable to foreign officials, it is undoubtedly wrong. See DeRoburt v.
Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 579-80 (D. Hawaii 1979), 507 F. Supp. 880, 882 & n.2 (D.
Hawaii 1981) (plaintiff was a "public official" or "public figure"), 548 F. Supp. 1370, 1373
(1982), reo'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 11 MEDrA L. REP.
(BNA) No. 7 (1985), where the court repeatedly applied the constitutional "actual malice"
rule to the President of Nauru. See also Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162, 1167
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (former Israeli Minister of Defense and present Minister without Portfolio
termed a "public figure"). Any other result would be anomalous, indeed. The "public official" rule has never been strictly limited to criticism by the local governed of their local
governors, but rather to governors in general. A contrary decision regarding foreign officials would logically suggest that critics lose the right of free expression when criticizing
"public officials" outside their geographical locus, a view never accepted by any modern
libel decision. Note that if one is not a foreign official, he can nonetheless become a "vortex" public figure by thrusting himself into a foreign election. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406
F.2d 565, 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Bryant v. Associated Press, 595
F. Supp. 814, 816-18 (D.V.I. 1984) (former government minister and current opposition
leader in British territory of St. Kitts-Nevis held to be a "public figure"). In the latter the
court took note of the plaintiff's "unique and intriguing" argument-that he was not a
"public figure" in the Virgin Islands where the publication occurred-but held that he was
a "public figure" in the Virgin Islands, recognizing the "intimacy of our Caribbean community." It is doubtful the result would or should be different if the story had been picked
up and published by the Associated Press on the mainland, i.e., South Florida or New York
City.
206. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968-72 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (implied),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1101 (1969).
207. Dodd v. Pearson, 277 F. Supp. 469, 470-71 (D.D.C. 1967) ("a high.ranking public official").
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a state office, such as a governor, 08 attorney general, 0 9 state treasurer, 21 or member of the state senate 211 or house of representatives;212 and a myriad of county, city, and local officials of all three
branches of government-mayor; 2 3 city council member, 1 4 alderman, 2 15 or city commissioner; 216 county sheriff;217 county supervisor; 218 judge of the supreme court,2"19 circuit court, 2 0 county
208.

Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 376, 402 A.2d 651, 655 (1979).

209. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church, 103 Ariz. 582, 591-92, 447 P.2d 840, 84950 (1968) (implied), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1969).
210. Morgan v. Winters, 594 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Okla. 1979); Winters v. Morgan, 576
P.2d 1152, 1153 (Okla. 1978).
211. Hawkins v. Oden, 459 A.2d 481, 483-84 (R.I. 1983) (majority leader and vicechairman of the joint committee on legislative affairs); Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73
A.D.2d 276, 284, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 280 (1980); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C.
65, 70, 240 S.E.2d 812, 816, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
212. Bennett v. Transamerican Press, 298 F. Supp. 1013, 1014-15 (S.D. Iowa 1969).
213. Savannah News-Press v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, 234, 254 S.E.2d 151, 152
(1979); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17, 449 N.E.2d 716, 721, 462 N.Y.S.2d 822, 827,
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 109 (1983); Lundstrom v. Winnebago Newspapers, Inc., 58 Ill. App.
2d 33, 206 N.E.2d 525, 527 (1965); DeLoach v. Maurer, 130 Ga. App. 824, 826, 204
S.E.2d 776, 778 (1974); Prairieland Broadcasters v. Thompson, 135 Ga. App. 73, 73, 217
S.E.2d 296, 297 (1975); Mansfield v. Holcomb, 5 Wash. App. 881, 883, 491 P.2d 672, 673
(1971); Stokes v. Lorain journal Co., 26 Ohio Misc. 2d 219, 226, 266 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ct.
Comm. Pis. 1970); Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (the unsalaried position was "sufficiently casual" that the mayor, a retired engineer,
had fixed the sewer pumping station on a weekend when it ceased functioning), cert. denied,
373 So. 2d 462 (1979); Newton v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 447 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Holly v. Cannady, 669 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)
(mayor pro-tem's status as "public official" undisputed).
214. Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161, 165 (Me. 1983); Grabavoy
v. Wilson, 87 11. App. 2d 193, 230 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1967) (implied); Skain v. Weldon, 422
S.W.2d 271, 275 (Mo. 1967); Weeks v. M-P Publications Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 637, 516 P.2d
193, 198 (1973); Fuhrman v. Risner, 92 Cal. App. 3d 725, 731, 155 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126-27
(1979). See also Raffa v. Shilbury, 24 A.D.2d 814, 815, 263 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (1965) (implied that town supervisor was "public official"-unclear whether elected or appointed).
215. Glover v. Herald Co., 549 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 155-59, 419 N.E.2d 350, 355-62 (1980) (implied), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
216. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966).
217. Pritchard v. Times Southwest Broadcasting Inc., 277 Ark. 458, 460-62, 642
S.W.2d 877, 878-80 (1982) (implied); Foster v. Upchurch, 624 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.

1981).
218. Sierra Breeze v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 102, 107, 149 Cal. Rptr. 914,
917-18 (1979); Grebner v. Runyon, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1719, 1721 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) (county commissioner-status conceded); Trapp v. Southeastern Newspapers, 10
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1985, 1986 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (not disputed plaintiff, elected county
commissioner, is a public official).
219. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 379, 366 N.E.2d
1299, 1305, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 949, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). The supreme court
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court, 221 or police court; 222 member of the school board; 223 chairman of the county board;224 county district attorney; 225 county
superintendant of public instruction; 226 county surveyor; 2 7 town230
ship tax assessor 228 or auditor; 229 and parish (county) treasurer.
Reflecting the postulate that "[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
is the lowest level court of general subject matter jurisdiction in the New York State. The
supreme court appellate division is the intermediate appeals court in New York.
220. Dostert v. Washington Post Co., 531 F. Supp. 165, 166 n.1 (N.D. W. Va. 1982).
See also Times Publishing Co. v. Huffstettler, 409 So. 2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)

(unclear whether circuit judge elected or appointed), review denied, 417 So. 2d 329 (Fla.
1982).
221. Simonson v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 654 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1981). See also
Ross v. News-Journal Co., 228 A.2d 531, 532 (Del. 1967) (justice of peace and appointed
alderman, a judicial officer under Delaware law, "conceded" that they were "public officials'--unclear whether justice of the peace was appointed or elected). The latter case is
noteworthy in another respect. The court rejected an attempt to draw a de facto/de jure
distinction regarding the appointed alderman (who did not meet the jurisdictional requirements for the position) for purposes of the case. Although admitting that she was not a "de
jure" alderman, the court concluded that such did not have "any bearing." Id. at 535. This
is clearly a correct approach to the issue. Any other result would allow a "public official" to
impeach the legality of his functioning in an official capacity, admit he was acting totally
ultra vires, and diminish his status to that of a private person-surely, a bizarre result.
222. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ky. 1966)
(implied).
223. Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 50 Misc. 2d 574, 578, 270 N.Y.S.2d 913,
917 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 27 A.D.2d 543, 544, 275 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (1966). See also Scott v.
McCain, 272 S.C. 198, 201-02, 250 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1978) (seven members of board of
trustees of county school district are "public officials"-not stated whether appointed or
elected).
224. Costello v. Capital Cities Media, 111 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1016, 445 N.E.2d 13, 18
(1982) (implied).
225. Brubaker v. Reading Eagle Co., 422 Pa. 63, 65, 221 A.2d 190, 191 (1966); Fox
v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563, 566, 221 A.2d 181, 183 (implied), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
226. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
'227. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. 1976), cert. de.
nied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977). The state court held that unless there was a direct or implied
reference to his position as elected county surveyor, the New York Times rule was inapplicable. It remanded the case for trial on this and other issues. Id. at 814-16. See supra note
203 and accompanying text.
228. Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 557 F.2d 107, 108 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977) (the court remarked that it was hard to find a more "classical
application of first amendment values"). See also Bukky v. Painesville Tel. & Lake Geauga
Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 47-48, 428 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1981) (township trustee-unclear whether elected or appointed).
229. Kernick v. Dardanell Press, 428 Pa. 288, 295, 236 A.2d 191, 194-95 (1967).
230. Cherry v. Hall, 270 So. 2d 626, 628-29 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
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choices among candidates for office is essential," for such candidates, if successful, "inevitably shape the course that we follow as
a nation," 231 the cases have also uniformly held that candidates for
a rather broad spectrum of offices, whether in a primary or a general election,2 32 are compelled to meet the same exacting standard. Candidates for the following offices have thus been held to
fall within the "public official" rubric: the United States presidency; 233 the United States House of Representatives, 234 or the
Senate; 2 5 governor, 2 3 6 or lieutenant governor; 23 7 state insurance
239 or house of representatives; 240
commissioner; 2 38 state senate,
231. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (dicta). Although rare, the candidacy
for public office can be for an appointive position. Goodrick v. Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp.
125, 126 (D. Del. 1980) (nominated for appointment to circuit court-a "public figure").
In one interesting case a court applied the New York Times standard to an elected member
of a university student senate as a matter of "law and equity" without deciding whether
such application was constitutionally compelled. Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158, 166,
418 P.2d 404, 412 (1966).
232. Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir.) ("It is
part of the democratic evolution of our country that primary elections have increasingly
taken the place of private clubs and close knit caucuses, to select both the holders of party
office and nominees for public office"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968).
233. Yorty v. Stone, 259 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1972) (non-libel case involving a candidate trying to keep his name off the Florida presidential primary ballot).
234. Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 452, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820-21
(1966) (competing candidate against defendant-incumbent in Republican primary); Perkins
v. Mississippi Publishers, Co., 241 So. 2d 139, 141 (Miss. 1970).
235. Washington v. World Publishing Co., 506 P.2d 913, 916 (Okla. 1973) (American
Party candidate); Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587, 590 (Okla.) (candidate for Democratic nomination conceded he was a "public figure"), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
923 (1982).
236. Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 680-81 (W. Va.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Co. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337, 344
(Nev. 1983) (candidate for Republican nomination).
237. Beamer v. Nishiki, 670 P.2d 1264, 1272 (Hawaii 1983) (status as public figure
conceded).
238. Dyer v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 678, 683-85 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ refused, 250 La.
533, 197 So. 2d 79 (1967) ("The result is correct").
239. Taylor v. Greensboro News Co., 57 N.C. App. 426, 436, 291 S.E.2d 852, 858
(1982) (Democratic primary); Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 540,
445 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Republican candidate), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Phifer v.
Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 1968); Morrissette v. Corvette, 122 N.H. 731, 734-35, 449
A.2d 1221, 1222-23 (1982) (Democratic primary); Sigman v. Gove, 169 Ga. App. 580, 581,
314 S.E.2d 238, 239 (1984) (held to be a "public figure"); Sparks v. Boone, 560 S.W.2d
236, 238-39 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (candidate in Democratic primary). In this latter case, the
plaintiff also may have been subject to the New York Times requirement on another basis not
discussed by the court-the allegedly defamatory criticism was directed at his recent presidency of a major state university. He was probably a public official for such purposes. See
infra text accompanying notes 274-75.
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state supreme court;241 county sheriff;242 county commissioner, 243
or county (parish) council member; 244 district attorney; 245 town
moderator; 246 member of the board of education; 2 7 and constitutional convention delegate.248 A number of cases have involved
twofold justifications for application of the New York Times standard, paralleling Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron,4 9 i.e., an
elected official running for reelection or for another office. 25 0
240. Jacobowitz v. Posner, 21 N.Y.2d 936, 237 N.E.2d 83, 289 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1968),
aftg, 28 A.D.2d 706, 282 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1967).
241. Taylor v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 573 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tenn. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1978).
242. Brown v. Herald Co., 698 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1983); Guthrie v. Annabel, 50
Ill. App. 2d 969, 971, 365 N.E.2d 1367, 1368 (1977).
243. Demman v. Star Broadcasting Co., 28 Utah 2d 50, 52, 497 P.2d 1378, 1379
(1972) (implied).
244. Blanke v. Time, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 378, 380 n.6 (E.D. La. 1970) (also a matter of
"public interest").
245. Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 148, 325 So. 2d 137, 142 (1975) (implied).
246. LaPrade v. H.S. Gere & Sons, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 797, 360 N.E.2d 915, 916
(1977).
247. Magowan v. McDermott, 47 A.D.2d 657, 658, 364 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189-90 (1975),
affid, 38 N.Y.2d 953, 348 N.E.2d 608, 384 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1976); Jackson v. Atlantic
Monthly Co., 324 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See also Noel v. McCain, 538 F.2d
633, 636 (4th Cir. 1976) (unclear whether school board members designated as "public
officials" were elected or appointed).
248. A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 75, 265 A.2d 207, 218 (1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 921 (1971).
249. 401 U.S. 295 (1971). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
250. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1049 (1970) (United States senator and Republican candidate for president); Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964) (incumbent-candidate for reelection for United
States senate); Wells v. Morton, 388 S.W.2d 607, 608-10 (Ky. 1965) (incumbent-candidate
for circuit judge) (implied); Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp., 293 So. 2d 751, 752
(Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (candidate for reelection to city commission); Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1968) (incumbent-candidate for county commissioner);
Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 118, 413 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (1980)
(city councilman and candidate for mayor), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Fong v.
Mirena, 655 P.2d 875, 876 (Hawaii 1982) (incumbent-candidate for state house of representatives); Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 314, 477 A.2d 1005,
1006 (1984) (state senator-candidate for reelection and deputy majority leader); Gulf Publishing Co., Inc. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 698 (Miss. 1983) (one plaintiff was circuit clerk
running for reelection, the other was a member of the state house of representatives running for senator); Fisher v. Larsen, 138 Cal. App. 3d 633, 634, 646, 648, 188 Cal. Rptr.
216, 222, 230, 232 (1982) (plaintiff was defeated candidate for reelection to the school
board-variously called a "public official" and "public figure"), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 390
(1983); Matassa v. Bel, 246 La. 294, 297, 302, 164 So. 2d 332, 333, 335 (1964) (member of
the state legislature and candidate for constable). The same is undoubtedly true where a
candidate, non-incumbent is criticized for his conduct in said office in the past, Weaver v.
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A wide variety of non-elected government officials and employees at every gradation of the federal, state, and local government has been subsumed within the almost open-ended, "governmental affiliation" approach to the "public official" status under
the grossly misunderstood and misapplied Rosenblatt v. Baer standards. In the upper tier of this wide-ranging group are numerous
examples of appointees to state, county, or local agencies, boards,
or commissions who wield substantial authority and partake in the
making of policy. These appointees undoubtedly and justifiably
qualify under either the "have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs" or "independent interest beyond that in the qualifications and performance of all government employees" alternative criteria of Rosenblatt v. Baer.25 ' These appointees have
included: U.S. ambassador or consul to a foreign embassy; 252 head

of the state bureau for the elderly; 253 member of the state board
Prior Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967, 973 (Okla. 1977), or in another public office, D'Amato v.
Freeman Printing Co., 38 Wis. 2d 589, 596, 157 N.W.2d 686, 690 (1968) (candidate for
judge, regarding his conduct as district attorney), or where he is running for election to a
municipal court position to which he was appointed, Driscoll v. Block, 3 Ohio App. 2d 351,
358-61, 210 N.E.2d 899, 904-06 (1965).
251. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. The late Professor Eldredge has
made an impassioned appeal for treatment of such board members as private individuals.
See ELDREDGE, supra note 24. This position, however, is untenable regarding elected members, see infra notes 410-18 and accompanying text, or appointed members thereof. The
limited Supreme Court guidance on the issue is contrary to his position. See supra notes 64
& 90-93 and accompanying text. Indeed, it would appear that such board members generally qualify under either of the Rosenblatt criteria. Only two opinions, neither of which
were final status adjudications, have declined to find such board members public officials.
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 862-63, 330 N.E.2d 161, 171-72
(1975) (school department food service director and member of redevelopment authority
board-court expressed "no opinion" on "public official" status issue-such was left for
further development on remand); Jones v. Himstead, 7 MEDIA L. RE'. (BNA) 2433, 2435
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1981) (Stone followed, on summary judgment motion regarding airport
commission member). The Gertz decision does not support Eldredge's position. The Court
did reference the fact that Gertz had, "[s]everal years prior to the present incident...
served briefly on housing committees" as a mayoral appointee, but that he had never had a
"remunerative governmental position." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351
(1974). The latter aside is, however, no precedential support for a contention that had
Gertz been publicly identified and criticized in his capacity as a board member he would
not have been deemed a public official.
252. Davis v. Costa-Gravas, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2484, 2487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(ambassador and consul to Chile during Allende overthrow).
253. Michaud v. Inhabitants of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me. 1978)
("chief of an important State bureau" and gubernatorial appointee of cabinet level
stature).
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of optometry; 25 4 member of the board of directors of the metropolitan transit authority; 25 5 member or president of the county
airport board;256 executive secretary of the state board of medical
examiners; 257 member of a city licensing board;258 member of the
state fish and game commission;259 commissioner of a port district;26 0 director of the state lottery; 61 chairman of the state
board of highways;26 2 chairman of the county democratic primary
board;26 3 and chief zoning hearing officer for a county. 264 Of coequal stature is another grouping of public functionaries whose extensive involvement in and control over public affairs, public monies, and important governmental functions qualify them as public
officials: director of the division of utilities and sanitation of the
254. Rogers v. Doubleday & Co., 644 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (gubernatorial app6intee approved through state senate confirmation process), rev'd on other
grounds, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2173, 2174-75 (Tex. 1984).
255. Murray v. Williams, 166 Ga. App. 865, 866, 305 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1983).
256. MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 831 (Wyo. 1980) (status
admitted); McMurry v. Howard Publications, Inc., 612 P.2d 14, 15 (Wyo. 1980) (companion case to MacGuire); Fegley v. Morthimer, 204 Pa. Super. 54, 55, 202 A.2d 125, 126
(1964) (school board member and chairman of the building committee).
257. Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 641-42, 266 S.E.2d 230, 232-33, affd sub
nom Morton v. Gardner, 155 Ga. App. 600, 604, 271 S.E. 2d 733, 737 (1980). The latter
decision concluded, however, that the material did not apply to his "official conduct." See
infra note 396 and accompanying text.
258. Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 372 Mass. 582, 583, 363 N.E.2d
240, 241 (1977) ("admittedly" a public official). See also Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co., 48
Ill. App. 2d 402, 403, 199 N.E.2d 73, 74 (1964) (dicta to the effect that New York Times
"would have effectively disposed of this case"-unclear whether village president deemed
public official was elected or appointed).
259. Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho 364, 365-66, 529 P.2d 264, 265 (1974).
260. Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 40-41, 515 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1973)
(status "unquestioned").
261. Bruno v. New York News, Inc., 89 A.D. 2d 260, 263, 456 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839
(1982); Brady v. Hearst Corp., 281 F. Supp. 637, 641 (D. Mass. 1968) (chairman of the
Massachusetts parking authority-dicta in right of privacy action brought by wife).
262. Johnson v. Capital City Press, Inc., 346 So. 2d 819, 821-22 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 350 So. 2d 677 (La. 1977) (decision "correct").
263. McNabb v. Tennessean Newspaper, Inc., 55 Tenn. App. 380, 392-93, 400
S.W.2d 871, 876-80 (1965), cert. denied (1966). It is unclear whether the plaintiff was appointed by the state Democratic executive committee to whom he reported and certified
precinct returns, or was appointed by local governmental officials. In any event, his functions were extensively regulated by statute and he performed a pivotal role in the local
political process. The state court implicitly held him to be a public official without discussing his status in detail; this treatment is undoubtedly correct.
264. Samborsky v. Hearst Corp., 2 MEDIA L. RaP. (BNA) 1638, 1639 (D. Md. 1977)
(exercising quasi-judicial functions).
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Virgin Islands department of public works; 26 5 United States district attorney; 26 6 chief investigator for the House Un-American
Activities Committee; 26 7 and director of the state employees' retirement system.2 6s Also included have been individuals with policymaking and supervisory status within the police or military hierarchy-chief of police 269 or comparable official, 270 commanding
265. Moorhead v. Millin, 542 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.V.I. 1982) (extensive responsibilities over drinking water distribution, collection of solid waste and its disposal, sanitation,
sewage, salt water supply, cemetery services, and other utilities give plaintiff "control over
an important area of local government . . . important to the health and welfare of the
people of the territory"). A comparable argument for "public official" status could be
made regarding an independent contractor which, "[flor all practical purposes" functions
as the sanitation department of several cities and towns, i.e., in a "quasi-governmental"
capacity. See Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (decided on a pre-Rosenbloom "public interest" basis).
266. Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 170-71, 439 A.2d 652,
659 (1981) (status conceded).
267. Stripling v. Literary Guild, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1958, 1959-60 (W.D. Tex.
1979) (also a "public figure"), affd, 636 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Dalton v.
Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 176, 180, 188 N.W.2d 494, 495, 499 (1971) (state assistant attorney general and head of criminal investigation division held to be a "public figure" and
involved in a matter of "public or general concern"). He also clearly qualifies as a "public
official" under Rosenblatt v. Baer.
268. Schaefer v. Lynch, 306 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. 1981).
269. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651 (divided
opinion, affirming trial court) (appointed county sheriff), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970);
Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So. 2d 1306, 1310 (La.) (acting chief of police), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 829 (1978); Goolsby v. Wilson, 146 Ga. App. 288, 289, 246 S.E.2d 371, 372 (1978);
McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1976);
Jurkowski v. Crawley, 637 P.2d 56, 57 (Okla. 1981); Henslee v. Monks, 571 P.2d 440, 44142 (Okla. 1977) (parties "agree" plaintiff is a "public official"); Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 385-86, 415 A.2d 683, 685 (1980).
270. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 349, 160 N.W.2d 1, 14
(1968) (one of four detective captains-outranked only by the inspector of detectives, inspector of police, and chief of police); Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir.
1965) (deputy chief of detectives of Chicago and lieutenant of police); Thuma v. Hearst
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 867, 868 n.2, 872 (D. Md. 1972) (captain of county police and commander of police district); Hohman v. A.S. Abell Co., 44 Md. App. 193, 407 A.2d 794,
797-98 (1979) (major of county police and head of traffic division-one of "high-ranking
officers" depicted in article); Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225, 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982)
(plaintiff was assistant superintendent of state liquor enforcement division of state liquor
board, later merged with the state department of public safety); Suchomel v. Suburban Life
Newspapers, Inc., 40 I11.2d 32, 37, 240 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1968) (sergeant of police and juvenile
officer who was in full charge of twenty officers during his shift and second in command
generally of the police force); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Blessent, 601 S.W.2d 487, 48889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) ("ranking officer" of the state department of public safety in the
Dallas area-"a high-ranking police officer charged with supervising others in the enforcement of drug laws"); Shipley v. Knoxville Journal, 670 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1984) (city safety director deemed a "public figure"), rev. denied (1984); Hoke v. Paul, 65
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officer of a naval vessel during wartime,2 7 1 ranking colonel in the
air national guard 27 2 or marine corps 273-- or persons with comparable stature in the field of education-superintendent of a junior
college district, 27 4 or dean of the college of education of a state
university. 7 The positions of these individuals would appear similarly to justify "public official" status under the aforementioned
criteria.
Juxtaposed to these appropriate determinations are a significant number of lower echelon government employees, seemingly
prototypical ordinary citizens, that the courts have indefensibly inHawaii 478, 653 P.2d 1155, 1158 (1982) (a captain of police was a "highly visible 'public
official' "); Koch v. Laborico, 66 Or. App. 78, 80, 674 P.2d 602, 605-06 (1983) (day shift
supervisor of "nerve center" for all police dispatches for city of Portland and encompassing county held to be a public official), rev. denied, 296 Or. 712, 678 P. 2d 740 (1984). See
also In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 96, 397 P.2d 205, 211 (1964) (disparaging statements concerning J. Edgar Hoover governed by New York Times in case involving admission to the
bar). This classification would include the administrator of a major penal facility. West v.
New York Daily News, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1269, 1270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (warden of
Brooklyn house of detention concedes his status as a "public official" or "public figure").
271. Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1978) (had "control of governmental activity of the most sensitive nature"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979). See also Davis v. Costa-Gravas, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2484, 2487-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (commander of U.S. military group in Chile during Allende overthrow).
272. Sands v. American G.I. Forum, 97 N.M. 625, 628-29, 642 P.2d 611, 614 (Ct.
App. 1982) (plaintiff, under consideration for promotion to brigadier general, "agreed"
with trial court determination of "public official" status). Undoubtedly, General Westmoreland is a public official regarding his actions in Vietnam. See supra note 48 and Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1167 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (court in discussing issue of televising of libel trial, characterized proceedings as involving the "high military command in
Vietnam"), affid, 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1013 (2d Cir. 1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, 596
F. Supp. 1170, 1172-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court apparently interchangeably refers to
plaintiff as a "public official" and a "public figure."
273. MacNeil v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 22, 23, 25 (D.D.C.
1975) (faculty member at the U.S. Defense Department's Industrial College of the Armed
Forces giving lectures as a member of a "National Security Seminar," one of which was
filmed by defendant-plaintiff was governmental "spokesman" ".onmatters of great public
importance," the Vietnam War). One decision erroneously applied New York Times to an
army major after Gertz under the Rosenbloom "public or general concern" approach. Nieves
v. Army Times, 440 F. Supp. 677, 679 (D.P.R. 1976).
274. McCunn v. California Teachers Ass'n, 3 Cal. App. 3d 956, 962-63, 83 Cal. Rptr.
846, 850-51 (1970).
275. Hicks v. Stone, 425 So. 2d 807, 813 (La. Ct. App. 1982), writ denied, 429 So. 2d
129 (La. 1983) (plaintiff was a "public official, or at least a public figure" regarding his
university involvement). See also State v. Deffley, 395 So. 2d 759, 761 (La. 1981) (criminal
defamation case where victims were parish (county) school supervisor and school superintendent); Cone v. Phipps Broadcasting, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1972, 1975 (M.D. Ga. 1979)
(county superintendent of schools is "chief operating officer" of the school system).

1984]

DEFAMING PUBLIC OFFICIALS

635

cluded within the "public official" status: supervisor of a branch

277
post office; 27 6 personnel coordinator in clerk-of-court's office;
independently contracted architectural and structural engineer; 278
psychiatric27 9 or traditional28
social worker; public school
teacher; 281 administrator of a county motor pool; 282 patronagesecretary to the public works director;28 3 army pediatric clinic re-

276. Silbowitz v. Lepper, 32 A.D.2d 520, 520, 299 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (1969), affg, 55
Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
277. Guzzardo v. Adams, 411 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (La. Ct. App.) (one of thirty-two
supervisors of equal rank and salary in clerk's office), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 942 (La.
1982). The application of the New York Times standard was undoubtedly correct on another
ground, however, as plaintiff "thrust himself into the fray" regarding his employer's controversial trip. The court confuses the "public official" and "public figure" statuses.
278. Turley v. WTAX, Inc., 94 Ill. App. 2d 377, 381-82, 236 N.E.2d 778, 780-81
(1968).
279. Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 484-85, 204 N.E. 2d 441, 445-46 (1965) (New
York Times "reasoning" of "considerable influence").
280. Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 441-43 (Tenn. 1978). See also Whitmore
v. Kansas City Star Co., 499 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (plaintiff-deputy juvenile
officer in county foster home department-subject to "actual malice" standard under "trilogy of libel"-New York Times, Butts, and Rosenbloom).
281. Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App. 1978)
(high school chemistry teacher); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101,
1103 (Okla. 1978) (high school wrestling coach); Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d
889, 892-93, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974) (high school teachers and coaches). In the same
class is the designation of a law faculty member-assistant dean as a public official, Gallman
v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 991-92, 497 S.W.2d 47, 49-50 (1973) (alternate ground was "public or general concern" criterion under Rosenbloom), or a professor and head of the English
department of a state community college. Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369, 372, 192 S.E.2d
754, 757 (1972) (Rosenbloom "public or general concern" test applied).
282. Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 413-16, 589 P.2d 1223,
1226-28 (1979).
283. Grzelak v. Calumet Publishing Co., 543 F.2d 579, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1975). The
exact basis for this decision is unclear. The court initially found merit in the contention
that the plaintiff "occupied a public position and that the matter of her public appointment
was a subject of public or general interest." However, even if not a "public figure," her
patronage status was deemed an issue of "genuine interest and concern," id., referencing
Rosenbloom. The reference to the latter decision in 1975 would, of course, be an erroneous
ground for the constitutional "actual malice" standard as a matter of first amendment jurisprudence. It seems probable that the court, applying Indiana law in a diversity case,
meant to rely on Rosenbloom as a matter of Indiana state law, following a then recent Indiana decision which reaffirmed the Rosenbloom approach, regardless of the status of the individual, in matters of "general and public concern." Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co.
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 679-80, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586-87
(1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). Consequently, although the "public official" status of the plaintiff (if such was the basis) is undoubtedly erroneous, the standard was clearly
correct as a matter of state law. See infra text accompanying notes 446-50.
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ceptionist; 8 4 assistant public defender; 28 5 independently contracted doctor for correctional facilities; 28 6 garden variety police
officer;2 817 employee of the department of parks and recreation
284.

Audil v. Times Journal Co., 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2302, 2304 (E.D. Va. 1984).

285. Tague v. Citizens for Law & Order, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 21-24, 142
Cal. Rptr. 689, 691-94 (1971); Goodrick v. Gannet Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 125, 126 (D.
Del. 1980) (conceded status as "public official"). The New York Times standard was, however, appropriately applied in the latter based on his status as a candidate for appointment
to the circuit court and concomitant alternative status as a public figure.
286. Green v. Northern Publishing Co., 655 P.2d 736, 741 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983). Compare Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271, 279 (Miss. 1984),
where the court held that emergency room physicians at a publicly-funded hospital were
"vortex public figures." The court implicitly rejected "public official" status, id. at 279 n.9,
noting that, though they were "public employees," they held no "public office." Id. at 277.
287. Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987, 989-90 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (state highway
patrolman); Russell v. Smith, 456 So. 2d 462, 464 (Fla. 1984) (police officer), cert. denied,
11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) No. 14 (1985); Pierce v. Pacific & Southern Co., 166 Ga. App.
113, 116, 303 S.E.2d 316, 318-19 (undercover policeman) cert. denied (1983); Gray v.
Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 590-91 (10th Cir. 1981) (patrolman); Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757,
762 (Me. 1981) (detective); Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 240 n.5,
445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 795 n.5 (1981) (police officers); Lancaster v. Daily Banner-News Publishing Co., 274 Ark. 145, 622 S.W.2d 671, 672 (1981) ("public official" status "conceded"
by policeman); Hansen v. Stoll, 130 Ariz. 454, 457, 636 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Ct. App. 1981)
(federal drug enforcement agents); Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 301 Pa.
Super. 475, 478 n.1, 448 A.2d 6, 8 n.1 (parties "agree, as they must," that plaintiff-sergeant was a public official), app. denied (1982). Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C. App. 209, 213, 210
S.E.2d 446, 448-49 (1974) (county deputy sheriff), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d
793 (1975); Dellinger v. Belk, 34 N.C. App. 488, 490, 238 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1977) (taxicab
inspector), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 182, 241 S.E.2d 517 (1978); Wollman v. Graff, 287
N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D. 1980) (part-time police officer) (implied); Coursey v. Greater Niles
Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 262-65, 239 N.E.2d 837, 840-41 (1968) (patrolman); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 Ill. App. 3d 300, 303-04, 337 N.E. 2d 443, 446 (1975)
(policeman); Weber v. Woods, 31 111. App. 3d 122, 127, 334 N.E. 2d 857, 860 (1975)
(police officer in departmental communications division); Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co., 557 F.
Supp. 951, 957 (D. Md. 1983) (state police sergeant); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563,
566 (Minn. 1977) (police officer, deputy sheriff, and deputy sheriff-dispatcher); Rowden v.
Amick, 446 S.W.2d 849, 857-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (deputy city marshall); Postill v.
Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 619, 325 N.W.2d 511, 516 (1982) (appointed county jail administrator); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 91 N.M.
250, 252-53, 572 P.2d 1258, 1260-61 (Ct. App.) (deputy sheriffs), writ denied, (1977), cert,
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Malerba v. Newsday, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 623, 624, 406 N.Y.S.2d
552, 554 (1978) (county patrolman); McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 283-84, 270 S.E.2d
124, 125 (1980) (policeman); Fogus v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 111 111. App. 3d 1060,
1063-64, 444 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-03 (1982) (police officer); Times-Mirror Co. v. Harden,
628 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) ("stipulates" plaintiff-state undercover narcotics'agent was a public official); Harrison v. Williams, 430 So. 2d 585, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (police officer); Angelo v. Brenner, 84 Ill. App. 3d 594, 597, 406 N.E.2d 38,
40 (1980) (police officer); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 11, 356
A.2d 472, 476 (1975) (police officer and juvenile officer); Shafer v. Lamar Publishing Co.,
621 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Mo. Ct. App.) (police officer), motion for transfer denied (1981);
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and director of its ski program;' and chief x-ray technician at a
county hospital. 289 A number of others designated by the courts as
"public officials" are difficult to categorize because of the dearth
of discussion therein. These characterizations, however, may have
been defensible had there been a fact-intensive delineation of
their duties and authority: executive director of a city parking authority;2 90 director of county computer services; 291 director of
town department of parks and recreation or city manager;29 2 chief
of the division of penalties of the corporation counsel; 29 3 assistant,29 4 or deputy,2 9 5 district or village attorney; 29 6 director of a
NAACP v. Moody, 350 So. 2d 1365, 1369 (Miss. 1977) (highway patrolman was public
figure, misinterpreting New York Times); Ethridge v. North Miss. Communications, Inc., 460
F. Supp. 347, 350-51 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (investigator-undercover officer found to be both
public official and public figure); Starr v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 157 W. Va. 447, 452,
201 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1974) (sergeant); Ramaccioti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217, 225 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (sergeant); Hart v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1811,
1812 (D.C. Kan. 1979) (federal narcotics bureau agent); Angel v. Ward, 43 N.C. App. 288,
292-93, 258 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1979) (junior I.R.S. agent); Bonar v. Heth, 10 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1057, 1059-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (deputy sheriff, performing duties of community
relations and internal affairs officer); Willis v. Perry, 677 P.2d 961, 963 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983) (city patrolmen); McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 69 Or. App. 136, 685 P.2d
458, 460 (1984) (police officer), cert. denied, 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) No. 12 (1985).
288. Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 317 (Colo. 1981).
289. Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 190, 334 N.E.2d 79, 86 (1975) (parties
"agreed" that New York Times applied).
290. Burke v. Deiner, 190 N.J. Super. 382, 390, 463 A.2d 963, 967, rev'd on other
grounds, 97 N.J. 465, 479 A.2d 393 (1984). See also Rye v. Seattle Times Co., 678 P.2d
1282, 1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (executive director of federally-funded anti-poverty
agency did not contest status as "public figure" or "public official"), rev. denied, 11 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA) No. 3 (1984).
291. Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc., 42 Colo. App. 324, 599 P.2d 931
(1979). It is unclear from the case whether plaintiff was deemed a "public official" on this
ground alone or also because of his status as a commissioner when some of the alleged
impropriety started. The case was reversed on procedural grounds, 631 P.2d 1114 (Colo.
1981), and no "actual malice" was found on remand. 661 P.2d 289 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
292. Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 316-17 (Colo. 1981).
A third individual allegedly defamed by defendant was an "employee of the department
and director of its ski programs." It is suggested that the latter qualifies as a mere government employee. See supra text accompanying notes 276-89. See also Buratt v. Capital City
Press, Inc., 459 So. 2d 1268, 1270 n.2 (Ct. App. La. 1984) (member of a parish police jury
and parish manager a "public figure").
293. Schneph v. New York Post Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 1011, 213 N.E.2d 309, 265
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1965), aft'g, 23 A.D.2d 822, 259 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1965) (mem.).
294. Dineen v. Star Press, Inc., 391 A.2d 834, 836 (Me. 1978) (implied); Windsor v.
Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (conceded he was a "public figure"
regarding "official conduct" as former assistant U.S. attorney), app. denied (1983); Dowd v.
Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (D.D.C. 1984) (attorney members of Justice Department "strike force" conceded "public official" status).
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city urban development agency; 297 county engineer; 29 8 county
medical examiner;2 9 9 village building inspector;3 0 0 delinquent tax
collector,3 01 or appointed tax assessor; 30 2 principal of an attendance center, 0 3 or a high school;3 04 chief deputy in a county clerk's
295. Bryan v. Brown, 339 So. 2d 577, 583 (Ala. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954
(1977).
296. Ewald v. Roelofs, 120 Ill. App. 2d 30, 256 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1970) (status conceded); Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 99 Ill. App. 2d 1, 241 N.E.2d 28, 36-37
(1968), rev'd on other grounds, 43 Ill.2d 239, 252 N.E.2d 538 (1969) (city attorney), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970); McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 390 So.2d 556, 560
(La. Ct. App. 1980) (city attorney and attorney for harbor and terminal district), cert, denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). See also Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff categ'orized without discussion of the underlying facts as a "public
official or public figure by virtue of his former status as city attorney and his current activities relating thereto or emanating therefrom"), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978). See
also Hahn v. Andrello, 44 A.D.2d 501, 503, 355 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (1974) (need not decide if assistant corporation counsel was public official-Rosenbloom applied), af'd, 36
N.Y.2d 907, 334 N.E.2d 597, 372 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1975); Frink v. McEldowney, 36 A.D.2d
536, 318 N.Y.S.2d 924 (mem.), affd without opinion, 29 N.Y.2d 720, 275 N.E.2d 337, 325
N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971) (court noted and relied on New York Times and Rosenbloom regarding
town attorney); Batson v. Time, Inc., 298 So. 2d 100, 102 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (Rosenbloom
applied to former chief counsel of Louisiana department of revenue), cert. denied, 299 So.
2d 803 (La. 1983).
297. Gallagher v. Johnson, 611 P.2d 613, 614 (Mont. 1980) (plaintiff "agreed to be a
public officer").
298. Blessum v. Howard County Bd. of Supervisors, 295 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Iowa
1980).
299. Hall v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 762, 266 S.E.2d 397, 399400 (1980) (mental commitment proceeding deemed "quasi-judicial").
300. Dattner v. Pokoik, 81 A.D.2d 572, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 425, 427, appeal dismissed, 54
N.Y.2d 750, 426 N.E.2d 491, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1981); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams,
336 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (all "agree" plaintiff is a "public official"),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
301. Ryan v. Dionne, 28 Conn. Supp. 35, 38, 248 A.2d 583, 585 (1968).
302. Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 506-07, 221 A.2d 547, 549 (1966). See also
Hodges v. Oklahoma Journal Publishing Co., 617 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Okla. 1980) (independent contractor and county license tag agent administered "an area of the law which affected practically every citizen of Oklahoma County, the area in which he served"). An
examination of the court of appeals opinion discloses that plaintiff, as an independent contractor, functioned in the capacity of managing a "governmental agency-an adjunct of
the Oklahoma Tax Commission." Plaintiff did not dispute this characterization. Hodges v.
Oklahoma Journal Publishing Co., 50 Okla. B.J. 580, 581 (Ct. App. 1979).
303. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453, 456-58 (Miss. 1967); Reaves v. Foster, 191 So.
2d 423, 424 (Miss. 1966) (same). See also Ray v. Edwards, 557 F. Supp. 664, 667, 673 (N.D.
Ga. 1982), modified, 725 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1984) (superintendent of Georgia retardation
center-status as "public official" undisputed). Another decision involving a school principal applied the New York Times decision as a matter of state law qualified privilege, noting
that the latter did not effectuate any change in state law. Schulze v. Coykendall, 218 Kan.
653, 660, 545 P.2d 392, 398-99 (1976).
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office,30 5 or clerk of county district court,30 6 or clerk of the state
senate;307 assistant secretary of state or corporations secretary;308
independent contractor for nursing homes;30 9 owner-manager of a
community center; 310 and county director of public welfare., In
a few gray-area cases the courts have provided fact-intensive and
in-depth analyses of the functions and responsibilities of the "public officials" involved therein which substantiate appropriately
their decision to apply the New York Times standards: director of
financial aid at a state college;3 12 county environmentalist; 313 supervisory contract negotiator for a navy ships parts control
304. Kapiloffv. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 524, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) ("plain" that
plaintiff was "within the 'public figure'-'public official' classification" and that "the position
was a matter of public or general interest or concern"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
305. Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 645, 651, 339 N.E.2d 477,
481 (1975) (dicta); Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 3d 247, 248, 365
N.E.2d 744, 745 (1977) (status "conceded").
306. Theckston v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 452, 455, 242 A.2d
629, 630 (trial court designation as "public official" not controverted), cert. denied, 52 N.J.
173, 244 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968). See also Kinney v. Bauch, 23 Wash.
App. 88, 96, 596 P.2d 1074, 1079 (1979) (city clerk wbo had own department was conceded to be a public official-her duties were not specified).
307. Martonik v. Durkan, 23 Wash. App. 47, 53, 596 P.2d 1054, 1057-58 (1979).
308. Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 683, 165 N.W.2d 705, 709-10 (1969) (status
as public officials "not questioned").
309. Halpern v. News-Sun Broadcasting Co., 53 Il. App. 3d 644, 646, 368 N.E.2d
1062, 1064 (1977) (status conceded). But compare Doctors Convalescent Center, Inc. v. East
Shore Newpapers, Inc., 104 Ill. App. 2d 271, 244 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1968) ("There are few
functions of the state of Illinois in which the public has greater interest and concern than
institutionalization of unfortunately subnormal and mentally retarded children"-it extended the same rationale to "all persons young or old so afflicted"). Of course, if the
facility is completely private, the plaintiff can be subjected to the New York Times standard
only if found to be a public figure. See Doman v. Rosner, 246 Pa. Super. 616, 620, 371
A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (private institute for brain-injured children found
to be "public figure").
310. Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Mo. 1969).
311. Bienvenu v. Angelle, 254 La. 182, 191, 223 So. 2d 140, 143 (1969). This case is
very interesting in another respect. Plaintiff therein was informally promised the job on an
unofficial basis but had not been officially hired. Defendant intervened and, as a result of
his defamatory remarks, plaintiff never received the job. In litigation the courts later "confirmed" her appointment, retroactive to the date of the informal assurances and prior to
the defamation. In finding her to be a public official, the court stated, "[w]ere this not the
case we would have difficulty in distinguishing between an active applicant, candidate, or
seeker of public office and an office-holder."
312. Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 55-56 (Utah 1983) (excellent, well-developed
opinion).
313. Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431, 432-33 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (in control of rabies
control truck, dog pound, rabies control program, and served on the county board of sanitation), app. denied (1981).
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center; 14 and former city attorney and counsel for the city urban
redevelopment agency.3 15
Although the aforesaid decisions clearly evidence that the
overwhelming majority of decisions have adopted, albeit with little
or only superficial analysis, an unduly expansive interpretation of
"public official," a small but growing minority view reflects a
more sophisticated appreciation of the limitations of the "public
official" concept. As one recent, well-reasoned opinion involving
an independent contractor-consultant on archaeological matters
has aptly concluded, Rosenblatt v. Baer "fits well into the framework of competing values" in libel cases, and defamation plaintiffs
with some governmental affiliation should not be compelled to
comply with the demanding New York Times standard unless they
have "relinquished" their private status by "entering into the type of
government and political activities that would set it apart as an entity
that must be closely scrutinized by the press."318 The following governmental agents or employees have been deemed, either explicitly, implicitly, or in dicta as not having "relinquished" their private status, and, consequently, not being subject to the
constitutional "actual malice" requirement: private consulting engineer;317 juror;3 18 city recreation director;319 part-time deputy
314. Rusak v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 293, 298 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (one of eleven
persons who had contracting and purchasing authority-his extensive duties included solicitations of proposals and bids and capacity to contract on behalf of the federal
government).
315. Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136-39, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 706-09,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (plaintiff was held to be both a "public official" and "public figure"-at the time of the allegedly libelous articles he had "assumed a role of especial
prominence in the affairs of the community . . . and occupied a position of persuasive
fame and notoriety in the community . .. ).
316. Arctic Co. v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981) (emphasis added).
317. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 813-14 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
318. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 721-22, 302
S.E.2d 692, 695 (implied plaintiff-petit juror was a "private individual"), cert. granted and
vacated, 309 S.E.2d 142 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2343 (1984). But compare Standke v.
B.E. Darby & Sons, 291 Minn. 468, 471-75, 193 N.W.2d 139, 142-45 (1971) (grand jurors
held to be subject to New York Times as "public officials," "public figures," matters of "public interest"), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
319. Peoples v. Tautfest, 274 Cal. App. 2d 630, 636, 79 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482 (1969)
(defendant failed to meet burden of adducing evidence delineating the "functions, duties,
or relationship with the public of that ...

job").
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sheriff,3 20 prison guards s 21 or unpaid undercover police informant;322 supervisor of a county recreation district; 323 private attorney as "officer of the court," 24 or appointed counsel receiving
3 26
32 5
governmental funding in a criminal trial; public health nurse;
public school teacher,3 27 principal 32 8 or state university faculty
members; 329 independent contractor-legal counsel for a county
320. McCusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, 261, 428 A.2d 493, 495 (1981) (deputy
sheriff not a "public official as a matter of law"-matter for the jury), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1017 (1981). Note that the same result has been achieved in other cases by manipulating
the "official conduct" concept. See infra text accompanying notes 395-403.
321. Towse v. State, 64 Hawaii 624, 632-33, 647 P.2d 696, 703 (1982) (only common
law privileges, defeasible by negligence, applied in suit against the state for defamation and
false imprisonment). The Towse decision has been subsequently interpreted as involving
plaintiffs who might have been "public employees" but not "public officials" or "public
figures." See Hoke v. Paul, 65 Hawaii 478, 481, 653 P.2d 1155, 1158 (1982). Note that one
decision has rejected the New York Times standards in malicious prosecution actions by police officers, allowing "malice" to be "inferred" from lack of "reasonable inquiry." Breda
v. Attaway, 371 So. 2d 1270, 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
322. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (he was reimbursed for
expenses).
323. Baer v. Rosenblatt, 108 N.H. 368, 369-71, 237 A.2d 130, 132 (1967) (on remand) (not a public official as a matter of law-question for the jury).
324. Harkaway v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 418 F.2d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 1969).
325. Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 n.23 (D.V.I. 1979); Steere v. Cupp, 226
Kan. 566, 572, 602 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1979). There seems to be no defensible difference
between these cases and Tague v. Citizens for Law & Order, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1977), involving an assistant public defender. As a concurring
judge trenchantly stated therein, there is "no material distinction" between such an assistant public defender and a court-appointed, publicly-paid or privately-compensated attorney in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 26, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (Avakian, J., concurring).
Once such an acknowledgment is made, however, one is faced with the clear finding of the
Supreme Court in Gertz, that an attorney qua attorney is not a public official. For a further

discussion, see infra text accompanying note 465 and supra text accompanying note 146.
326.

Nuyen v. Slater, 372 Mich. 654, 659-60, 127 N.W.2d 369, 373 (1964) (only com-

mon law privileges applied-New York Times implicitly rejected).
327.

Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 466, 141 N.W.2d 251, 259 (1966) (after

citing the constitutional cases, court characterized case as "a private individual suing a public official for libel"); Poe v. San Antonio Express-News Co., 590 S.W.2d 537, 539-41 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (high school science teacher); Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136-37 (1979);
Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 297, N.E.2d -, (1984) (former

high school wrestling coach held not a "public official" as a matter of law); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (high school teacher subject to only common law

privileges-not a "public official"). Another case has arrived at the same result by misinterpreting the "official conduct" concept. See infra note 399 and accompanying text.
328. McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 III. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (1981);

Stevens v. Tillman, 568 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. 111.1983) (defamation claim by elementary
school principal in section 1985 case).
329. Foote v. Sarafyan, 432 So. 2d 877, 880 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (department chair-
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sewer district; 330 independent contractor-architects on state
332
projects, 3 31 or contractor on university construction projects;
man and two mathematics faculty members), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 736 (La. 1983). Although the decision is correct, the reasoning is flawed. The court misinterpreted Hutchinson v. Proxmireas holding that the state university adjunct faculty member therein was not
a "public official." In fact, the court never reached the "public official" issue. See supra
notes 156-62 and accompanying text. See also supra note 70. Another decision involving a
tenured faculty member at the University of Virginia, Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275
S.E.2d 632 (1981), tacitly suggests that the plaintiff therein was not a public official. Plaintiff had been disparaged in several publications, including paid ads in the university newspapers, as "racist" because of his opposition as landowner to defendant's request for a
zoning change. Defendant's ads repeatedly referred to plaintiff's status as a university
faculty member ("tenured position-holder") and plaintiff claimed that such reference had
injured his reputation in the university community. Despite these linkages to his status as a
university faculty member, the court only discussed the "public figure" status (finding him
to be a "private" person) and the non-actionability of the epithet without special damages.
Id. at 887-92, 275 S.E.2d at 634-37. Lastly, the Illinois Supreme Court, though declining
to decide whether an assistant professor of library science was a "public official" or "public
figure," has recently extended the New York Times first amendment privilege to university
tenure determinations. Colson v. Steig, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13, 433 N.E.2d 246, 249
(1982). The decision is poorly reasoned and extends the New York Times threshold barrier
to a situation involving a private person to which the latter rule "simply does not apply."
Id. at 216, 433 N.E.2d at 251 (Clark, J., specially concurring). The Colson decision, in essence, seems to have adopted the New York Times standard as a matter of state law as the
definition of "abuse" of a common law qualified privilege, thereby modifying the preexisting "abuse" criteria, which had included negligence, i.e., lack of reasonable grounds. See
Smolla, supra note 157, at 73 (Colson "mischaracterized federal constitutional law in the
service of expanding Illinois common law"). For another decision involving a university
instructor where the court similarly adopted New York Times as the state law "abuse" standard, see Creps v. Waltz, 5 Ohio App. 3d 213, 450 N.E.2d 716 (1982) (part-time instructor
in state university continuing education program in suit against members of the realty profession who questioned his fitness to teach realty courses in a letter to the university
administration).
330. Zeck v. Spiro, 52 Misc. 2d 629, 276 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See also Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 273 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982) (in dicta the court indicated
that it had "serious doubts" whether a part-time borough attorney was a public official),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 461-67.
331. Mauck, Stastny & Rassan, P.A. v. Bicknell, 95 N.M. 702, 705, 625 P.2d 1219,
1221-22 (Ct. App. 1980) (court applied a Rosenbloom "public interest" privilege, despite
finding plaintiff was not a public official or public figure). See also Priestly v. Hastings &
Sons Publishing Co., 360 Mass. 118, 122, 271 N.E.2d 628, 631 (1971) (extended New York
Times to an architect commissioned to build a junior high school under the Rosenbloom
decision, noting that the Court had "abandoned its reliance on the increasingly amorphous
designation of public official"). A fortiori, a consulting electrical engineer hired by the
architect for a state school and solely "accountable" to him is not a public official or a
public figure, even though his recommendations resulted in the expenditure of public
money. Forrest v. Lynch, 347 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (La. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 351 So. 2d 668
(La. 1977) ("no error of law"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
332. Nelson v. Cail, 120 Ariz. 64, 68, 583 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Ct. App. 1978) (implied)
(Gertz standards controlling). See also Browning v. Birmingham News, 348 So. 2d 455, 460
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accountant with a state commerce commission; as s director of a

university print shop;33 4 engineer for a national medical insti3 8 official court reporter;337
tute; 335 juvenile probation officer;
CETA file clerk;3 38 and state-employed adult congregate-living facility coordinator. 3 In all of these decisions, the courts seem to
have recognized that the Rosenblatt v. Baer standards apply only
where "the concept of a freedom of the governed to question the
governor, of those who are influenced by the operation of government to criticize those who control the conduct of government" is
involved and not to mere governmental employees whose level of
''governance or control . . . over the conduct of government is at
' 3 40
best remote and philosophical.
(Ala. 1977) (where plaintiff, owner of taxi franchise, pleaded only negligence, trial court
should have "presumed" plaintiff was a private person-defendants did not submit evidence to the contrary).
333. Zurek v. Hasten, 553 F. Supp. 745, 749 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (ancillary claim in section 1983 action at motion to dismiss stage-"typical government employee" "lacking either prosecutorial or adjudicatory responsibility"). See also Kruteck v. Schimmel, 27
A.D.2d 837, 278 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (1967), rev'g 50 Misc. 2d 1052, 1053-54, 272 N.Y.S.2d
261, 264-65 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The lower court had held that the plaintiff, a part-time accountant-auditor for a water works, did not meet the "independent interest" test, but fell
within Rosenblatt "footnote thirteen." The lower court was undoubtedly correct on the
"public official" status issue. The reversing court was, however, probably correct in reversing the case on the alternative ground that the plaintiff actively sought and received press
coverage and was a "vortex" public figure. Kruteck, 27 A.D.2d at 837,,278 N.Y.S.2d at 26
(implied).
334. Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 66-67, 589 P.2d 126, 132-33 (1978) (court
was "skeptical" plaintiff was a "public official"-question for the jury).
335. Stephens v. Dixon, 30 Md. App. 56, 351 A.2d 187 (1976) (plaintiff treated as
private individual in his defamation suit against mayor). See also Dameron v. Washington,
575 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1983) (in dicta the court rejected the suggestion
that "every individual performing work which 'citizens have entrusted to government'.
is a public official" in a case involving an air traffic controller).
336. Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 139, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978) (common
law privilege applied in suit against a fellow employee-New York Times adopted as standard
for "abuse").
337. Houston Chronicle v. Stewart, 668 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
338. Sellars v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 684 P.2d 450, 453 (Kan. Ct. App.
1984).
339. Wilkinson v. Florida Adult Care Ass'n, 450 So. 2d 1168, 1172-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984). In a well-considered opinion the court extensively analyzed the employee's
functions, concluding that neither Rosenblatt test was met. He had "minimal control" of
"governmental affairs" (his only involvement in the licensing process was advisory) and the
only "special public scrutiny" was that "generated from the instant controversy."
340. Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d
915, 926, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1979).
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"Public Officials" and the "Official" versus "Private"
Conduct Dichotomy

In holding in New York Times that "public officials" were constitutionally required to prove "actual malice" in defamation actions
brought against "critics of [their] official conduct,1 341 the Supreme Court expressly declined to elucidate the "boundaries of
the 'official conduct' concept."342 It limited its holding to a conclusion that, ifthe allegedly libelous allegations-that "truckloads
of police" had "ringed the . . . campus" and that the "Southern
violators" had used "intimidation and violence" against Dr. Martin Luther King, bombing his abode ("almost killing his wife and
child"), assaulting him and charging him with a variety of misdemeanors and with perjury, a felony 343 -were "of and concerning" the elected city commissioner "at all," such allegations must
' ' 44
have been in regard to the "performance of his official duties. 1
In dealing thusly with the unusual factual basis for compliance
with the "of and concerning" requirement-that, although plaintiff was not specifically identified by name, he was identified by the
public with the defamation because of his official position as the
city commissioner with supervisory control over the police department 45-the Court, in an ambiguous aside, stated that it was "immaterial" that the allegations regarding the assaults and bombing
of Dr. King "might not be considered to involve respondent's official
conduct ifhe himself had been accused of perpetrating" the illegalities, as he had not claimed such alleged defamations "charged him
personally" with such actions. 46 The Court thereby seemingly appended a caveat to the "official conduct" concept, intimating that
the issue of whether a public official was to be held to the exacting
New York Times rule when defamed "personally" rather than in his
"official capacity" might be an open issue-even where such actions, outside the realm of his official duties, would be arguably
relevant to his fitness for the public position which he occupies.
The Court expeditiously resolved the latter intimation of a
possible narrow construction of the relevance-to-"official con341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
Id. n.23.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 283 n.23.
See supra note 20.
Id. at 283 n.23 (emphasis added).
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duct" criterion in the criminal defamation case of the same year

as New York Times: Garrisonv. Louisiana. 4" In that case, the Court
held that the defendant-appellant's disparaging statements-that
the "large backlog of pending criminal cases [was imputable] to
the inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations" of the criminal
district court judiciary, that the judges had impeded his vice investigations by declining to approve his expenditures for such, and
that the judges had "made it eloquently clear where their sympathies lie in regard to aggressive vice investigations

. .

. [, raising]

interesting questions about the racketeer influences on our eight
vacation-minded judges" 3 4 -were "within the purview of criticism of the official conduct of public officials" 34 9 under New York
Times. It expressly repudiated the limited sphere of applicability
accorded the "official conduct" criterion by the Louisiana Supreme Court, i.e., encompassing only "criticisms of a court trial or
of the manner in which any one of the eight judges conducted his
court when in session, 3 50 and concluded that such "personal attacks upon the integrity and honesty of the eight judges"' 51 were
protected. Although conceding that "any criticism" of performance of official duties would inevitably "tend to affect his private,
as well as his public, reputation,"' 52 the court concluded that such
duality of disparagement did not displace the panoply of New York
Times. The latter decision had protected the "paramount public
interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning
public officials, their servants." 353 Consequently, the Garrison
Court held that "[t]o this end, anything which might touch on an
official's fitness for office is relevant: Few personal attributes are
more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance,
or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may
3
also affect the official's private character." 54
347. 379 U.S. 64 (1979).
348. Id. at 66 (synthesis of allegations by the Court).
349. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
350. Id. (quoting the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Garrison, 244 La. at
834-35, 154 So. 2d at 417-18).
351. 379 U.S. at 76 (quoting the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Garrison, 244 La. at 834-35, 154 So. 2d at 417-18).
352. 379 U.S. at 77.
353. Id.
354. Id. The Garrison opinion specifically noted that "different interests" might come
into play in the realm of "purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs," and
stated that the decision was not to be construed as "intimating any views" in this "discrete
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In the jointly issued decisions of Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy"'
and Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron,5 6 the Supreme Court reaf-

firmed the expansiveness of the "official conduct" concept, giving
it an almost open-ended construction, and extended the same
treatment to candidates for public office. The Supreme Court rejected the state court's determination that a jury could justifiably
conclude that an allegation that the candidate in Monitor Patriot

Co. was a "former small-time bootlegger" was a "'private matter
in the private sector,' " i.e., "'a bringing forward of the plaintiff's
long forgotten misconduct in which the public had no interest.'

"35

The Court decided that the "official conduct" formula-

tion applied "with special force" to candidates for public office
and that "whatever vitality the 'official conduct' concept may retain with regard to occupants of public office

. . .

it is clearly of

little applicability in the context of an election campaign."

'5 8

In

such a context the "principal activity of a candidate . . . his 'of-

fice,' so to speak," is his submission to the electorate of "every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he thinks may lead the
electorate to gain a good impression of him." 3 Indeed, "[g]iven the
area of purely private libels." Id. at 72 n.8. It further indicated that the Court "need not
be concerned" with the issue of the "good motives" limitation on freedom of expression
included in many state constitutions "to the extent that it reflects abhorrence that 'a man's
forgotten misconduct, or the misconduct of a relation, in which the public had no interest,
should be wantonly raked up, and published to the world, on the ground of its being
true.'" Id. at 72 (emphasis added). Note that the state court seized upon this language in
the Monitor Patriot Co. decision.
355. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
356. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
357. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 269 (quoting the trial court's instructions to the
jury). Thus, the Court resolved one issue left open by the caveat in the Garrison opinion,
see supra note 354, by determining that criminal conduct was always relevant to the fitness
of public officials and candidates for public office.
358. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274. The Court seems to suggest the possibility
that the "official conduct" criterion might have'a more constrained application to "occupants of public office" than to'candidates therefore. Id. The only arguable logic to such a
suggestion is that the office-holder has a public record from which to evaluate his fitness
for and conduct of his office, whereas a candidate (non-incumbent) has only his private life
from which the electorate can draw deductions concerning his fitness to hold a public trust.
See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 888 (1949). It has been suggested any such distinction between candidates and office-holders might pose equal protection problems. See supra note 104.
359. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added). The Court amplified its
views thusly:
A candidate who, for example, seeks to further his cause through the prominent display of his wife and children can hardly argue that his qualities as a
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realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what
statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks." 3 0 Opining that the
husband or father remain of "purely private" concern. And the candidate who
vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry "Foull"
when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the
contrary.
Id. The Court gave further guidance concerning what was protected under the "official
conduct" criterion by quoting from a leading author to the effect that " '[c]harges of gross
incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually
have filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not
infrequent ... '" Id. n.4 (quoting Noel, supra note 358, at 875).
360. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 275. The Court left open the issue of "whether
there remains some exiguous area of defamation" where the candidate "may have full recourse." Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes the possibility that the Supreme Court
will decide "that for a certain type of public official or public figure any defamatory statement affects him in regard to his conduct, fitness or role in that capacity" so that the New
York Times standard applies to any and all defamatory statements of and concerning him. It
suggests, however, that the more probable conclusion is that there will be some defamatory
aspersions that will be found to affect such a public person, "no matter how prominent, in
only a purely private capacity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, comment c
(1977). If so, the negligence standard would apply. Id. One possible area is the realm of
sexual privacy. However, even in these sacrosanct areas one's private views and conduct-regarding contraception, abortion, homosexuality, transsexuality-may be relevant
to one's fitness for public office, at least with regard to many elected and high appointive
positions, e.g., the controversy involving 1984 Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee Ferraro and New York Governor Cuomo on Catholic public officials' "public" versus "private" attitudes toward abortion. See, e.g., Glover v. Herald Co., 549 S.W.2d 858, 859-64
(Mo.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) (where a woman alderman sued as a result of an
erroneous report that she had admitted during a public session that she had had two abortions. Although she lost on the ground of a failure to prove "actual malice," there is no
suggestion in the opinion that the matters were not defamatory or were irrelevant to her
fitness for public office). See also the "public interest" debate in Rosenbloom regarding contraception, supra note 117. But see Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118,
188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (1983), in which in a right of privacy/"public disclosure" case
the court refused to find that press disclosure of plaintiff's transsexuality (and surgical
transformation of sexual identity) was "newsworthy" as a matter of law regarding plaintiff's
"fitness for office" as student body president of a state community college and member of
the community college board of trustees-whether "newswprthy" or "beyond the bounds
of decency" was a jury question. While the facts therein certainly have a sympathetic ring,
it is doubtful that if she had sued for a similar false, defamatory depiction that such would
be irrelevant to her fitness for office, assuming arguendo that she is a public official. Compare Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587 (Okla. 1982) (press criticism of
one candidate for Democratic nomination for U.S. Senate for imputing homosexuality and
possible security risk to his opponent was protected opinion). It is doubtful that had his
opponent sued as defamation plaintiff this information would have been deemed totally.
irrelevant under the Garrison,Monitor Patriot,and Ocala Star-Bannercases. See also Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 329 n.3, 331-32, 335 n.17 (2d Cir. 1969) (alleged sexual
identity difficulties were part of the defamatory imputation of mental illness that the court
found relevant to candidacy for the U.S. presidency), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970);

648

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

public/private dichotomy applicable by the jury by a "preponderance" standard provided the jury undue "leeway to act as censors," '

the Court held "as a matter of constitutional law ' 3 62 that

such "a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or
place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate'sfitnessfor
office" under New York Times."'3 In Ocala Star-BannerCo., the Court
followed this expansive "official conduct" criterion in determining
that allegations of perjury in a civil rights suit were "relevant" to
the fitness of a "public official" mayor and candidate for county
office, "under any test we can conceive,"364 even though those allegations were completely and utterly false and resulted from a
mistaken substitution of plaintiff's name for that of his sibling.3 5
The federal and state decisional law overwhelmingly follows
the broad-gauged and almost all-encompassing delineation of relevance regarding "offical conduct" established by the Garrison,
Monitor Patriot,and Ocala Star-Banner decisions. Reflecting the Supreme Court's hierarchical preference for a well-informed citiTreutler v. Meredith Co., 455 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1972) (allegations of sale of pornographic materials by company owned by mayoral candidate related to a matter of "public
or general concern" under the Rosenbloom and Monitor Patriot cases); Sipple v. Chronicle
Publishing Co., 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1690, 1694 (Cal. Ct. App.) (homosexuality of
plaintiff, who helped avert an assassination attempt on President Ford, was "newsworthy"
for purposes of a "public disclosure"-"right of privacy" suit-one ground for such "newsworthiness" was that it raised the "important political question" of whether President
Ford was biased against gays by failing to thank plaintiff), rev. denied (1984). Of course, as
discussed infra note 443 and accompanying text, the first amendment standard is a constitutional minimum and the states may give a more expansive meaning to relevance-to-"official conduct" than constitutionally required. See also RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
580A, comment c (1977). See infra note 401.
361. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 275. Unlike a "standard of care" which can be
content-neutral, a "standard of 'relevance' " under a preponderance standard is "unlikely
to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an
instrument for the suppression" of free expression. Id. at 276-77.
362. Id. at 277. In rejecting the contention that relevance regarding "official conduct"
was a factual question for the jury, the Court stated that the "syllogistic manipulation" of
"public sectors" and "private sectors," or "fact" versus "law" was of little utility in delineating issues of first amendment coverage. Id. at 273.
363. Id. at 277. The Court thus specifically rejected the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's contention that minor bootlegging involvement "some 26 or 37 years in the past"
could have been constitutionally found by ajury to be "purely private defamation" outside
the New York Times rule. Roy v. Monitor Patriot Co., 109 N.H. 441, 445, 254 A.2d 832,
834 (1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
364. Ocala Star-Banner Co., 401 U.S. at 300-01.
365. At trial the newspaper attributed the error to the "mental aberration" of one of
its editors, who had been employed by it for only a brief period. Id. at 297.
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zenry over the reputation of the injured public official or candidate for public office, one early state decision concluded that the
citizenry was "entitled to know and discuss the life, the character
and qualifications, the finances and the innermost thoughts, motives, connections and associations" of such public persons, "as
well as the likely or inevitable result of the official's or candidate's
actions, connections, statements, or votes ... ."36 A more recent
state decision has similarly expansively concluded that the reportage of commentary on the private business characteristics of a
public official fell "within the New York Times rule where facts
show his integrity, qualifications, compassion, honesty, ethics, or
'anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office' ",867
are at issue. A plethora of state and federal decisions has held that
imputations of criminality, either in one's public capacity or private life, 368 are undeniably relevant to the fitness of the candidate
366. Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42, 44 (1964) (dicta in a case in which
comments regarding the "communist tendencies" of the record of an incumbent-candidate
for the U.S. Senate were deemed non-libelous).
367. Johnson v. Capital City Press, Inc., 346 So. 2d 819, 821-22 (La. Ct. App.) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964)), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 677 (La.
1977).
368. Many of the decisions have involved police officials. See Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 618-19, 325 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1982) (that a county sheriff
and a jail administrator had criminal records, threatened to kill a police officer and his
wife, misappropriated prisoners' and public property, had engaged in general maladministration in office, and threatened to retaliatorily discharge officers cooperating in the investigation); Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1981) (a police officer was charged
with sale of drugs on duty, "extorting" favors from a prostitute, use of heroin, and provision of inside information on raids to a prostitute cohabitor); Hirman v. Rogers, 257
N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 1977) (attempted illegal entry into a public office); Seymour v.
A.S. Abell Co., 557 F. Supp. 951, 953, 957 (D. Md. 1983) ("theft" during a "sting" operation); Meiners v. Moriarty, 563 F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977) (criminal violations of civil
rights, assault, theft of personal property, and malicious damage to private property);
DeGregorio v. News Printing, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1045, 1047-48 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1982) (implied involvement of police officer in urban arson and operation of an unlicensed boarding house with accumulated housing code violations); Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C.
App. 209, 215, 210 S.E.2d 446, 447-49 (1974), cert. denied, 211 S.E.2d 793 (N.C. 1975)
(killing a burglar in violation of his constitutional rights); Jurkowski v. Crawley, 637 P.2d
56, 57-59 (Okla. 1981) ("staging" a robbery as a pretext for executing third parties during
the "apprehension" of the perpetrator at a prior job as chief of police was relevant to his
current position in a similar capacity); Shafer v. Lamar Publishing Co., 621 S.W.2d 709,
711 (Mo. Ct. App.) (imputation of crime of statutory rape), motion for transfer denied (1981).
Other elected and non-elected "public officials" and candidates have also been required to
meet the New York Times standard with regard to imputations of criminality. See Chase v.
Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 41-42, 515 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1973) (implied misappropriation of monies by a port district official); Rusak v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 293,
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or public official. However, the concept is not so limited to allegations of criminality, and the decisions have generally extended the
relevance-to-"official conduct" concept to a multiplicity of non-

criminal defamatory aspersions: violations of a citizen's right of
privacy, 36 9 or of his civil or constitutional rights; 37 0 misuse of pub297-99 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (procurement abuses and irregularities which imputed to naval
contract negotiator dishonest, deceitful, fraudulent, unethical, and criminal behavior); Savannah News-Press v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, 234-35, 254 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1979)
(imputation of criminal trespass and "cattle rustling" in his private capacity had "close connection" to mayor's fitness for office); Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116,
413 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 & n.2 (1980) (city councilman/candidate for mayor implicitly
charged with illegal conduct in recovering private property in his capacity as a private investigator), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17, 449
N.E.2d 716, 720-21, 462 N.Y.S.2d 822, 827 (1983) (the average reader might reasonably
construe articles regarding mayor, who was a candidate ...candidate for reelection as
charging him with "illegal conduct" in office), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 109 (1983); Rinaldi v.
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 379, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306-07, 397
N.Y.S.2d 943, 949 (imputation to an elected judge of "suspiciously lenient" sentences and
that he was "probably corrupt" had "strong undertones of conspiracy and illegality" that
the average reader would interpret as involving "illegal and unethical actions"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 59, 64-65 (2d
Cir. 1980) (imputation of rape and obstruction of justice (as a law student) regarding
mayor/candidate for reelection); Goodrick v. Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp. 125, 126 (D. Del.
1980) (mistaken identification as county jail inmate); Cone v. Phipps Broadcasting, 5 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA) 1972, 1973 (D. Ga. 1979) (allegations of misappropriation of public funds
and operation of illegal business to county school superintendent).
369. Colombo v. Times-Argus Ass'n, 135 Vt. 454, 456-57, 380 A.2d 80, 82-83 (1977)
(alleged dissemination by a policeman of the picture of a nude college streaker).
370. Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1978) (social worker charged
with coercing a mother into involuntary sterilization as a precondition for the return of
her children to her); Noel v. McCain, 538 F.2d 633, 634-36 (4th Cir. 1976) (members of
school board charged with racial discrimination); Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ., 116 NJ. Super.
403, 407, 412, 282 A.2d 445, 447, 450 (Law Div. 1971) (mounted police charged with
being "Rightists, Racist Pig Bastards" in separating right-wing and left-wing demonstrators); Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1983) (director of financial aid of state
college charged with sexually harassing aid applicants and recipients); Roberts v. Dover,
525 F. Supp. 987, 989 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (allegations highway patrolman urinated publicly
along the highway, used foul language, "buzzed" truck driver in his helicopter, and detained the truck driver in an abusive and inhumane manner); Hall v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 763, 266 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1980) (charge of "railroading" a civil
commitment imputed to county medical examiner misfeasance in the "performance of his
duties"); Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 385, 294 A.2d 326, 334 (1972) (allegations of
police brutality). See also a similar conclusion in a case involving truthful disclosures in a
"Looking Backward" column, wherein the court rejected a "public disclosure"-right of
privacy cause of action. Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 296, 305,
543 P.2d 988, 989, 996 (1975) (accurate republication of discharge of a police officer for
"conduct unbecoming an officer" in "annoying" a woman appertained to his "conduct in
office, and not

. . .

his private life").
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lic position for private pecuniary gain,371 or for private non-pecuniary benefit; 72 psychiatric unfitness for office;3 73 misrepresentation of one's accomplishments in office;3 74 unethical and
unprofessional behavior; 75 a suggestion by a judge that women
provoke sexual assaults;378 general malfeasance and misfeasance in
371. Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 510 (3d Cir.) (former mayor and chairperson of port authority allegedly charged with abuse of his position
for private pecuniary gain), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978); Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho
364, 365, 529 P.2d 264, 265 (1974) (member of fish and.game board accused of using
inside information to "outbid" commission on prime land); Kerwick v. Orange County
Publications Div. of Ottawa Newspapers, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 901, 902, 422 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180
(1979) (town tax assessor portrayed as having granted church a tax exemption and thereafter having become a member of the congregation in order to take advantage of said exemption), rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.Y.2d 625, 420 N.E.2d 970, 438 N.Y.S.2d 778
(1981); Gulf Publishing Co. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 695 (Miss. 1983) (elected officials conceded that libels-allegedly imputing to them use of their political positions to get free
roads constructed on their private lands-affected them in their "official capacities");
Hodges v. OklahomaJ. Publishing Co., 617 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. 1980) (county license tag
agent charged with having a 'slush fund").
372. Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 27 A.D.2d 543, 543, 275 N.Y.S.2d 396,
398 (1966) (member of board of education charged with grade-tampering on behalf of her
son); Thibadeau v. Crane, 131 Ga. App. 591, 591, 206 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1974) (imputation
to a judge of "abuse of power" and use of his position for "personal vendetta").
373. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 1969) (imputations of "paranoiac personality," sadism, etc., to a U.S. Senator and candidate for president), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 763 (Me. 1981) (imputation that
officer was too unstable to safely handle a weapon and that his conduct is "disgraceful" as a
"human being" and "public servant"). '
374. Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1968) (imputation
in a political advertisement of a county commissioner's (a candidate for reelection) long list
of misstated, false accomplishments in office).
375. Tague v. Citizens for Law & Order, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 23, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 693 (1977) (allegation that plaintiff-public defender misrepresented facts to a
court).
376. Simonson v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1261, 1267-68 (E.D. Wis.
1980), affid, 654 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 973 (Del.
1978), where in a discussion of the nature of libel the court held that the statements attributed to plaintiff as chief of police (which implied that prostitution was not a problem locally
because a substantial number of the city's women were unchaste) imputed to him "a characteristic or view incompatible with the exercise of [his]. . . profession, or office" and was
defamatory per se. Generally, anything held slanderous per se or libelous regarding a public official or candidate in respect to his "profession" or "office" as such, will, by definition,
"relate" to his "official conduct" thereof. The reverse is not, however, true. Although it
would undoubtedly be relevant concerning a candidate's fitness that he had previously
dropped out of a race for the same office for a substantial "bribe," a minority view holds
such to not be slanderous per se regarding a non-incumbent. Field v. Coulson, 93 Ky. 347,
20 S.W. 264 (1892). The Restatement and preferred view is contra. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs §573, comment b (1977).
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office;377 a forced resignation from a position that would reflect
on fitness for a comparable public office;178 receipt of disciplinary
action for violation of public employment regulations; 3 79 imputation ot intimidating and coercive private business practices; 8 " insulting and offensive public behavior; 381 public insobriety;382 vindictiveness, obstructionism and ineptitude;-83 "hood-winking" the
public in the operation of a public lottery;38 ' failure of a candidate
to file required financial reports;8 5 and general lack of qualifications or unfitness for office. 8 '
377. Mansfield v. Holcomb, 5 Wash. App. 881, 491 P.2d 672, 673 (1971) (not specified in detail); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (N.D.
Ind. 1976) (allegations of misuse of taxing power by elected town tax assessor), affid, 557
F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Burke v. Deiner, 190 N.J. Super.
382, 387-90, 463 A.2d 963, 966-67 (App. Div. 1983) (plaintiff charged with negligence,
"which borders on misappropriation or misuse of the property" of the authority, and general inefficiency), rev'd on other grounds, 97 N.J. 465, 479 A.2d 393 (1984).
378. Magowan v. McDermott, 47 A.D.2d 657, 658, 364 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (1975)
(candidate for board of education portrayed as having resigned involuntarily from a position as a teacher with resulting withdrawal of endorsement by citizens' group) (implied),
affd, 38 N.Y.2d 953, 348 N.E.2d 608, 384 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1976); Hackworth v. Larson, 83
S.D. 674, 679, 165 N.W.2d 705, 708-10 (1969) (assistant secretary of state and corporations secretary charged with having been terminated, not having resigned, for "insubordination and failure to work"); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 17880, 439 A.2d 652, 659-60 (1981) (imputation that U.S. attorney would have been fired
even if he had not resigned).
379. Klein v. Prial, 32 A.D.2d 925, 926, 302 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (1969) (discipline of
police captain for violation of police department regulations by attending Mass while absent due to sickness), afld without opinion, 28 N.Y.2d 506, 267 N.E.2d 589, 318 N.Y.S.2d
946 (1971).
380. Johnson v. Capital City Press, Inc., 346 So. 2d 819, 820 (La. Ct. App.) (member
of the state board of highways charged with "intimidating business tactics" in his private
business), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 677 (La. 1977) (decision below "correct").
381. Michaud v. Inhabitants of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113, 1116-17 (Me.
1978) (charge in letter to governor that head of important government bureau had treated
local officials with arrogance and contempt).
382. State v. Deffley, 395 So. 2d 759, 761 (La. 1981) (criminal defamation case based
on charge that deceased parish school supervisor and school superintendent were
drunkards).
383. Moorhead v. Millin, 542 F. Supp. 614, 615-16, 618 (D.V.I. 1982) (director of
division of utilities and sanitation charged with mishandling and worse in supplying water
by barge to the islands).
384. Bruno v. New York News, Inc., 89 A.D.2d 260, 456 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1982) (also
allegations of "gypping" the public, "systematically cheating" the public, and covering up
the "scandal"-most held to be protected opinion).
385. A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 67, 75, 265 A.2d 207, 214, 218 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971).
386. Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 508, 221 A.2d 547, 549 (App. Div. 1966)
(appointed tax assessor depicted as "not free of pressures" and not "qualified" for the

1984]

DEFAMING PUBLIC OFFICIALS

653

Undoubtedly, the sphere of applicability of the relevance-to"official conduct" criterion is a flexible one; its parameters vary
with "the nature of the office involved, with its responsibilities
and necessary qualifications, -and the nature of the private conduct
38
' 7
and the implications that it has as to his fitness for the office.
position); Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

(charges of "ineptness, incompetence and indecisiveness" were relevant to fitness for office,
but were protected pure opinion), appeal dismissed, 354 So. 2d 351 (1977), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 910 (1978); Bennett v. Transamerican Press, 298 F. Supp. 1013, 1014-15 (S.D. Iowa
1969) (state legislator charged with being a liar); Windsor v. Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d 680,

682-87 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (prosecutorial misconduct imputed to an assistant U.S. attorney),
appeal denied (1983); Dyer v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 678, 686-87 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ refused, 250 La. 533, 197 So. 2d 79 (1967) ("The result is correct") (imputation of deceiving
the public, lack of sincerity, and ignorance of the law relating to the position sought); Driscoil v. Block, 3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 363-71, 210 N.E.2d 899, 907-11 (1965) (lack ofjudicial
temperament and suitability as an appointed municipal court judge and candidate for election); Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 139-40 & n.6, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 709 &
n.6 (1980) (that former city attorney and counsel for city urban redevelopment agency had
never been "completely exonerated" from "legal predicaments involving charges of negligence, malpractice and fraud," engaged in "other dubious activities" justifying his termination as city attorney, and that his "standard of ethics has been tried and found badly wanting"); Cherry v. Hall, 270 So. 2d 626, 628-29 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (imputation that
prepayment of salaries by parish treasurer was "contrary to the public interest and should
be discontinued" and questioning the "credibility" of the official); Grzelak v. Calumet Publishing Co., 543 F.2d 579, 581-83 (7th Cir. 1975) (allegations of excessive absenteeism, lack
of skills and competence as a secretary, and that plaintiff, as a patronage employee, was
doing essentially no work for the person for whom she was technically working); Cervantes
v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 990-91 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973)
("broadside attack" on mayor's alleged underworld ties and his fitness to perform mayoral
responsibilities "touch and concern issues of public or general concern"). See also Hahn v.
Andrello, 44 A.D.2d 501, 503-04, 355 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853-54 (1974), affd, 36 N.Y.2d 907,
334 N.E.2d 597, 372 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1975). In the latter case, the court declined to decide
whether the plaintiff, an assistant corporation counsel, was a public official in light of the
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia decision. However, in determining whether plaintiff's claims of
imputations of "incompetence or inability" in his "professional capacity" (libelous per se)
merely damaged him in his "private capacity as lawyer," and presumably were not a matter
of "public interest," the court applied the broad fitness-for-office test adopted by the Supreme Court for public officials. See also Oswalt v. State-Record Co., 250 S.C. 429, 433-36,
158 S.E.2d 204, 205 (1967), wherein the court cited the constitutional privilege cases but
concluded that the imputations-that plaintiff police officer's high speed chase of violator
of traffic regulation, resulting in collision and death of third parties-evidenced lack of the
"high sense of responsibility, and judgment judgment . . .essential" to his position and
was qualifiedly privileged under common law concepts.
387." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, comment b (1977). The Restatement
provides a single illustration: "Thus a statement that the governor drinks himself into a
drunken stupor at home every night much more clearly affects his qualifications than a
statement that a tax assessor keeps a secret collection of pornographic pictures." Id. However, this flexible standard for determination of "official conduct" does not justify abrogation of the two-step process-determination of (1) "public official" status and (2) relevance
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Consequently, one who sought the presidency of the United
States, where the necessity for a "continuing robust approach to
matters and men political" reached its quintessence, 38 "invited
the press and the public to scrutinize every aspect of his life, public
and private alike." 8 9 In a push-button age with a multitude of
weapons of mass destruction at the President's proverbial fingertip, the purported mental disequilibrium of the candidate 90 was
"not only relevant but indeed crucial" to the intelligent selection
of the occupant of "our most powerful office."3 91 At the opposite
end of the "official conduct" spectrum, e.g., an elected member of
to "official conduct"-mandated by Rosenblatt v. Baer. There has been some recent tendency to use a sliding-scale approach to determination of (1) above, which permits a governmental employee "near the bottom" of the governmental hierarchy to be considered a
"public official" if the imputations regarding "official conduct" are "more closely connected to actual job performance." Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408,
417, 589 P.2d 1223, 1228 (1979) (administrator of county motor pool held to be a "public
official" regarding allegations he repaired sheriff's son's car at public expense). The difficulty with the commingling of steps (1) and (2) is that it effectively disembowels the "public
official" determination and deprives it of any significance as a limitation on treating all
government employees as "public officials." The net result of this incestuous symbiosis is
well illustrated by an example cited approvingly by a leading commentator:
For example, if an article falsely portrays a governmental employee as having
failed a few history courses in college, it would have little bearing on his job
performance as a driver of city trucks. However, a history of having been fired
for drunkenness on the job may well be sufficiently relevant to the performance
of a night watchman for a nuclear facility to designate him a public official
under this test.
MErcALF, supra note 161, at 1.111. Presumably, under this analysis, a pattern of drunkenness would be relevant to the fitness of the truck driver. The net result of the aforesaid
"nexus" test is that two individuals, a truck driver and a night watchman, who were never
contemplated as within "public officialdom," are "bootstrapped" into required compliance
with New York Times.
388. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S.
1049 (1970).
389. Id. (emphasis added).
390. See supra note 373. The "person who holds that high office [of the presidency]
has an almost unbounded power for good and evil." Ginzburg v. Goldwater, 396 U.S.
1049, 1051 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
391. Goldwater, 414 F.2d at 335. But even such a quintessentially public person probably has some areas protected from public scrutiny. See Providence J. Co. v. FBI, 460 F.
Supp. 778, 789-90 (D.R.I. 1978) ("Even a president, as to whom the public has the most
compelling, near total interest, has private realms which may not be disclosed") (dicta),
rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979); Nixon v. Adm'r. of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 457 (1977) ("We may agree with appellant that, at least when Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not wholly without constitu-

tionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by
them in their public capacity") (dictum in a case upholding the constitutionality of the

Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act).
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the student senate of a state university (assuming arguendo he is a
"public official" for New York Times purposes), 92 the swath of the
"official conduct" concept would conceivably and justifiably be
much more circumscribed, limited only to matters directly bearing on fitness for that office.3 93 In this respect, as in the making of
the threshold determination of "public official" status, the constitutional, substratal policies underlying the "public" versus "private" status bifurcation-the primary "assumption-of-risk" and
peripheral "access" rationales-are factors that should be utilized
for guidance in borderline, "gray areas" of !'private" versus "official" conduct.
The flexible, commensurability approach to discerning "private" from "official" conducf will doubtlessly leave some more or
less limited realm of privacy wherein the states will be permitted
to protect the basic, quasi-constitutional interest in reputation.
That protection will likely be under a less stringent constitutional
standard than New York Times, i.e., negligence/preponderance-ofevidence standards. This is the clear intimation flowing from the
"official conduct" concept itself and the limited decisional law reaffirming this residual sphere of "private" conduct.3 94 Unfortu392. See supra note 231.
393. Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158, 418 P.2d 404 (1966). In this decision the
court held that the epithets disparaging the plaintiff's political reputation were protected
opinion. Id. at 415-16. In dicta it did note that the disparaging activities only related to his
political activities and fitness as an elected student leader and did not attack "traits of character" having no connection to his fitness for said position. Id. at 413.
394. Gulf Publishing Co. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 695 n.8 (Miss. 1983) (dicta); Savannah News-Press v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, 234, 254 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1979) (dicta);
People v. Mager, 25 A.D.2d 363, 364, 269 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (1966) (Garrison limited to
criminal libels where "official conduct" of "public official" involved-only unidentified
"private conduct" involved therein); Brubaker v. Reading Eagle Co., 422 Pa. 63, 65-66,
221 A.2d 190, 191 (1966) (question of whether plaintiff county district attorney was defamed only in "private citizen" capacity was properly for trial court-there was "no opportunity" for plaintiff to raise such and appellate court refused to consider such as "properly" before it); Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App.),
rev. denied (1978) (approved draft predecessor to now § 580B, permitting negligence regarding "private" conduct of public official) (dicta). In one decision, involving dubious application of the "actual malice" standard to a patronage secretary, the court affirmed a
lower court dismissal of a claim that an "impromptu 'go-go'" on a pool table at a local bar
was not actionable. The trial and appellate courts did so on the basis that such was not
libelous per se and no special damages were pleaded. Grzelak v. Calumet Publishing Co.,
543 F.2d 579, 581-84 (7th Cir. 1975). The trial court had previously found that such defamatory allegations related only to plaintiff's "private life" and were not subject to the
"actual malice" standard. Id. at 581.
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nately, the decisional law elucidating the "private" realm of otherwise "public" officials has generally been fatally flawed and
proffers very little guidance on the issue. The cases generally apply a strict "official conduct" definition reminiscent of the parallel
argument repudiated clearly and unequivocally in Garrison and,
later, in the MonitorPatriot and Ocala Star-Bannerduet. For example, an early post-New York Times Kentucky case held that allegations by a civil rights leader regarding a patrolman assigned to the
convention of a segregated fraternity-that he was of "limited
training, no culture, and a professional moocher" ("who strikes
you for 50 cents or a dollar every time he meets you on the
streets") and who was "illegally using" his authority to harass defendant, "at the behest of his masters

. . .

in this phony race or-

ganization"-merely focused on his "fitness and character as a
man" epitomizing the fraternity, a "purely personal attack,"
rather than on the "coincidental circumstance" of his official
position.3 95

Similarly deficient reasoning relying on a stringent "private"
versus "official" conduct dichotomy antithetical to the doctrine espoused in Garrison, Monitor Patriot, and Ocala Star-Banner has
been likewise applied in other cases: that fraudulent misrepresentations by a police officer to raise money for his junior league
football team related to "unofficial" conduct of "a private citizen;"3 96 that a United States congressman's purported attempt to
"fix" a pending criminal case did not "appear to refer to or in395. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, 114-16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). Of course, prior
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., a finding that a defamatory matter did npt appertain to a
public official's "official conduct" resulted in the application of only the common law
privileges.
396. Aku v. Lewis, 52 Hawaii 366, 375, 477 P.2d 162, 168 (1970). The court's perfunctory discussion of the New York Times rule is curiously inconsistent with its conclusion
therein that the same language was defamatory per se, as charging plaintiff with behavior
that would render him "unfit to faithfully and correctly fulfill his duties" as a police officer.
Id. at 373, 477 P.2d at 166-67. One decision has questioned the continuing viability of the
Tucker v. Kilgore and Aku v. Lewis cases and has distinguished them in a case involving alleged instability of a police officer affecting his trustworthiness with a firearm: "[A]ny statement to a police officer's superior expressing concern about that officer's official weapon
must bear upon his 'fitness for office.'" Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 763 n.4 (Me. 1981).
While one noted author has commented that the Tucker v. Kilgore and Aku v. Lewis decisions have an "appealing ring," Eaton, supra note 4, at 1381, the decisions are clearly
inconsistent with the definition of "official conduct" in the wealth of the decisional law
aforementioned. The results achieved are correct, but on a different rationale-that the
plaintiffs were not "public officials." See infra text accompanying notes 468-93.
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performance of his duties as a congressman;" 9 ' that

attribution to an elected school board member of a wide variety of
misbehavior-intimidating threats, attribution of misuse of office
to fellow board members, unethical behavior, that he was a " 'politician in the lowest sense of the word,' " that he had attempted to
promote illegal actions by the board and the school superintendent-did not, "as a matter of law," appertain to his "official conduct;"3"" that "illegal" expenditures of lodge funds by police of-

for lobbying did not
ficer members of a public safety council
99

"relate" to their "official conduct";
that imputation to a retiring teacher sued for mistaken receipt of salary while on disability
leave that he was a "[n]o-show teacher" did not appertain to his
"qualification or performance" as a teacher; 400 or that generalized
" 'complaints pertaining to the medical practice'" of the executive secretary of the state composite board of medical examiners

were not "related to his 'official conduct.'

"401

397. Keogh v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 888, 893, 274 N.Y.S.2d
302, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (dicta), affd, 28 A.D.2d 1209, 285 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1967), affd, 21
N.Y.2d 955, 237 N.E.2d 235, 289 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1968).
398. Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 531-36, 446 S.W.2d 543, 549-51 (1969).
399. Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 716, 459 P.2d 8, 13 (1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). Since the appellants had not challenged the lower court
determination that they were public figures, a view affirmed on appeal, the discussion of
the "official conduct" issue is dicta. However, in a more recent case, Himango v. Prime
Time Broadcasting, 37 Wash. App. 259, 680 P.2d 432, 436 (1984), the court followed the
Tilton case dicta. It concluded that the "nexus" between his "official position" and the
defamatory allegations was "weak." Although terming the policeman "not a public official," the case seems to rely basically on the strict construction of "official position" and
"official duties" rejected in the Supreme Court cases discussed in the text. Clearly, it is
relevant to the fitness of a police officer on the vice squad that he was portrayed during
reportage of the husband's criminal trial as having made sexual advances to his wife and as
having been found in a "compromising position" in her car in a parking lot, resulting in
the physical altercation which was the basis for the prosecution. The court undoubtedly
felt uncomfortable applying the "public official" rule to the lowly police officer therein.
However, the correct result is based on the wrong rationale. Such a low echelon police
officer functionary should not be denominated a "public official." See infra text accompanying notes 468-93.
400. DeLuca v. New York News, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1981).
401. Morton v. Gardner, 155 Ga. App. 600, 601, 604, 271 S.E.2d 733, 735, 737
(1980) (quoting the allegedly libelous letter written by the defendants; also quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A(b)). The court does not discuss the issue in detail or
discuss the contents of the letters sent to the board concerning the plaintiff. Interestingly,
in discussing defendants' motives for sending the letter the court mentioned general considerations such as the " 'quality of medical care' " and the "'interests of patients' health,
interest and safety.' "Id. at 605, 271 S.E.2d at 738 (quoting testimony of record relating to
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There are two readily apparent, partial reasons for the rampant confusion evidenced by the aforesaid decisions. First, all but
two of the decisions were pre-Monitor Patriot and Ocala Star-Banner and further did not refer to, discuss, or appear to be aware of
the Garrison "official conduct" discussion. 2 Second, in at least
three cases a close analysis of the decisions suggests that the courts
were collectively discomfitted by the spectre of including the
plaintiffs-police officers in two cases and a school teacher in the
other-within the status of "public officialdom." In the words of
the aforementioned Kentucky decision, the New York Times standard could not "sensibly be turned into an open season to shoot
down the good name of any man who happens to be a public servant. ' 403 Although the results achieved in these three cases are
quite likely correct (with the concomitant minimal constitutional
standard of negligence and whatever state privileges are not inconsistent therewith), the courts seized upon and misinterpreted
the secondary hurdle ("official conduct" concept)-rather than
the threshold determination ("public official" status)-as the
raison d'etre for their conclusions.
Undeniably, and as the majority view discussed above convincingly demonstrates, the determination of the "official conduct" issue, with its expansive definitional scope, will normally be
defendant's motive for initiating the allegedly libelous letter). Surely, such allegations concerning his fitness as a doctor are relevant to his ability as a board member to make similar
assessments regarding other physicians. If the allegations in the non-media defendants' letter are comparable to those reported in the press account, where plaintiff was implicated in
"'questionable ethics'" and "'unquestionable fraud,'" Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App.
636, 637, 266 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1979) (quoting the allegedly libelous editorial that appeared in the defendant Atlanta Newspaper, Inc., publication, the Atlanta Constitution), the
non-relevance regarding "official conduct" conclusion is clearly unjustified under the constitutional standard. Indeed, the court doubtlessly used the same standard that it applied to
its statutory conditional privilege-"comments upon the acts of public men in their public
capacity." GA. CODE § 51-5-7 (1982). Clearly, the statutory standard is much narrower than
the Garrison,MonitorPatriot,and Ocala Star-Bannerconstitutional standard; the court erred
in commingling the two standards. A court clearly can give greater expansiveness to the
"official conduct" concept than required by minimal first amendment constraints; however,
it is not permitted to return to the narrow construction of "official conduct" definitively
repudiated by that line of cases. See supra note 360.
402. One case mentioned Garrison only on the issue of defining "actual malice." Tilton, 76 Wash. 2d at 724-25, 459 P.2d at 17. Another case, Himango v. Prime Time Broadcasting, Inc., 37 Wash. App. 259, 680 P.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1984), misinterpreted Garrisonas
permitting the limited definition of "official conduct" that Garrison had expressly repudiated.
403. Tucker, 388 S.W.2d at 116 (emphasis added).
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a "relatively simple matter."40 4 The courts should endeavor, however, in cases where the issue appropriately arises, to define the
limits of the concept-as delineated by the controlling Supreme
Court decisional law and in light of the jurisprudential substrata
underlying the Supreme Court's "public"/"private" bifurcation-and ignore the limited, clearly erroneous lower federal and
state court authority delineated above.
III. Rosenblatt v. Baer-A Reformulation
A.

The Revivification

In order to give a flavor of and insight into the deep philosophical
debates engendered by the imposition of constitutional restraints
on the confusing morass of the common law, the initial sections of
this Article have sketched in some detail the Supreme Court's decisional law over the last two decades. In retrospect, the Court's
decision in New York Times and subsequent expansion-to bona
fide appointed "public officials" in Rosenblatt, "public figures" in
Butts and Walker, and candidates for public office in MonitorPatriot
and Ocala Star-Banner-make eminently good sense. Its fleeting
flirtation with an all-encompassing "public or general interest"
test in Rosenbloom, however, did not. In Rosenbloom the Court effectively absolved the media of liability to nearly all plaintiffs with
a resultant near desuetude of the law of defamation in cases
within the panoply of the first amendment. Fortunately, three
years later in Gertz the Court recognized the skewed nature of the
reputational interest-free expression accommodation of Rosenbloom in private versus media defendant cases. This recognition
has resulted in a more equitable and fundamentally fair compromise between the inherently competing and inconsistent interests
at stake: those who have actual or potential power over matters
near the "core" of the first amendment-effective self-government-or who otherwise attempt to influence this "core" decision-making process relinquish appreciably thereby their claim to
404. Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579, 588 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968). This is not always the case, however. See, e.g., Foster
v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 815-16 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1123 (1977), where the court appears to tacitly admit that disparaging comments would
relate to plaintiff's fitness for the elected office of county surveyor, ifdefendant could show
at trial a direct or implied reference thereto in the article. See generally supra note 203.
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protection of the basic interest in reputation-an interest of
quasi-constitutional stature. 0 5 For those who retain their status as
anonymous, and, therefore, essentially defenseless, members of
the body politic, there is no justification for subjecting them to
the requirements of New York Times, requirements recently characterized by the most consistently media-protective member of the
present Court as "exceedingly generous standards."' 06 Unlike
public persons, prototypical private persons cannot defensibly be
said to have voluntarily subjected themselves, by bare membership
in the body politic, to the potentiality of the stringent scrutiny and
utterly damaging exposition of their private lives whenever
deemed newsworthy by the institutional press in its self-defining
wisdom. This, in essence, would have been the result of the nowrepudiated Rosenbloom plurality view.
Whatever one's ultimate posture on the appropriateness of
Gertz and its progeny, it is clear that the values considered therein
(particularly in delineating the "public person" status) reflect a basic realignment of the competing interests of reputation and free
expression. The Court seems to have granted approximate parity
to the two, treating the interest in reputation as an "equally com405. See infra text accompanying note 407. See also Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp.
188, 191 (D.D.C. 1965) (the "civil right" of one's reputation is "equally fundamental and
vital, and its protection is equally efficacious and vigorous"); Troman v. Wood, 62 I1. 2d.
184, 194-95, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975) (right of protecting reputation "fundamental"
under the state constitution-rationale for rejecting more stringent standards than negligence in private versus media defendant cases); Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 62-63,
589 P.2d 126, 130-31 (1978) (condition precedent of compliance with state retraction statute violated state constitutional right of access to the courts to protect reputation); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981) ("freedom from false attacks on one's
personality may be viewed as at least as essential to ordered liberty as freedom from physical abuse"); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky. 1981)
("the fundamental right of private individuals to be free from being defamed"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982). The Court has, of course, held that the mere deprivation by
state action of the right of reputation is insufficient to support a procedural due process
claim in a § 1983 action. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The case has been strongly
criticized as having "very little historical basis, as Anglo-American law has long placed a
value on the individual's right to one's good reputation," J. NoWAK, supra note 41, at 55253, and may be limited to situations where there is a common law action available under
state law. Id. Curiously, the Court never mentioned that "reputation" is a constitutionally
protected right under the Kentucky state constitution under the guaranteed right of access
to the courts "for any injury" to "lands, goods, persons or reputation." Ky. CONST. Bill of
Rights § 14. A recent comment lists thirty-nine jurisdictions as similarly expressly protecting reputation in their state constitutions. Comment, Defamation and State Constitutions:The
Searchfor a State Law After Gertz, 19 WiLLAmE=rE L. REv. 665, 665 n.2 (1983).

406. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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pelling need" which must not be subjected to "substantial depreciation" "without any convincing assurance" that such a "sacrifice"
is mandated by the first amendment.40 7 Moreover, it woult be a
gross miscalculation to relegate this realignment solely to the
realm of "public figures" and assume that the "governmental affiliation" test remains unsullied in its pristine, knee-jerk imperturbability. The Court has clearly evidenced a predisposition to the
contrary in its "footnote eight" in Hutchinson and its terse rejection of attorney Gertz as a "public official"/"officer-of-thecourt." 40 8s It is clear from the philosophical substratum of the
Court's recent decisions that the Rosenblatt criteria, including
"footnote thirteen," are viable and "fit well into the framework of
competing 9 values created by libel litigation" involving "public
40
officials."
To facilitate application of a rejuvenated Rosenblatt, with an
infusion of the value perspective reflected in Gertz and its progeny, it is suggested here that the following multi-step analysis be
utilized:
-1. All elected officials and candidates for public office should be
deemed "public officials" for purposes of the New York Times standard. The New York Times decision and its progeny collectively evidence a strong consensus that those functioning at the "core" of
the political process are the supreme exemplars of those over
whom the public has the right and duty of exercising its " 'censorial power.' "410 Although some sympathy is to be had for the late
Professor Eldredge's passionate plea for not subjecting the myriad
members of local boards and commissions (appointed or elected)
to the "devastating effect" 411 of New York Times, this eloquent appeal finds no support with respect to elected members thereof in
the cases decided by the Supreme Court to date. Neither can such
407.

Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (discussion of refusal to extend

New York Times to factually inaccurate reports of judicial proceedings).
408. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). See supra text accompanying note 146.
409. Arctic Co. v. Loudon Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
410. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (quoting 4 ANNALS OF
CONG. 934 (1794)). Of course, if the person is no longer an official or candidate at the time
of the defamation, he is still within the rule as long as there is continuing public interest in
the matter. See supra note 48.
411.

See ELDREDGE, supra notes 24 & 251.
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support be found in the jurisprudential underpinnings of the public/private dichotomy drawn by the Court. Moreover, there is a
definite need for a "per se"4 12 or "bright line" rule in cases involving elected officials or candidates for public office. The press
should be and is entitled to proceed on the assumption that those
who "hold"4 3" or "seek governmental office" 41 4 assume the "risk
of closer public scrutiny" and have concomitantly "relinquished" 41 5 proportionately their claim on the state to protect
their interest in an unsullied reputation. There is nothing fundamentally unfair in thusly according elected officials and candidates
for office such "per se" status, 416 as it reflects, as a matter of con412. See R. SACK, LiBEL,SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 190 (1980).
413. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
414. Id. at 344.
415. Id. at 345. The Court has relegated the "access" rationale to a quite subordinate
or peripheral status. See Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687, 700 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (access is
not a "necessary element nor is its absence determinative"). Many exemplars of "public
officialdom" will have no effective access to the media or other means of reply. See State v.
Deffley, 395 So. 2d 759, 761 (La. 1981) (although deceased "public officials" by definition
were unable to respond to defamation, as "public officials" they assumed the "responsibilities of a public position" and "relinquished" a measure of their protection under the law of
defamation); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 381, 366 N.E.2d
1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950 ("Judges are constrained, by principles ofjudicial ethics, to refrain from engaging in public debate"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977);
Landmark Communications, Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (Court in non-libel
case noted that judges "by tradition will not respond to public commentary" but declined
to give judges as individuals or the judiciary as an institution "greater immunity from criticism" on said basis); Bienvenu v. Angelle, 254 La. 182, 191, 223 So. 2d 140, 143 (1969)
(contention civil service regulations' prohibitions against speaking politically removed
plaintiff from category of public official held without merit-"it is one's power to manage
affairs affecting the public which subjects one to the federal rule").
416. It is suggested that candidates for public office be treated as "public officials," or
in a separate "candidate" classification, rather than as "public figures." There is no necessity for subjecting the press to the quagmire of cumulative criteria for determination of
whether the candidate is an "all" or "limited purpose" (the more likely category) public
figure. Where the plaintiff's elected or candidate status at the time of defamation is readily
conceded or is detectable from the complaint, answer, or appended affidavits, the court
should summarily determine said issue as a preliminary matter on motion by the defendant.
Of course, if the plaintiff is a candidate for office in a political party, the "public figure"
criteria would have to be applied. See Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d
774, 776 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968). The same applies to office-holders in
a political party, News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166, 170 (Del. 1967) (chairman
of city Republican committee held to be a public figure), Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d
1221, 1222, 1227 (3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiff, member of county Republican board of supervisors, admitted he was a public figure), or to spouses of candidates, Hemengway v,
Blanchard, 163 Ga. App. 668, 671, 294 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1982) (spouse of congressional
candidate playing "an important part" in campaign held to be a public figure), cert. denied
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stitutional jurisprudence, a common sense maxim of politics and
public life-"If you can't stand the heat, you should stay out of
the kitchen" 41' 7-and allows the elected public official or candidate, as well as the critics thereof, to order their existence
accordingly. 1
-2. The courts must recognize that the Supreme Court has
never extended the "public official" status to non-elected garden
variety "public officials" and has expressly rejected that view in its
"night watchman" analysis in Rosenblatt. Moreover, the courts
should frankly view with skepticism much of the decisional law delineated above which was engendered during the period prior to
Gertz (when the Court had not clearly disentangled the "status"
and "subject matter" approaches), and which resulted in many
"public official" determinations based on generalized references
to the "public interest" generated by public employees' activities.419 Public employment plus "public interest" or "newsworthiness" was insufficient to attain "public official" status under Rosenblatt and is clearly insufficient under the post-Gertz decisions. The
demonstrated capacity of media legal counsel to persuade lower
federal and state courts that New York Times was to be logically
extended to all matters of "public interest" was mirrored in that
(1983), Burns v. Times Argus Ass'n, 139 Vt. 381, 385-88, 430 A.2d 773, 775-77 (1981)
(spouse of lieutenant governor/candidate for governor held to be a public figure), or to an
elected official of a credit union, Korbar v. Hite, 43 11. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135, 139
(1976) (credit union president a public figure), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). But cf.
Lewis v. Vallis, 356 Mass. 662, 668, 255 N.E.2d 337, 341 (1970) (campaign manager for a
minority mayoral candidate did not make plaintiff a public figure).
417. The analogy has been a popular one. Yorty v. Stone, 259 So. 2d 146, 146-47
(Fla. 1972) (non-libel case); Thibadeau v. Crane, 131 Ga. App. 591, 594, 206 S.E.2d 609,
611 (1974); Borski v. Kochanowski, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 269, 331 N.E.2d 556, 559 n. 4
(1975).
418. The Supreme Court's case law undoubtedly supports a "per se" rule for all
elected government office-holders and candidates therefore. See supra notes 183-85 and
accompanying text. It is possible that the courts will follow the decision of one court and
hold that elected student officers at the high school or lower level are not subject to the
above rule. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (in a §1983 action against a school official for seizing student newspaper, court declined to place an
elected vice-president of the student body in the "same withering spotlight of the press as
it does publicly elected officials," emphasizing, the "protected environment" of a school).
But compare Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158, 418 P.2d 404, 412 (1966), where the
court applied the New York Times rule as a matter of "law and equity," without deciding
whether it was mandatory, in the case of an elected student senator of university senate.
419. Deprived of its "footnote thirteen" caveat, the Rosenblatt "independent interest"
had become, in essence, a public employment plus "newsworthiness" standard.
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extension's Siamese twin, the "governmental affiliation" (governmental employment and "newsworthiness"'/"public interest") test.
The former view has been rejected expressly by Gertz; the latter
correlative illegitimate was indefensible under Rosenblatt and has
been implicitly disavowed by Gertz and its offspring, as well as by
the well-considered lower federal and state decisional law.
-3. The courts should adopt and apply the prevailing rule in the
law of defamation that the defendant has "the burden of proving,
when the issue is properly raised, the presence of the circumstances necessary for the existence of a privilege to publish the
defamatory communication.

'420

When the defendant sustains that

burden of proving "public official" privilege, the plaintiff will then
be required to meet the "burden of proving that the privilege was
abused, '

42 1

i.e., establish knowing or reckless disregard of falsity,

by "clear and convincing" evidence.4 2 If the media defendant
fails to sustain its burden of demonstrating a New York Times privilege, the plaintiff will be required to meet the constitutional min420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613(2) (1977). See generally Peoples v.
Tautfest, 274 Cal. App. 2d 630, 635, 79 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482 (1969) (New York Times privilege is an "affirmative defense" upon which defendant has the burden of pleading and
proof-"unless it appears on the face" of plaintiff's complaint); Flannery v. Allyn, 75 Il.
App. 2d 365, 221 N.E.2d 89 (1966) (New York Times privilege waived where not asserted at
trial), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
633 F.2d 583, 592 (1st Cir. 1980) (defendant failed to meet its burden on the record of
proving successful middle echelon manufacturer merchant was a public figure); Bufalino v.
Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1982) (court implied that the burden of
proof was on defendant to show that plaintiff was within the "public official" privilege-it
"made no showing" that plaintiff, not identified by title, met the requirements for "implied" colloquium-of-office), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2463 (1983); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977) (same as
Bufalino); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff's "public figure" status determines the standard of proof he must present in defamation
action); R. SACK, supra note 412, at 150. On the issue of court versus jury functions, see
supra note 62.
421. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613, comment g (1977).
422. Numerous statements by the Supreme Court in its case law have generally imposed the burden of proof of "actual malice" on public persons; generally, the lower court
decisional law has followed this clear indication by the Court. See ELDER, supra note 20, at
357-58. For example, the Court stated in Herbertv. Lando that New York Times and its progeny had "effected major changes" in the common law and "public officials and public
figures who sue for defamation must prove knowing or reckless falsehood in order to establish liability." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979). See also id. at 160, 169, 170,
172, 174. And see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 n.30 (1984)
(the Court reaffirmed the duty of the courts to reexamine the record to ensure compliance
with the "actual malice" requirement).
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ima of negligence-by-a-preponderance4 23 criterion (or whatever
more media-protective standard has been adopted in minority
jurisdictions).424
The defendant's burden will be a nominal one in cases involving elected public officials and candidates for public office. That
burden will be easily met in cases involving other officials comparable to those deemed, directly or indirectly, "public officials" in
the Supreme Court's limited decisional law. In addition, state
courts (or federal courts sitting in diversity cases and applying and
anticipating state law) may wish to develop "bright line" categories of other public employees (e.g., law enforcement personnel)
who are to be subjected to the New York Times criteria as a matter
of state constitutional law or as a matter of public policy. 425 In all

other cases involving public employee plaintiffs where the plaintiff
has not conceded the status issue the defendant will normally be
required, by fact-intensive analysis, to demonstrate that the plaintiff meets one of the alternative tests of Rosenblatt. In such cases
the burden is the same as that imposed implicitly by the Court in
the "four horsemen" of "public figuredom" (Gertz, Firestone,
Hutchinson, and Wolston)
and explicitly by the consensus of lower
426
court decisional law.

423. The leading case is Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371,
375-76 (6th Cir. 1981).
424. See infra note 448.
425. The adoption of such a "bright line" rule is not specifically advocated here. See
infra text accompanying notes 468-93.
426. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589 (1st
Cir. 1980) ("particularized determinations of public figure status are the rule"). In implementing the fact-intensive analysis of functions and responsibilities of the public employee
suggested in the text, the following non-inclusive (and somewhat overlapping) list of areas
of inquiry may be helpful: the source of the appointment and the nature of the appointment approval process, if any; the proximity of the position to the "core" functions of
government; the extent of the appointee's independent discretion, policy-making responsibilities, supervisory control over others, administrative functions, and authority to legally
bind the employer; the extent and content of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory specification of functions and responsibilities; the nature of the appointee's legal relationship to
government and the source and nature of funding thereof (independent contractor? hourly
employee? etc.); the nature and extent of the appointee's control over public monies; the
number of employees performing the same or comparable job; whether the governmental
nature of the job is essentially fortuitous or irrelevant (i.e., the functions are the same as
those in the private sector and the only or major distinguishing factor is the source of
funding); the degree of immunity the appointee would have as defendant; the sensitivity of
the functions of the position and the extent of public visibility of the appointee; access to
the press; and the potential for social harm from abuse of the appointee's position, the

666

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

-4. Courts must not apply the Rosenblatt alternative "independent interest" test offhandedly. As delineated in detail above, the
Supreme Court has clearly repudiated the notion that that
test-"such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person
who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualificationsof
all government employees"4 2 -could be met by press-generated
newsworthiness, i.e., that a statement defaming "some person in
government employ catches the public's interest.''428 Such a "public

employee" plus "newsworthiness" definition of "public official"
status "virtually disregard[s] society's interest in protecting reputation. ' 429 Consequently, in order to constitute a "public official"
under this test the governmental position "must be one which
would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it,
entirely apartfrom the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."430
Although this extremely important footnote in Rosenblatt has
been somewhat cavalierly ignored as extraneous dicta by some, 31
it is clear from a careful reading of the opinion that the Court
number of persons potentially affected thereby, and the nature of interests potentially affected thereby. The latter factor must be utilized, however, with extreme care, as it has the
potential for consuming the limitations on "public official" imposed by Rosenblatt and effectively resulting in a reaffirmation and application of a form of the "governmental affiliation" approach criticized throughout this Article. Clearly, the "night watchman" at a secure military facility or a clerk-typist whose boss has access to classified information both
have an enormous capability for injury to the public interest. However, undoubtedly, they
are not "public officials" under Rosenblatt. Moreover, in assessing this factor courts must
beware of attaching too much significance to the subjective perspective of the individual
victim of the appointee's actions. To the victim, said appointee may, indeed, "epitomize"
government, but such an approach would result in "bootstrapping" all government functionaries into "public officials" because of the perceptions of their victim(s). See Press, Inc.
v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tenn. 1978) (to the victims of a social worker's alleged
abuse of authority, she was "the very epitome of government"). Under this approach a
janitor at an elementary school charged with molesting a student might be termed a "public official," an assuredly anomalous result. Note that the Rosenblatt alternative tests both
refer to "the public" (not the victim) and utilize an objective standard for applying the
"public official" status, which, if properly applied, would preclude the latter result. See
supra text accompanying notes 47-62.
427. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 (emphasis added).
428. Id. at 87 n.13 (emphasis added).
429.

Id.

430. Id. (emphasis added).
431. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4 at 640, citing only Eaton, supra note 4, but failing to
note that Eaton concluded that Gertz may "signal a retreat" from the "governmental affili-

ation" test. Eaton, supra note 4, at 1447.
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intended to eliminate the spectre of subjecting all governmental
employees to the demanding New York Times standard through media-generated newsworthiness. This "footnote thirteen" qualification constitutes a pivotal element in this delicate balancing of the
competing reputational and free expression interests involved in
the determination of status issues. In any event, the "footnote
thirteen" qualification appears to have been implicitly revivified
by the Chief Justice's pregnant "footnote eight" in Hutchinson and
the Court's oft-reiterated rejection of bare newsworthiness in
"public figure" cases: "A libel defendant must show more than
mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times."4 32 In light of the Supreme Court's equation of "public officials" and "public figures" with respect to the
primary "assumption-of-risk" and peripheral "access" rationales
and its repudiation in Gertz of the"newsworthiness"-"public interest" approach of Rosenbloom, it is virtually inconceivable that the
present Court would discard the "footnote thirteen" caveat delineated above. Rather, it appears undeniable that "footnote thirteen" is alive and well and has two functions parallel to the criteria for "public figuredom" discussed above. First, it repudiates
resoundingly the adequacy of newsworthiness regarding a public
employee as a sufficient basis for a finding of "public official" status. Second, it illustrates clearly the insufficiency of a vague "concern about general public expenditures" 43 3 to meet the "independent interest" test. The latter proposition is well illustrated by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision on remand in Rosenblatt, where it incisively concluded that the "independent interest" test would not be met by evidence of newsworthiness plus a
demonstration that plaintiff had "general charge of financial
transactions" at the recreation area and "general supervisory powers" subject to the local county commissioners' "direction. '4
The aforesaid principles deducible from a careful reading of
Rosenblatt, particularly in light of the lessons clearly evidenced by
the Court's "public figure" cases, have been generally grossly misinterpreted, flagrantly misapplied, or blatantly ignored in lower
432. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979).
433. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
434. Baer v. Rosenblatt, 108 N.H. 368, 370, 237 A.2d 130, 132 (1967). The court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the other Supreme Court test
could be met by defendant. Id. at 372, 237 A.2d at 133.
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court decisions. A trio of examples elucidates the nature of the
trap many courts have fallen into and will illustrate the beneficient
results of rejuvenation of the "independent interest" test with its
"footnote thirteen" caveat.
In Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp.,3 5 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held, without even mentioning "footnote thirteen,"
that a high school wrestling coach was a public official under the
"independent interest" test. The Oklahoma court cited, as evidence in support of its conclusion, the numerous withdrawals
from the teacher-coach's classes as a result of the adverse publicity
generated by the press regarding alleged physical abuse, with the
tacit approval of the plaintiff-a student on the wrestling team.
In another decision, Clawson v. Longview PublishingCo., 38 the
Supreme Court of Washington held that the administrator of a
county motor pool was a "public official" with regard to the controversy generated by allegations that he had performed private
repairs on a sheriff's son's car with public materials. Although admitting that the administrator had a public function "near the
bottom" of the public employment hierarchy, the court found an
extremely close "nexus" between the plaintiff's position and the
"defamatory allegations" which were directly relevant to his job
performance.' 3 Citing the "potential for abuse" to which the administrator "did, in fact, succumb," it found that potential to be a
"matter of public interest". "quite apart" from the specific malfeasance charged in the article, because of the "legitimate and continuing interest" in how tax dollars are spent by governmental
employees having authority to "utilize the public purse.' 4 8 From
a close reading of the opinion it is clear that its two predominant
foci were the public interest generated by the controversy and the
generalized interest in public expenditures-both of which are inadequate, as a matter of law, under the Rosenblatt criteria. Justice
Rosellini, in a well reasoned, biting dissent, concluded that the
majority had given "slight heed" to Rosenblatt and that there was
a dearth of evidence to demonstrate "any interest" in the plaintiff's position prior to the controversy developed by the press. Ac435.
436.
437.
387.
438.

583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978).
91 Wash. 2d 408, 417-18, 589 P.2d 1223, 1228-29 (1979).
Id. at 417, 589 P.2d at 1231. For a criticism of this nexus test, see supra note
Clawson, 91 Wash. 2d at 417, 589 P.2d at 1228.
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cording to the dissent, the majority unduly emphasized the potential for abuse of his position for private gain. Although such
potential might have "affected his performance of his duties," it
"was not a characteristicof his position .

. .

it is that type of charac-

teristic which determines whether a position is one commanding
the attention of the public."43
In a third egregious example, Green v. Northern PublishingCo.,

Inc.,440 the Alaska Supreme Court admitted that an independent
contractor-physician supplying medical care to Anchorage area
jails was generally "not highly visible in the community," "usually
attracted little 'public scrutiny,' " and that the plaintiff's position
did not receive "critical public attention" until the unforeseen demise of a patient under his ostensible care resulted in a public uproar. Despite the court's apparent admission that the case was one
inappropriate for the "independent interest" test and its concession that the case was arguably one within the "footnote thirteen"
caveat, the court curiously concluded that the "independent interest" test was met.44 1 The court, in essence, disregarded the "inde-

pendent interest" test. As one concurring judge tersely commented, the majority's analysis of the "public official" standards
constituted a "very convincing argument" that the plaintiff was
not a "public official. 442
-5. State courts should keep in mind that the Supreme Court's
decisional law in the realm of libel clearly imposes only minimal
federal constitutional (and, in the area of labor law, statutorily preemptive)443 restraints on defamation actions brought under state
law. Consequently, it is beyond peradventure that state courts
have the undoubted prerogative, as a matter of state constitutional
law or public policy, to afford defamation defendants protection
439. Id. at 424, 589 P.2d'at 1231 (Rossellini, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). He rejected the laundry list of "governmental affiliation" cases cited by the majority as "rather
curious decisions" in which "[n]ot surprisingly the rationale. . . if any, is not presented in
the opinion."
440. Green v. Northern Publishing Co., 655 P.2d 736, 741 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983).
441. The court blithely concluded that the "independent interest" test was not foreclosed by the "normally quiescent character of the public job." Green, 655 P.2d at 741.
442. Id. at 744 n.1 (Compton, J., concurring) (dicta).
443. See Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281-86 (1974). See also supra notes
47 & 140. The Court has recently acknowledged that the Linn-Letter Carriersrule for labor
disputes protected under federal law also has "constitutional overtones." Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 309 n.16 (1979).
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in excess of that mandated by the Supreme Court's decisions.44
Indeed, one state's premier decision extending "public official"
status to a social worker (and opining that exemptions from such
status for any public employee must be strictly scrutinized) appears to reflect substantial reliance on its state constitution. 44
While this additional protection would require reasoned explication of the justifications warranting such preferred stature for defamation defendants (a particularly difficult hurdle for those states
incorporating into their constitutions explicit "abuse" limitations
on the exercise of freedom of expression), 446 there is clearly no
444. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 891 (La. 1977) (the first amendment sets
"only minimum safeguards;" it is "permissible and perhaps appropriate for a state to grant
broader protection" under its own constitution and laws) (dicta); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444
U.S. 193, 198 (1979) ("[W]hen state law creates a cause of action, the state is free to define
the defenses to that claim, including the defense of immunity, unless, of course, the state
rule is in conflict with federal law"); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 279 &
n.74 (3d Cir. 1980) (since the first amendment does not mandate a cause of action for
defamation, a state may limit such a cause of action-by a state "shield" law-to "promote
other social purposes"); Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687, 690 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (state
can broaden the definition of "public figure" beyond first amendment "constitutional minima") (dicta); Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 188-89, 445 A.2d 376, 384-85
(shield law upheld-rejected contention plaintiff had a state constitutional entitlement to
bring a libel action), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982). And see the minority view prohibiting all punitive damages in libel cases as a matter of state law: Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 860, 330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (1975); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or.
99, 118-19, 593 P.2d 777, 789 (1979); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 85 Wash. 439,
447, 546 P.2d 81, 86 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 104 Mich. App. 59, 68,
304 N.W.2d 814, 819 (1981). See also Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271, 278-79 (Miss.
1984) (adopting a broader definition of "vortex public figure" as a matter of state law than
would be constitutionally mandated by the first amendment).
445. In Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 441-42 (Tenn. 1978), the court referenced § 19, article I of the state constitution-"That the printing presses shall be free to
every person to examine the proceedings of the Legislature; or of any branch or officer of
government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof"-in support of
its conclusion that the state constitutional counterpart was a "substantially stronger provision," in that it was "clear and certain, leaving nothing to conjecture and requiring no
interpretation, construction or clarification." In light of the latter "any infringement"
upon freedom of expression was "constitutionally suspect" with a threshold presumption of
invalidity. It is clear that, although the court rests its conclusion jointly on commingled
state and federal grounds, it placed heavy reliance on the language of the aforesaid state
constitutional provision.
446. Several cases have relied on such "abuse" provisions in rejecting standards more
exacting than the constitutional minima mandated by Gertz in private versus media defendant cases. See Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.
2d 184, 194-95, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297-98 (1975);
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 886, 895 (Ky. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla.
1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232, 531 P.2d 76, 83 (1975). But see
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671,
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federal constitutional barrier to adoption of a mere "governmental affiliation" test (government employment plus a "newsworthiness"-"public interest" addendum), or the development on a selective basis of additional "per se" or "bright line" categories
(e.g., all police officers, whatever their level in the law enforcement hierarchy) 44 7 -as a matter of state law.448 As one court vividly
stated in another context, state courts are not required to "ride
with the Federales" 44 9 when providing more expansive protection
to constitutional liberties than required by the federal constitution. However, it is incumbent upon the state courts (or federal
courts anticipating and applying state law in diversity cases) to elucidate clearly and unambiguously the basis or bases for their decisions in light of the Supreme Court's recent indication that "public official" does not connote "public employee" under the first
amendment. 8 0
678 & n.4, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 & n.4 (1974) (state constitution contained an "abuse"
provision, but the court did not discuss it), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Maressa v.
NewJersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 192, 445 A.2d 376, 384-85 (1982) (shield law case-no

constitutional right to bring a libel action accorded by "abuse" provision), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 907 (1982); Diversified Management v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1109 n.2,
1110 (Colo. 1983) ("abuse" provision not a factor in the court's granting of greater than
minimum protection to defendants).
447. See supra note 425.
448. Although the Supreme Court rejected use of state legal definitions in defining
"public official" under the first amendment, see supra note 49, there is no federal constitutional bar to the state using such standards as a matter of state law to give protection
exceeding first amendment requirements. Compare the minority decisions according
greater protection to plaintiffs in the private versus media context than the Gertz-mandated
minimum of negligence: Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98, 538 P.2d
450, 457-58, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), superseded by Diversified Management v.
Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1109-10 (Colo. 1982) (adopting subjective "actual malice" criterion in place of objective concept); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 679, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (Rosenbloom adopted); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,
Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (gross negligence standard applied to matters of public interest); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82
Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693, 698 (1978) (Rosenbloom adopted); Gaynes v. Allen, 128
Mich. App. 42, 47, 339 N.W.2d 678, 680-81 (1983) (reaffirming Peisner).
449. Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d
877, 879 n.3 (Ky. 1979) (Kentucky constitutional religious freedom provision held to be
more restrictive of state regulation of private schools than its federal counterpart), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
450. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8-(1979). Otherwise, the Supreme
Court may grant review. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983), where the
Court indicated that it would not review state court decisions indicating "clearly and expressly" alternative "bona fide separate, adequate, and independent" state and federal
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B. Application of a Revivified Rosenblatt
Application of the above conceptual framework for revitalization
of Rosenblatt to three common categories of defamation plaintiffs-educators, attorneys, and law enforcement personnel-will
aptly illustrate how "public official" status determinations should
be handled. Although the early decisions involving the first group,
educators, mirrored the mechanistic application of the "public official" appellation of the case law majority view," 1 more recent
decisional law has trenchantly criticized this perspective and some
decisions have declined to impose on the garden variety teacher
or university faculty member 45 2 the almost insuperable obstacles
to effective relief posed by New York Times. In the words of one
decision, the level of "governance or control" which a classroom
educator has over "the conduct of government is at most remote
and philosophical" and cannot be justified by any contention of
the assumption of risk of "nonmalicious defamation.

'4 53

Any

grounds, but would review such decisions where the "adequacy and independence" of the
state ground is "not clear from the face of the opinion." In such cases where federal and
state grounds were commingled ambiguously, it would "accept as the most reasonable explanation" that the state court felt compelled to so hold by the federal precedents. Where,
however, the state court used federal decisions only as precedential authority of equal calibre to other states' opinions for "purpose of guidance," the state should make such "clear"
by a "plain statement" in its decision in the interest of "both justice and judicial administration." Id.
451. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 643-47. The leading decision for the view that all
teachers are public officials is Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill.
App. 3d 889, 892-93, 321
N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974). This decision is of dubious value as a precedent regarding garden
variety teachers for a number of reasons in addition to its basic "governmental affiliation"
substratum. First, the plaintiffs therein were suing on behalf of the teachers' federation, a
factor which may have influenced the court's decision. Note that there has been significant
case law finding unions or organizations of low echelon governmental employees to be public persons. See infra note 498. Second, the court commingled the "public official" standard
with "public interest" analysis, suggesting that it was influenced, in part, by post-Gertz viability of Rosenbloom-the teachers and coaches were "'public officials' or 'public figures,'
or involved in matters of general interest .. " Third, the Basarich case may not represent
controlling law in Illinois. See McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 Il.App. 3d 421, 423-24, 425
N.E.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1981) (rejected treatment of a teacher-principal as a "public official"); Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 276 & n.1,
334 N.E.2d 442, 447 & n.1 (1975) (former junior college professors were not "by that very
fact public officials" but were public figures regarding their active involvement in the textbook controversy on campus).
452. See supra notes 327 & 329 and accompanying text.
453. Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 1108, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136, hearing denied (1979).
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other result would present "a real and intolerable danger ' 4

54

to

that intellectual creativity which is a precondition to true teaching
effectiveness. However, non-elected educators with substantial,
policy-making positions in the educational hierachy-a state university president, 4 55 dean of a state college,4 56 or superintendent
of a junior college district,457 or a county or city school system 4 5 8 -can be justifiably treated as "public officials" under either

Rosenblatt test, as such educators easily fit within the raison d'etre
of New York Times: the "freedom of the governed to question the
governor, of those who are influenced by the operation of government to criticize those who control the conduct of government.

' 459

Elementary or high school principals would be included here as a
generality within the non-"public official" grouping. However, the
defendant may, in an unusual case, be able to develop a documented case for treatment of such an educator as a "public official" through the fact-intensive assessment of functions and responsibilities suggested above. 60
A parallel analysis applies to the different varieties of government attorneys. Clearly, federal or state legal counsel with substantial control over important aspects of the judicial system and
significant decision-making or policy-making input into the opera454. Id.
455. See supra note 239.
456. See supra note 275. In Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C.
App. 200, 204, 304 S.E.2d 593, 596-97 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 310 N.C. 312, 312
S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984), the lower court treated plaintiff therein, an
associate dean of the college of arts and sciences of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, as a "public figure" for "purposes of this appellate review," and opined that
he appeared to come under either of the types of "public figure" described in Gertz. On
appeal, the state supreme court reversed on other (common law) grounds, noting that it
need not resolve the first amendment issues therein. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 315 n.1, 312
S.E.2d at 408 n.1. See also Byers v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp., 161 Ga. App. 717,
721, 288 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (1982), where the court declined to resolve the issue of
whether the dean of Savannah State College was a public official and held him to be a
"limited purpose" public figure.
457. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 275.
459. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (1979) (emphasis
original).
460. See supra notes 303-04 & 327-28. See also McCutcheon, 99 Ill.
App. 3d at 424, 425
N.E.2d at 1133, where the court concluded that the connection that a public school
teacher or principal has with "the conduct of government is far too remote . . . to justify
exposing these individuals to a qualifiedly privileged assault . . . upon reputation."
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tion thereof-the U.S. Attorney General, a U.S. attorney,"" a
county or city chief prosecutor, 62 chief counsel for a congressional committee, 63 or an appointed federal special prosecutor-are fairly deemed "public officials." At the other extreme,
the functions of an assistant public defender or an appointed defense counsel paid with government funds are "akin to that of private counsel" with a "principal responsibility

. . .

to serve the un-

divided interest of his client '" 4 " and are thus indistinguishable
from the attorney Gertz, a private citizen.465 In the gray area between these two extremes are the myriad part-time and full-time
attorneys employed by government at the local level. A good example of well-reasoned jurisprudence in this gray area is a recent
federal decision in which the court indicated "serious doubts"
whether the "public official" status, with its resultant loss of an
effective remedy for defamation, was necessitated by first amendment considerations 46" with regard to part-time or full-time town
461. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
462. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). Although the county attorney in Henry
v. Collins was elected, such elected status was not mentioned in the Court's opinion. See
supra note 46. The parish (county) district attorneys in the Court's two 1964 criminal defamation cases-the criminal defamation defendant in Garrison and the criminal defamation
victim in Moity-were implicitly treated as "public officials" by the Court. See supra notes
38 & 44 and accompanying text. In neither case does the Court (or the state supreme court
in its opinion) disclose the district attorney's status as appointed or elected, although it
appears from the state supreme court's opinion that they were elected officials. See State v.
Garrison, 244 La. 787, 868-69, 154 So. 2d 400, 429 (1963) (statement in defendant's
brief). In any event, it does not appear to have been a factor deemed relevant by the Court
to resolution of the first amendment issues in the cases.
463. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. See also Cohn v. National Broadcasting Co., 67 A.D.2d 140, 145, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1979) (chief counsel and chief consultant to McCarthy committee were "clearly" public figures), ajf'd, 50 N.Y.2d 885, 408
N.E.2d 672, 430 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980).
464. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 200-01 & n.17, 204-05 (1979) (an appointed
attorney in federal criminal trial held to have no immunity, as a matter of federal law, in a
state malpractice action by his former client).
465. See supra notes 145, 324 & 325 and accompanying text. Such attorneys do not
"exercise any sovereign power, an essential element of public office." Steere v. Cupp, 226
Kan. 566, 572, 602 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1979).
466. Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 273 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 2463 (1983). See also L. ELDREDGE, supra notes 24, 251, 411. The Bufalino court
cited approvingly Eldredge's plea concerning private status for elected or appointed city
and town board members and queried rhetorically whether "the public interest in the qualifications of a part-time, appointed town counsel [is] really so great that the counselor must
suffer defamation with little prospect of redress?" Bufalino, 692 F.2d at 273 n.5.
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or village attorneys.46 7 The defendant may, however, be able to
demonstrate that the particular functions and responsiblities of
such an attorney qualify him as a "public official" through a factintensive delineation of his authority in accordance with the analysis proferred above.
The last category, law enforcement personnel, presents the
most significant difficulties in applying the revitalized Rosenblatt
criteria. Doubtlessly, police officials at the upper levels with important supervisory and policy-making positions-the director of
the F.B.I., 468 the chief of police of a large or even a small city, 469

and other comparably ranked law enforcement professionals 4 70 -present no obstacle to application of the "public official"
designation. However, the prolific and ever-burgeoning case law
generally draws no distinction between the latter upper echelon
police officials and the street level beat policeman, highway patrolman, or undercover agent.47 ' As one court cryptically stated: "A

deputy sheriff, a deputy marshall, a police officer, from the lowest
to the highest rank in municipalities, are public officials." 472 The
discussion in the decisional law regarding application of the Rosenblatt criteria has generally been quite superficial and few decisions
have even mentioned the discussion in that decision rejecting application of "public official" status to Rosenblatt's "footnote thirteen" "night watchman," a close relative of these lowest echelon
police officers. The courts have generally followed the rationale of
the47 leading
case of Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing
3
Co.

and have considered some of the following factors in ac-

467. 692 F.2d at 273 n.5.
468. See In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964) (discussed supra note 270).
469. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
470. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. This non-differentiation view has
been adopted in W. PRossER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 806 (5th ed. 1984).
472. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Co., 91 N.M. 250, 253, 572 P.2d 1258,
1261 (Ct. App. 1977), writ denied (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). See also Gray v.
Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Street level policemen, as well as high ranking officers, qualify as public officials" under Rosenblatt); Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 762
(Me. 1981) ("[E]very court that has faced the issue has decided that an officer of law enforcement, from the ordinary patrolman to Chief of Police is a 'public official'.").
473. The court of appeals held that a patrolman, "the lowest in rank of police officials," could not be considered a "public official" under the Rosenblatt "substantial responsibility" test. Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Co., 82 111. App. 2d 76, 81,
227 N.E.2d 164, 168 (1967). The Illinois Supreme Court appears to have accepted the
conclusion that said test was not met in the case of a patrolman, who would have "slight
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cording "public official" status to the garden variety law enforcement officer: the general public interest in information regarding
abuse of a police officer's authority;47 4 the potential power exercised by the police over the daily lives of the citizenry; 46 the great
potential for societal harm from abuse of a police officer's author47 1
ity;

the "peculiarly 'governmental' " or essential nature of po-

lice functions in a democratic form of government; 4 " the assumed
risk of criticism as a quid pro quo of the "honor and respect" they
voice in setting departmental policy," and appears to have relied solely on the "independent interest" test:
[H]is duties are peculiarly "governmental" in character and highly charged with
the public interest. It is indisputable that law enforcement is a primary function
of local government and that the public has a far greater interest in the qualifications and conduct of law enforcement officers, even at, and perhaps especially at, an
"on the street" level than in the qualifications and conduct of other comparably lowrankinggovernment employees performing more proprietaryfunctions. The abuse of a
patrolman's office can have great potentiality for social harm; hence, public discussion and public criticism directed towards the performance of that office
cannot constitutionally be inhibited by threat of prosecution under State libel
laws.
Coursey, 40 I1. 2d at 265, 239 N.E.2d at 841 (emphases added). An analysis of the precedents cited therein discloses that the Illinois Supreme Court appears to have given some
weight to the Supreme Court's acceptance of the state courts' conclusion in the St. Amant
case, see supra text accompanying notes 87-89, that the deputy sheriff was a public official,
and failed to note that, of the remaining "variety" of "law enforcement" cases cited in its
opinion, all involved officers who might justifiably be deemed to have substantial policymaking and supervisory functions within the police hierarchy: Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S.
356 (1965) (chief of police), see supra text accompanying notes 45-46; Pape v. Time, Inc.,
354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965) (the deputy chief of detectives of Chicago), see supra notes 98
& 270; and Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 216, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313-14 (Sup. Ct.
1965) (involved police lieutenant-plaintiff whose responsibilities were not discussed), af'd,
29 A.D.2d 935, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1968).
474. Gray, 656 F.2d at 591 ("The strong public interest in ensuring open discussion
and criticism of his qualifications and job performance warrant the conclusion that he is a
public official."); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987, 990 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (the public
has "a significant interest in having access to information that concerns the abuse of power
by its police officers, the very individuals expected to protect each individual from the
abuses of others").
475. Roberts, 525 F. Supp. at 991; Gray, 656 F.2d at 591 (police officer "possesses both
the authority and the ability to exercise force"); Roche, 433 A.2d at 762 (police detective is
"in fact, and also is generally known to be, vested with substantial responsibility for the
safety and welfare of the citizenry in areas impinging most directly and intimately on daily
living: the home, the place of work and of recreation, the sidewalks and the streets").
476. Gray, 656 F.2d at 591 ("Misuse of his authority can result in significant deprivation of constitutional rights and personal freedoms, not to mention bodily injury and financial loss."); Dellinger v. Belk, 34 N.C. App. 488, 489, 238 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1977) ("great
potential for harm"), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 182, 241 S.E.2d 517 (1978).
477. Coursey, 40 Ill.
2d at 265, 239 N.E.2d at 841.
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are entitled to; 7 8 their high public visibility; 7 9 the accoutrements
of office-a firearm and a badge;' the requirement of an oath of
48 2
office;' derivative authority through their ranking superior;
the greater interest in police officers than "other comparably lowranking" employees functioning in "more proprietary" capacities; 48 3 the necessity of public criticism and the inhibiting effect
thereon of potential libel actions; 4 4 and the uniformity of the decisional law. 85
Having carefully perused the plethora of decisions involving
law enforcement personnel, it appears that there are a number of
serious difficulties with the almost universal posture of the case
law extending "public official" status to all law enforcement officers, regardless of their position and functions within the police

hierarchical regime. Numerous decisions have been substantially
influenced by the false impression that St. Amant v. Thompson was a
clear holding by the Court that a deputy sheriff was a "public official."' 8 6 Others have failed to discern the quantum difference in
functions, authority, and responsibilities between the chief of police in Henry v. Collins487 and the deputy chief of detectives in
Time, Inc. v. Pape8 8 and the lowly police officer at the bottom of
478. Russell v. Smith, 434 So. 2d 342, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), affid, 456 So. 2d
462 (1984), cert. denied, 11 MEDIA L. REP (BNA) No. 14 (1985).
479. Dellinger, 34 N.C. App. at 489, 238 S.E.2d at 789; Gray, 656 F.2d at 591.
480. Roche, 433 A.2d at 762, 763 n.4.
481. Ammerman, 91 N.M. at 256, 572 P.2d at 1260.
482. Thompson v. St. Amant, 250 La. 405, 422, 196 So. 2d 255, 261 (1967) (concluding that that the deputy's acts were the acts of the sheriff); Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C. App.
209, 215, 210 S.E.2d 446, 449, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 793 (1975).
483. Coursey, 40 Ill. 2d at 265, 239 N.E.2d at 841.
484. Gray, 656 F.2d at 591 ("strong public interest in ensuring open discussion and
criticism of his qualifications and job performance"); Coursey, 40 II. 2d at 265, 239 N.E.2d
at 841 ("public discussion and public criticism directed towards the performance of that
office cannot constitutionally be inhibited by threat of prosecution under state libel laws").
485. Gray, 656 F.2d at 591; Roche, 433 A.2d at 762; Cline, 24 N.C. App. at 213, 210
S.E.2d at 448; Starr v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 201 S.E.2d 911, 913 (W. Va. 1974)
(court felt "impelled" to hold police sergeant a "public official" by Supreme Court decisions and decisions of "numerous courts throughout the land"); Reed v. Northwestern
Publishing Co., I1 MEDIA L. RaP. (BNA) 1382, 1384-85 (Ct. App. Iii. 1985) (court followed
Coursey though noting that the Supreme Court had never decided a case of a police officer
of "relatively low rank").
486. See, e.g., Colombo v. Times-Argus Ass'n, 135 Vt. 454, 456, 380 A.2d 80, 83
(1977); Gray, 656 F.2d at 591; Starr, 201 S.E.2d at 913.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. See also Colombo, 135 Vt. at 456, 380
A.2d at 83.
488. Gray, 656 F.2d at 591; Starr, 201 S.E.2d at 913.
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the "totem pole"4' 9 of the police infrastructure. Most suprisingly
of all, the cases have rarely endeavored to confront and distinguish the "night watchman" discussion of Rosenblatt. Can the latter federal security officer be distinguised in any principled fashion from the beat policeman, the undercover agent, the radio
dispatcher, the part-time deputy, the uniformed taxicab inspector,
or the officer in the communications department (or their counterparts in the military)?490 It is extremely doubtful that such police officers come within the "motivating force" of Rosenblatt, i.e.,
"a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of [public] issues.' 491 Recent decisional law reflects a reawakening of interest in this issue492 and suggests that the mass of case law to the contrary will
not preclude courts from adopting the instinctive fairness of the
Kentucky decision the year after New York Times, in which the
court refused to apply the "public official" status to a garden variety policeman on the ground that the latter decision did not justify an "open season" on anyone who "happens to be a public
servant."' 93
CONCLUSION

This Article has demonstrated that the Supreme Court's limited
decisional law in the realm of "public officialdom" does not justify
the overly expansive definition of that status appended by oftentimes non-discriminating courts, which have accorded only superficial treatment to the Rosenblatt criteria-standards never intended to encompass all public employees or servants. With Gertz's
repudiation of the "public interest" sojourn of the plurality in Ro489. McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 283, 270 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1980). Some decisions have tacitly admitted that the "substantial responsibility" standard of Rosenblatt does
not apply to low-ranking police officers, and only the "independent interest" test applies.
See, e.g., Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 240 n.5, 445 N.Y.S.2d 786,
795 n.5 (1981). See supra note 473. But cf Gray, 656 F.2d at 591, holding that both tests
were met in the case of a police detective.
490. See supra note 287.
491. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
492. See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text, and Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md.
302, 312, 413 A.2d 170, 180 (1980) (court left "open" the issue of whether a policeman
"at the very bottom level" is a "public official"); DiLeo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318, 322-23
(Colo. 1980) ("unnecessary" to decide "public official" issue-discharged policeman held
to be a "limited purpose" public figure).
493. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ky. 1965).
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senbloom, the Court has clearly retrenched to the milieu prior to
Rosenbloom, where only those "matters bearing broadly on issues
of responsible government"4 94 are subject to the New York Times
standard and only when the individuals involved therein are "public figures" or bona fide "public officials"-the latter category including only those "responsible for government operations" and
"ina position significantly to influence the resolution of [public]
issues.

' 49 5

Consequently, a dispassionate reading of the Rosenblatt

decision (with its unequivocal rejection of the anyone-on-the-public-payroll definition of "public official") and thoughtful application of its two-part alternative test for "public official," infused
with the Gertz substratal "assumption of risk" "compelling normative consideration"496 for "public" statuses, is mandatory for
judges and attorneys attempting to fathom the parameters of New
York Times in the post-Gertz era. This is the lesson of "footnote
eight" 497 of Hutchinson. Enlightened application of these reinvigorated Rosenblatt criteria will eventually result in a resounding repudiation of the bare "governmental affiliation" approach (and
the "domino effect" this mechanistic test has had on the decisional law) and will eliminate the debilitation of the quasi-constitutional interest in reputational redress in cases of many deserving
public employee-plaintiffs-heretofore
left remediless, as "but
498
gilded loam or painted clay.
494. This proposition was rejected in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 42 (1971), but has effectively been reaffirmed by Gertz and its progeny. See Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973-74 (Utah 1981) ("[I]nformation concerning public officials and public figures is more likely to be relevant in the decisionmaking process of self-government .
495. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
496. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. Note that the Supreme Court has recently added a novel
rationale to its repertoire of arguments supporting state defamation law: "False statements
of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New
Hampshire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens."
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1474 (1984) (dicta).
497. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979).
498. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD III, Act I, scene 1, line 179.
Under the framework proposed above such mere governmental affiliates who are not
"public officials" will be subject to New York Times only if state law so requires or if the
plaintiff constitutes a "public figure." A number of cases have focused on the latter status
and found low-ranking government employees to be "limited purpose" public figures. See
Anderson v. Low Rent Hous. Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa) (secretary), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1086 (1981); Oaks v. City of Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1046-47 (S.D.
Ala. 1981) (former librarian); Romero v. Abbeville Broadcasting Service, Inc., 420 So. 2d
1247, 1249 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (deputy sheriff-jailer); DiLeo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318,
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322 (Colo. 1980) (discharged policeman); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403,
405 (Tex. 1969) (university professor); Johnson v. Board of Junior College District No.
508, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 276, 334 N.E.2d 442, 447 (1975) (junior college teachers). And
see the cases involving unions and organizations of such low-ranking governmental servants. Guam Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir. 1974)
(teachers' union and seven of its officers "in agreement" they are 'public officials'. . .or at
least 'public figures' "), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Central Broadcasting Co., 396 N.E.2d 996, 1002 n.12 (Mass. 1979) (national labor
union with a local in the city was a public figure of "limited range" if not an "all purpose"
public figure), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); City Firefighters Union, Local 28 v. Derci,
104 Misc. 2d 498, 504, 428 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775-76 (Sup. Ct, 1976) (firemen's and patrolmen's unions and officers held to be public figures); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76
Wash. 2d 707, 716, 459 P.2d 8, 14 (1969) (elected executive committee members (firemen
and policemen) of public safety council held to be public figures), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970).

